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THE
UNITY OF THE EPISCOPATE
CONSIDERED,

IN REPLY TO THE WORK

OF

THE REV. T. W. ALLIES, M.A

ENTITLED,

'The Church of England

CLEARED FROM

THE CHARGE OF SCHISM,

UPON TESTIMONIES AND COUNCILS OF FATHERS OF THE
FIRST SIX CENTURIES.'

BY

EDWARD HEALY THOMPSON, M.A.,

"Episcopatus unus est cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur."
ST. CYPRIAN.

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TO

THE RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN CHRIST,

WILLIAM BERNARD, D.D., O.S.B..

BISHOP OF HETALONA,

AND

VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ENGLAND,

THESE PAGES

ARE MOST HUMBLY INSCRIBED,

WITH FEELINGS OF THE DEEPEST RESPECT FOR HIS

OFFICE AND PERSON,

BY

HIS FAITHFUL SON AND SERVANT,

THE AUTHOR.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following pages have no pretension to be considered as a review of Mr. Allies' book, nor as an explanation in detail of those historical and other difficulties which are connected in his mind with the doctrine of the Papal Supremacy. Such objections have been answered again and again, as must be known to all who are acquainted with any Catholic treatise of dogmatic theology, or even with the controversial literature of the day. All that is here attempted is simply to state a *principle*, an application of which to the testimonies which Mr. A. has adduced will show the depth and consistency of the Catholic doctrine, and the weakness and insufficiency of those theories which are supposed to justify the position of the Eastern and Anglican churches.

The principle itself lies deeply at the root of one of the articles of the faith, though in its furthest developments it has not been formally comprehended within the terms of the Creed. The first chapter of what follows is intended to exhibit it in its primary form; the second to trace it to its ulterior conclusions; the third to apply it to the solution of difficulties.

Of Fathers and Councils the writer possesses only that general and indefinite kind of knowledge, which any one obtains whose reading is principally of a

theological nature; to more than this he does not pretend. It is not, therefore, deep research, or extensive acquaintance with patristic authorities, which has furnished him with an answer to Mr. A.'s argument, but the possession of an *idea* which so perfectly harmonizes with the language of the Fathers, and so completely coincides with the facts, to which Mr. A. has appealed, that the result of the perusal of his work has been only a deeper apprehension of the divine rights and powers of the Papal See. Great has been his astonishment that one who is so fair in his statements, and so candid in his admissions, and who has brought together so large an amount of evidence to the antiquity and legitimacy of the Papal claims, should acquiesce in conclusions, not only so far short of the truth, but so plainly opposed to his premises, and so inconsistent one with another. This he could not but attribute to the fact that Mr. A. appears never to have thoroughly grasped the idea, which served in his own mind as a key to the whole class of facts and authorities on which the Anglican argument is based. This idea, therefore, he wishes, if possible, to communicate to others; not as if he were suggesting anything new or original, but as merely imparting something which he had found of use to himself, and which he had learnt from the teaching of his holy Mother the Church, to whose bosom he has been lately so mercifully restored.

There are few who have time to *study the Fathers*, but all have time to *think*; and all are bound to *hold a right faith*. It must surely be possible to arrive at the truth without such long and laborious

study as few are even able to undertake, and which those who are will turn to no good account, unless they apply a right principle to the knowledge which they have acquired. Such a principle it is in the power of any one to apply in proportion to his knowledge; and although the acquisition of fresh facts may afford him a fresh opportunity of testing his principle, and obtaining a further confirmation of its truth, yet it is as capable of legitimate application to a small circle of knowledge as it is to a wider, and is as trust-worthy in the one case as in the other. If this were not so, a moral certainty in religious matters, where every one is responsible for his belief, could never be obtained. The most extensive knowledge might be still indefinitely extended. No one can believe himself acquainted with the whole cycle of facts that bear upon a case; after all, he can but apply his principles to a limited number. His nature of proof, therefore, differs not in kind from that which a person of ordinary knowledge may obtain. Each has the measure of proof which alone he can have; and for the use of which he will have to answer. They who believe that years should be spent in the study of the Fathers, and Ecclesiastical History, to decide the question between the Catholic Church and the separated Anglican Communion, might, if such were the case, allege with far greater reasonableness, that the question was one on which a decision was impossible. If responsibility exist not at every stage of knowledge, independent of its actual amount, it is difficult to see at what point moral responsibility

can be conceived to begin, nor how it can be said to exist at any.

That some at least may be led fairly to test their present belief, and the sense in which they understand that article of their Creed “one Catholic and Apostolic Church,” by the simple principle which is here laid down, is the writer’s earnest hope. If they could be induced to cast aside a profitless controversy about detached historical facts, and particular words and phrases in the writings of the Fathers, and coming out from the mazes in which prejudice has involved them, would take their stand as on some high eminence, and survey the subject as a whole; if they would but look at it in the light of that plain practical sense which God has bestowed upon every ordinary mind, great is his confidence that conviction would force itself upon many who now acquiesce in a system which satisfies neither their reason, nor their religious affections; and that they would perceive that the Catholic Church, from the perfect consistency of all its doctrines and principles, possesses such a claim upon their faith and submission, as is different in kind from that which is possessed by any other communion in the world;—and, so, by God’s mercy, be led to acknowledge it to be that One only Church to which obedience is due.

BATH,

Feast of the Presentation of the B. V. Mary, 1846.

THE
UNITY OF THE EPISCOPATE
CONSIDERED.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the advertisement to his book Mr. Allies says, that “ what an opponent has to establish in order to justify the Roman Church, and to prove that the English and the Eastern are in schism, is that Roman doctrine, as stated by Bellarmine, which is really the key-stone of the whole system,” that “ bishops succeed not properly to the apostles,” “ for they have no part of the true apostolic ministry,” but that “ all ordinary jurisdiction of bishops descends immediately from the Pope,” and that “ the Pope has full and entire that power which Christ left on the earth for the good of the Church.” “ Let this,” he says, “ be proved on the testimony of the first six centuries, and

if it be true, nothing can be more easy than to prove it, as the contradictory of it is attempted to be proved in the following pages, and all controversy is at an end.”

Upon this I observe, in the first place, that to prove the English Church to be in schism—I say nothing at present of the Eastern, nor of the assumption which is made in identifying the two cases—it is not necessary to establish Bellarmine’s doctrine, of the truth of which Mr. A. demands to be furnished with proof, as though the charge could not be sustained upon any ground short of it. Catholic divines, who dissented from Bellarmine’s proposition, were as strong in their condemnation of the Anglican Church as were any of their opponents ; and that upon a view of the unity and the constitution of the Church, which all were agreed in regarding as fundamental.

Neither, therefore, on the other hand, is it necessary to establish the doctrine in question in order to justify the Roman Church, seeing it has never been formally ruled and adopted by her. Whatever may be the prevailing theological opinion of divines of the present day, it is not reckoned among the articles of the Catholic faith. Indeed, in the sense in which he seems to understand it, Mr. A. would

have difficulty in showing that it has ever been held in the Church even as a matter of speculative opinion. Certainly, so far from being, as he imagines, a term of communion, to which every one must give their assent before they can be admitted into the Church, it is not required that it should be considered so much as probably deducible from any other Catholic doctrine. Any justification, therefore, of the Anglican Church which is based upon the assumption that an acknowledgment of the Pope's universal jurisdiction (even as rightly understood) is a necessary condition of communion with Rome, is simply insufficient and irrelevant. Whatever strong conviction Mr. A. may entertain as to what is the predominant feeling and opinion in the Roman Church, he certainly has no right to represent the act of separation on the part of the Anglican Church, and what he considers to be its present provisional state, as a protest against a doctrine or claim which the Roman Church has never positively asserted, and upon which she has allowed freedom of discussion.

However, there are subjects on which the mind of the Church, though not formally expressed, is morally evident, so that she

might be legitimately considered as holding a particular doctrine, though she did not impose it. The mind of the Church has its tendencies and indeterminate expressions, as well as its more formal and definite acts. It is ever developing, and cannot return into itself, and ignore its own knowledge and the experience of centuries. We cannot go back two hundred years, to the days of Bellarmine and Bossuet. The church which claims authority, and is the object of faith, is the church of the present ; nor are her children to be deprived of the accumulated wisdom of ages, merely because it is not formally ascertained and registered. Accordingly, in addition to the truths which she presents to the many as necessary to be believed, she provides a further and a deeper knowledge to all those who are capable of receiving it, and sets before them a variety of subjects upon which she leaves them at liberty to speculate, obliging them only not to deny anything which intrenches on the essentials of the faith. She allows them to agitate a question to and fro in their thoughts, and discuss it in all its bearings, reserving to herself the right of making any fresh declaration, should the occasion seem to require it. It is thus, indeed, that when she gives utterance to a

sentence, she speaks, not as if up to the time of the decision it was a doubtful matter, upon which she then for the first time deliberated and pronounced, but as expressing her authoritative judgment on a doctrine which she had ever implicitly held, and for the clear enunciation of which the minds of her children had long been prepared. Hence, previously to any explicit announcement, it becomes evident what the Church's decision will be in any particular case.

So may it be, therefore, in respect to the doctrine in question. And, for my part, I readily avow that the view which Bellarmine propounded, is that which appears to me to be involved in the primary idea of the Episcopate which the Church has always maintained ; and I fully admit and adopt it in the terms in which it is stated by Mr. A. It may be regarded by some as an extreme conclusion ; but I am thoroughly persuaded that men's hearts in these days are not gained by half statements, nor their convictions secured by withholding the full consequences which appear to be logically deducible from any ruled doctrine of the Church.

This remark applies especially to such branches of Catholic doctrine as naturally

address themselves to the reasoning faculty—in contradistinction to such as can only be practically realized—and can, therefore, be more readily appreciated by those who are without. Not that it is the province of reasoning to do more than remove obstacles out of the way ; faith alone can embrace the truth. Still reasoning has its legitimate sphere, and its appropriate work ; and more particularly is it necessary to bring forward the subjects of theology in their fulness and depth at a time when men are more than ever disposed to sift and analyze everything, and to be dissatisfied with whatever cannot be shown to rest upon a sound philosophical basis. There are many who are uneasy and discontented with the shallow anomalies and contradictions of Protestantism, and who feel it to be a system in which the intellect has no scope nor exercise, who might be won back to the ancient faith, were they not prepossessed with a notion that the tenets of the Catholic religion are unreasonable and incapable of logical defence. It is a mistake to hope to disarm the prejudices of such persons by the mere constant assertion that consequences which to their minds appear plainly deducible from certain Catholic doctrines, not being imposed, need not therefore

be justified ; what is necessary is to show them their depth, harmonious connection, and inward completeness. This perfect consistency and completeness will do far more to satisfy their minds, than the extreme nature of the conclusions to which they are carried to startle and deter them. That a theory is capable of being traced to the extremest consequences without losing its consistency, is itself one of the best criteria of its truth. Besides, to those who may be suspicious of the tendencies and results of a doctrine, nothing can be more convincing than to have it plainly demonstrated that even in its extremest conclusions, as all along in the process of continuous deduction, it never so much as verges upon the error with which they confound it, but keeps itself manifestly and distinctly separate throughout.

If, then, it can be shown that even the highest ultramontane doctrine on the subject of the Papal Supremacy, does not involve the consequences which Mr. A. supposes, but that he has misapprehended the conclusions from misconceiving the primary idea from which they are deduced ; enough, I hope, will have been proved to demonstrate not only that his notions are mistaken, but that his apprehensions are unfounded.

Waiving, then, altogether the objection which may be taken *in limine* to Mr. A.'s challenge, and without availing myself of the defence which might legitimately be made, that the Roman Church does not require as a term of communion subscription to the doctrine contained in the words of Bellarmine, I am content to accept it as that which seems to me to be implicitly held by the Church, though I deny his right to speak of it as a doctrine which is actually imposed by her, or as anything else than a very general theological opinion.

With regard to the terms of the challenge, I would observe that there is a sense in which it is fair and just, and deserves to be met ; but there is another in which it is not fair, and on which it would be wrong to allow the question to rest for a moment. In the first place, it is fair that whoever undertakes to justify the Roman Church should establish the Catholicity of any doctrine upon which she grounds her claims. But it would not, of course, be fair to expect that he should prove the Catholicity of any distorted or exaggerated semblance of that doctrine, which may be taken as its formal statement, or which is the conclusion deduced from it, by those who are opposed to her. It

is the doctrine itself which must be taken, and not the supposed consequences which are forcibly attributed to it by an adversary. In the second place, it is fair that testimony should be required in proof of any doctrine in all that is *essential* to it in *all* ages of the church, and that it should be shown not to be directly contradicted, i. e., not met by any counter-statement utterly irreconcilable with it, in *any* age. On the other hand, it would not be fair to expect to have it exhibited in the same precise, dogmatic form during a space of time arbitrarily chosen by an opponent. Formal dogmatic statements are, as is well known, elicited by formal heretical statements; they closely attend upon each other. It would be unfair, therefore, to require from those centuries which Mr. A. expressly characterizes as the times of the "*undivided Church*"—times when East and West were united in communion with each other, and with a common centre and head—precise and formal statements respecting the unity and proper government of the Church, such as were the necessary result of the determined denial of the very doctrines and powers in question. So far from admitting that nothing could be more easy than to prove a doctrine under such con-

ditions, I contend that nothing could be more unreasonable than to require a proof of such a nature. With such a concession, the unscrupulous assailer of Catholic truth would indeed fight at an immense advantage. Mr. A. is far too acute and well-informed a theologian to be ignorant of the principle for which I contend, and far too honest and ingenuous to seek to deprive an adversary of its due and lawful use ; nay, rather I am convinced that he is one whose candour and real love for known truth would lead to accept such amount of moral evidence as even religious truths can only have externally—such amount of evidence, in fact, as makes individuals responsible for their acceptance or rejection, because such as men act upon in all other matters ; and which nothing, therefore, but enmity to the truth itself can hinder them from being satisfied with in spiritual concerns. I have said *externally*, for viewed from within, as is the blessed privilege of Catholics, sight indeed seems to supersede the necessity of proof, and the harmonious proportions and solid structure of the city of the living God ask not for line and measure, but the admiring eye and the adoring heart. Oh, could we persuade those who stand without criticising and speculating,

to come where they could see instead of argue, then indeed would they, like Thomas, decline the proof which like him they had ignorantly demanded, and fall down on their knees and worship.

There is a sense, then, in which the proof required by Mr. A., as stated in his own words, would not be such as could, I think, be reasonably asked ; and to decline the challenge in the terms in which it is proposed, would, therefore, be no confession of the weakness of a cause. But though I am not prepared to contend that the doctrine which Mr. A. impugns, of the Pope, as the successor of St. Peter, being the source of jurisdiction, was as explicitly stated by the early fathers and councils as it has been by many divines of later times, yet I do contend that the whole history of the Church, and the testimony of the early fathers and councils bear witness to, and harmonize with, that view of the Episcopate which is maintained by the Roman (or Catholic) Church, and with no other possible theory ; and further, that even those ulterior conclusions which have been very generally drawn in modern times from the view in question, are in no way irreconcilable with the ancient Catholic idea.

The Unity of the Episcopate is that essential and primary truth, on which all right notions on the subject of jurisdiction and catholic communion are based, and from which they are legitimately developed. It has appeared to me that Mr. A. has failed to perceive what the early church really held with respect to the Episcopate, in connection with Catholic unity and the constitution of the Church ; and that he has imperfectly understood those ulterior doctrines on which he so much insists. For my part, I am persuaded that the present authoritative teaching of the Church is in perfect accordance with that of the earliest times ; and all that I believe to be required for a refutation of his argument is not a laborious examination of Fathers and Councils in order to obtain counter evidence ; but a simple comparison of that doctrine which is the received belief among Catholics of the present day with those authorities of the first six centuries to which he himself has appealed. It will thus appear that the idea of the Church and the Episcopate to which they bear witness, or which they incidentally confirm, is not the idea to which Mr. A. has given expression, but that which is embodied in the doctrine and practice of the One Holy Catholic Church,

which, amidst all apparent outward changes, is ever substantially the same.

This is all that I shall attempt to show. I shall scarcely, if at all, travel beyond the contents of Mr. A.'s own book. Tested in the mode which I propose, I believe that it answers itself. At all events, to accumulate a catena of often quoted passages from fathers and councils were superfluous and useless; nor do I think it would ever be the most certain way of arriving at the truth. An ingenious theory, overlooking their general tone and language, deals with them apart, and disposes of them separately; and should any defy this process, and seem to deliver a clear testimony on the opposite side, it is rejected as accidental or anomalous, or it is suggested that it contains the germ of the later supposed corruptions. Any how it has seemed to me that, in the present instance, such a course would be utterly unprofitable and hopeless, while the medium through which the whole subject is viewed tends to distort it, and the very principles assumed are un-catholic and erroneous. My object in the following pages is rather to point out what I believe to be the fundamental error on which Mr. A. has grounded his argument, and to state in con-

trast the true Catholic doctrine. This will be found, I hope, to furnish a key to the plain meaning of the Fathers, and to afford a point of view from which the doctrine they maintain may be regarded in its primary idea, and traced to its more developed forms.

Before, however, I proceed to examine Mr. A.'s position, it is necessary to take a view of the general tenor of his argument.

He undertakes to prove that, though the state of the English Church be, as he believes, merely provisional and temporary, (pp. 15, 198,) yet that her position is tenable upon the principles which directed the undivided Church ; otherwise he allows that she has no claim on the allegiance of her children as a part of the Catholic Church. Yet what is the general object of every page of his book ? Is it to establish the point which he undertakes to prove ? Does he attempt to gather from the concurrent voice of the Fathers, or even from the solitary testimony of any one in particular, that the Church of the first six centuries would have justified such a position as that of the Anglican Church, which three hundred years ago abandoned what was the then received system of doctrine and form of belief, forsook the traditions of centuries, re-

nounced allegiance to an authority, to which, in common with all other acknowledged members or the great Catholic body, it had from time immemorial submitted, and which has remained to the present day separated from the communion of the rest of Christendom, and from that which is allowed to have been regarded from the earliest age as the first and principal see, and to have been possessed of some sort of authority over the whole Church? Does the argument of his book partake of this positive character? No. In his preface he declares, that while the councils and fathers of the first six centuries “unanimously held the Roman primacy and the patriarchal system, of which the Roman Pontiff stood at the head, they as unanimously did not hold, nor even contemplate, that supremacy or monarchy [the acknowledgment of] which alone Rome will now accept as the price of her communion. They not only do not recognize it, but their words and their actions most manifestly contradict it. *This* is, in one word, his justification of his mother from the sin of schism.” And in his general argument he asserts, that whereas the bishop of Rome, “as in a special sense successor of S. Peter, (p. 19,) had a decided pre-eminence over the whole church,

taking precedence of the other two great bishops or patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, without whose presence or ratification even the decrees of a general council were not binding (p. 18); and although that pre-eminence was not a mere primacy of order, but one of positive authority—"a real thing, not a mere title of honour" (p. 120,)—and the extent of that authority not only not defined, but in its nature undefinable (pp. 18, 21, comp. p. 110): yet that the power which has been asserted and exercised by the later Roman Church is not only so excessive in *degree*, but so essentially different in *kind*, as to be subversive of the original constitution of the Christian Church, as based upon the Divine right of the Episcopate. (p. 18, comp. pp. 76, 166.)

This then being the end to which the argument is directed, let it be fairly considered whether it fulfils the object for which the work professes to be undertaken. I do not draw attention to this point for any mere controversial purpose, much less from a spirit of captious criticism; it is necessary to a right understanding of the question, and has an important bearing upon the general issue, that this negative character of the argument should

be intimated in the outset. The substance of the work is from the very first not that which the title-page announces. It is rather an attack upon the Church of Rome, than a defence of the Church of England; and might more properly have been entitled, ‘The Church of Rome convicted of the guilt of Schism,’ than ‘The Church of England cleared from the charge of Schism.’

But why is this so? Simply because it is impossible to justify England without condemning Rome. Schism to be “guarded,” must be “beaten back upon the right owners.”* A church in separation, and accused of schism, can defend itself only by retorting the charge. It is the only available mode of defence. And this it is which forces Mr. A., even against his will, to use the strongest language against Rome. He would fain avoid it, but the necessity of his position allows him no choice; he tries to make amends by generous admissions, by tempering severity with justice. The tone and style in which he writes are not only every way superior to that of ordinary controversialists, but worthy of the admiration of all serious and earnest men. The candour, honesty, and generosity which

* See title of Bramhall’s Fourth Discourse.

he so remarkably displays, must command the respect and sympathy of his readers, especially of those of whom he has spoken with so much equity and kindness, and with so true a perception of the grounds on which they have acted, although he regrets and disapproves their conduct. Nevertheless I must declare my conviction, that in proportion to the spirit of moderation and concession which he shows, in conducting the argument, is the argument itself really feeble and ineffective. He can be moderate only at the expense of consistency. At one time he weakens his cause by his admissions; and at another throws discredit on his admissions by the weight of his accusations. He is always either admitting too much against England, or proving too much against Rome. In short he endeavours to be both an Anglican and a Catholic; and hence his inconsistency. The further removed he is from sectarian views and prejudices, the clearer his discernment of Catholic principles; and the more ingenuous his admissions, the greater and the more evident are the inconsistencies of his statements, and the less defensible his position;—which is simply saying that, as Catholicism and Anglicanism are irreconcilable systems, the more

Catholic-minded an opponent is, the weaker must be his defence of Anglicanism. Mr. A. feels with Rome, but he sides with England. His sympathies and his convictions are at variance. His sense of the weakness, faithlessness, and thorough unsatisfactoriness of his own Church, prompts him to refrain from crimination; he feels he hardly has the right to turn accuser; but his reason tells him that a position like that of the English Church requires strong defences. Strong views are necessary to his position, and strong views involve strong expressions. Nothing but the deep sense which the Reformers had of the corruptions, both doctrinal and practical, of the whole existing Church, to which the strength of their expressions bears witness, *could* justify the religious revolution of the sixteenth century. The "*cause* cannot be different now from what it was at the commencement of the separation. If inherently indefensible then, it is so now." This Mr. A. must, and does feel (p. 173); and notwithstanding, therefore, not only the absence of all harsh language, but the prevalence of the kindest, and at times most respectful, and even affectionate terms—terms which must kindle the warmest sympathies in all Catholic

hearts, (as I know they have in many)—the charge against the Roman Church remains substantially the same. “No one,” he says, (p. 171,) “can now be in the communion of Rome without admitting this very thing which Pope Gregory declares to be *blasphemous* and *anti-Christian*, and derogatory to the honour of every Priest.” Again, (p. 173–4,) “I affirm my conviction, that it is better to endure almost any degree of usurpation, provided only it be not *anti-Christian*, than to make a schism; for the state of schism is a frustration of the purposes of the Lord’s Incarnation..... But the *schism is made*; let those answer for it before Christ’s tribunal who made it.”

He allows that the simple fact of having defined an authority, the extent of which at first had not been defined, nay, of having pushed that authority practically so far as to be a plain and manifest usurpation, would not be sufficient to justify the separation which took place three hundred years ago, nor the present continuance of it on the part of English Churchmen. But he expressly asserts that the position of the Church of England is tenable and just, because the Church in communion with Rome maintains an usurpation which is anti-Christian, and requires subscrip-

tion to a falsehood destructive of certain essential truths, and of the whole constitution of the Church.

And now let us consider upon what ground this assertion rests. Simply, as it appears to me, upon the assumption that such authority as is claimed by the Church of Rome is subversive of the divine rights of the Episcopate. I say the *assumption*, for the charge is throughout rather assumed, and taken for granted; than attempted to be substantiated or proved. Two misconceptions seem to me to pervade the whole work; a misconception of the constitution of the Episcopate itself, and an equal misconception of the consequences involved in the Roman doctrine and claim, as respects the divine authority of bishops. For this reason I am persuaded, that the argument drawn from the first six centuries will be found to be destitute of any real foundation. Its subject-matter is wanting. The writer has simply made an assumption, and proceeded to argue upon it.

His argument in reality stands thus. Antiquity states that the Episcopate in Christ's Church is possessed of certain rights; but the present Roman claims involve a denial of those rights; therefore they are at variance with

antiquity, and essentially false. This is the only form in which the argument is valid or complete, so as to bear out the charges against Rome. But it is plain that it depends entirely upon the soundness of the first two propositions. If the rights of Bishops be not such as Mr. A. supposes, and if the claims of the Church of Rome be not inconsistent with them, the whole argument falls to the ground.

It shall be my object in the following pages, briefly to examine the two positions upon which the writer has grounded his conclusions; and hence to suggest the true solution of the difficulty, as respects the apparent discrepancy between the system of government which prevailed in the earlier centuries, and that which has been established in the Church, according to the present discipline.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY IN THE EPISCOPATE.

I WILL now proceed to consider Mr. A.'s views of the Episcopate, and endeavour to show wherein their fundamental error lies.

At p. 17, quoting Thomassin, he says : “The perfection of the priesthood, or both the episcopal powers, (i. e., the sacerdotal and the pastoral,) He (Christ) gave at once to His apostles, when He sent them as He Himself was sent by the Father.....That same perfection they transmitted to bishops, sending them as they themselves were sent by Christ.” And then he proceeds : “Viewed in itself this power was sovereign and independent in *every individual bishop*, who was the spouse of the Church, the successor of the apostles and of St. Peter, the centre of unity ; able, moreover, to communicate this authority to others, and to become the source of a long line of spiritual descendants.”

This latter sentence may be taken as a formal statement of Mr. A.'s theory. It contains in a few words those false ideas on which the

entire argument is based. In it may be seen the original and fatal flaw of the whole system, as respects the authority of bishops and the source of their jurisdiction.

He declares that, viewed in itself, the power of every individual bishop is sovereign and independent. He declares that every individual bishop is the successor of the apostles ; every individual bishop the successor of St. Peter ; every individual bishop the centre of unity ; “each independent centres of authority.” He declares also that every individual bishop is able to *communicate* the authority he has—“a power unlimited in its nature”—to others, and to become the *source* of a long line of spiritual descendants. ‘These are his doctrinal sentiments, some of which I maintain to be positively erroneous, while to others I must take serious exceptions, admitting them only in a sense, and with most important distinctions.

It is hardly possible to keep the several questions, which each of these statements involves, separate in the general argument, as they are intimately connected one with another ; but, so far as is possible, and conducive to the clear exposition of the subject, I will enter upon each consideration by itself.

Mr. A. declares that, “viewed in itself, the power of every individual bishop is *sovereign* and *independent* ; i. e., that every bishop is, in the abstract, an absolute and spiritual monarch. Now this, I maintain, is not the Catholic doctrine : it was not the doctrine of the fathers and councils of the first six centuries. Christ has undoubtedly left the power of governing His Church with the Episcopate ; and this power is a true power of jurisdiction, commensurate with the world. This power is sometimes called the power of binding and loosing, sometimes the power of the keys, sometimes of feeding the flock. In its nature it is twofold. There is the power of *order*, and the power of *jurisdiction*. The former has been called sacramental power, the latter jurisdictional. The former, consisting in an invisible and indelible character, impressed immediately by God upon the soul, can from its nature only be communicated singly. The latter is not essential or inherent in the episcopal character ; and either can be conferred without the other.* The apostles received their jurisdic-

* “Almighty God has conferred upon the bishops of His Church a two-fold power, that of *order*, and that of *jurisdiction*. These two powers often exist apart. A bishop may have been validly consecrated, and thus possess the power of order, without possessing a particle

tional power, as well as that of order, immediately from Christ. But here two things are necessary to be observed. First, that this jurisdictional power was conferred upon them *in a body*, not upon each singly; and secondly, that the apostles *alone* received their jurisdictional power *immediately from Christ*. It was a mission universal in its nature, "Go ye into all the world," &c.; moreover, it was extraordinary in them, and (except in the case of Peter) was to terminate with their lives. Whereas the jurisdiction conferred by the apostles on individual bishops was limited and restricted, not sovereign and independent, in each. Mr. A. virtually admits as much when he says, that there would "have been *not only imminent danger, but almost certainty*, that a power, unlimited in its nature, committed to so large a body of men, who might become

of jurisdiction, which is the case with the prelates of the Greek Church, and was the case with the constitutional bishops of the French Revolution. On the other hand, a bishop elect, canonically appointed to a diocese by the Pope, and confirmed by him, though not yet consecrated, possesses the full power of jurisdiction; so that he can immediately grant faculties, suspend, deprive, or excommunicate, and do every thing in his diocese which depends not on the power of order. It is true, that in the primitive ages, both powers were frequently conferred at the same time; still they were always held to be distinct operations, and were even then frequently conferred apart."—Husenbeth's *St. Cyprian Vindicated*, p. 47.

indefinitely more numerous, yet were each independent centres of authority, *instead of tending to unity, would produce diversity.*” Surely the apostles, who were divinely commissioned to construct the Church, would not have intrusted the bishops, whom they ordained, with a power so unlimited in its nature as to be *almost certain* of producing diversity, instead of unity, which was an essential law of Christ’s kingdom. However, the power which each bishop possessed *could not* be sovereign and independent, from the very nature of sovereign power. An independent and sovereign power is by its nature exclusive. That power which, controlling others and acting as their superior, is at the same time controllable by none, admits, and can admit, of no coexisting sovereign power within the limits of its own authority. Sovereign power must be *one*; otherwise it is not sovereign, but inferior and dependent; and the sovereign power really resides in that authority which is able to control it. Sovereign power, it is true, may reside in a number of persons taken collectively, i. e., in a *body*; but in that case it can no longer be said that *each* person possesses in himself a sovereign and independent power; he can only be said to be a member of a body which possesses it.

It is not true, then, to say that, viewed in itself, the episcopal power is sovereign and independent in *every individual bishop*. The Catholic doctrine is, that the *Episcopate* is one, indivisible, sovereign, and independent ; and that every bishop has part in this Episcopate, not as an independent individual, but as a member of the episcopal body. The Episcopate is one. There are not as many episcopates as there are bishops, but one only. This Episcopate was conferred by Christ first on Peter alone. He gave it to him as a whole. When He gave it to the rest of the apostles, He did not give it separately to each, but made them partakers of it collectively in union with Peter. Nor yet did He give to each a separate share, or a part only, of that which He gave to Peter as a whole : but He gave to each *a part in the whole* ; so that each had what Peter had, with this only difference, that Peter had *of himself*, what they had by being *in union with Peter*. Mr. A.'s notion seems to be, that Christ gave the Episcopate to each of His apostles, so that each had a similar and equal episcopate ; which would be to make as many episcopates as there were apostles, or to divide the one Episcopate into as many portions, neither of which was the case.

Christ did not take twelve equal episcopates, and distribute one to each; neither did He divide the one Episcopate into twelve equal parts: but He gave the one Episcopate to one, i. e. to St. Peter; He gave it to him alone, whole and entire, and then He made the rest partakers of it in union with St. Peter, each receiving it whole and entire in union with him, who alone of all possessed it in himself, wholly, and in its fulness. The Episcopate which He gave first to Peter alone, He conferred—not another, or a similar Episcopate, but the same—on the whole apostolic body, with Peter at its head; not on that body *as well as* on Peter, (for then there would have been two sovereign powers,) but on the body of which Peter was the head—in other words, the root and source.

Human words, analogies taken from earthly kingdoms, cannot express the depth and intimacy of this great truth. It is not that the rest were taken into joint government with Peter, so as simply to be co-rulers, coadjutors with him; or that they were as his delegates and vicars; but as the Church, the Body of Christ, is that perfect incorporation which all other bodies can only represent, not be; so by the union of all its several organs with

its head, the Episcopate is that perfect, sovereign, and indissoluble government of which earthly states and kingdoms are but faintest types and shadows. It is based on essential unity. It is an image of the undivided Trinity. And as words are inadequate to express, and much more to explain, that adorable mystery, and sound self-contradictory and unintelligible to such as doubt or disbelieve, so is it with this great doctrine, which is an image of it. There is a depth, a closeness in it, which to one who has not hold of the true idea, makes even the terms in which it is expressed appear inexplicably confused. Either they communicate a merely human and false idea, or they convey no intelligible meaning whatsoever.

It is hardly surprising that among those who are separated from the unity of the Church, the very idea of unity should be obscured and lost. And certainly it has appeared to me, that the unity which Mr. A. ascribes to the Episcopate is rather that of equality and parity than of corporate oneness: at most, it is *identity of species*. The unity he supposes is merely in species, not in *essence*. So that when he says, that bishops, as being successors of the apostles, have one and the same episcopate, he only means that the powers

which they possess are the *same in kind* ; nor does he appear to be aware that the Episcopate itself is one, and one only, in the fulness of which every bishop has a share.

It has struck me that the same want of deep apprehension of the doctrine is discernible in the meaning which he attaches to the term '*head*.'* He appears to use it in a merely notional and figurative sense, as when it is applied, by way of accommodation, to the chief of a party or the leader of an army. The party or army can be conceived of separately from the head ; but it is not so in the case of an organized body, in which the head is necessary to its corporate existence.†

* It is hardly necessary to observe that the term "head" is applied to Peter and his successors, only in respect to the visible Church and to the Episcopate, and not to the *mystical* body of Christ, of which Himself only is the head. From Him the members derive feeling and motion, ("Sensum et motum habent,") while Peter is the head constituted by Him to be the source of external communion and government ; (a quo solus est externus influxus secundum externam gubernationum.)—See Dens' Theology, vol. 2, p. 152.

† These remarks have a general application. Anglicans will at times use orthodox terms and expressions, or such as are nearly so, totally irreconcilable with their other doctrinal statements. The reason of which is, that these terms and expressions in their mouths do not represent realities. This it is which makes Anglicanism, above all other systems external to the Church, so subtle and imposing. It appropriates Catholic phraseology and partially

Such, then is the episcopal body, and such is the Episcopate; the body is one, and the Episcopate is one. It is the want of deep

applies it, finding amongst the broken fragments it has retained, something to which it inexactly corresponds, and so makes itself appear to grant and to hold already all that a Catholic may urge, pretending to hold it pure and free from later corruptions and additions, which so-called corruptions and additions are in fact the legitimate consequences of the ancient truth, and would be seen to be so, were it not for the empty figure or partial similitude which, in the place of the living perfect reality, lies hid under the Catholic formulæ which it has appropriated.

It is this which obliges me to bear at times the appearance of endeavouring to prove what Mr. A. very readily allows, and to incur perhaps the charge of misinterpreting or not understanding him. It is a disadvantage which is unavoidable from the general inconsistency which pervades, and cannot but pervade, all justifications of the Anglican Church on such grounds as Mr. A. has chosen, however candid the writer may personally be, and however highly gifted in intellectual qualifications. I am obliged to regard many of his statements as only by accident orthodox and Catholic, and to take as expressive of his real meaning, not occasional declarations which he makes, but the constructions which he himself puts upon them, and the consequences which he asserts to be involved in them.

Such admissions, for instance, as are contained in the following passagess, I must consider that in their true sense he has never really made; as where (p. 123) he "freely allows that the Bishop of Rome is the first of the patriarchs, and first bishop of the whole world, *the head of the Apostolic College*, and holding among them the place which Peter held;" the meaning which he attaches to the terms "head" and "Apostolic College," being in fact merely figurative, not real, implying mere combination, not organic unity. So he not unfrequently speaks cor-

perception of this great truth, as it seems to me, which has prevented Mr. A. from comprehending and accepting the true Catholic doctrine; and has set him upon inventing a theory in opposition to it. He does not seem clearly to realize the difference between the Episcopate itself and the power of individual bishops. He continually confounds the two ideas; and this confusion it is which mars his whole argument. He assigns to every individual bishop separately the power which belongs to the whole episcopal body, and thus

rectly of the fulness of the priesthood, &c. (p. 47) as residing in the *whole episcopal body*, while it is plain from other specific statements, that by the episcopal body he really means "the bishops generally," (p. 48,) i. e., individually. So again, where he says (p. 120) "there can be no independence, strictly so called, in the Church and Body of Christ. Independence annihilates membership and coherence;" these words cannot be taken to mean all that they seem to mean, and ought to mean, for his original statement and his general argument are to the effect, that "viewed in itself the power of *every individual bishop* is sovereign and independent," "*each* is an independent centre of authority;" his theory being, that bishops are *jure divino* independent, but that *practically*, unity cannot be preserved, unless they are in mutual subordination to some "preponderating influence," or superior power; which amounts to this, that the Church is constituted of episcopal independencies, bound together by a unity which is merely moral, not organic; that bishops *are* independent by divine right, but that they *ought not to act* independently, because independence produces diversity, and annihilates membership and coherence.

destroys the unity of the Episcopate. He individualizes, and so disorganizes, that which is a corporate whole; makes its constituent members sovereign in themselves, and independent one of another; deprives them of the necessary bond of their union, and contrasts and opposes them with each other and with their common head. He says that, viewed in itself, the power of every individual bishop is sovereign and independent; the Catholic doctrine is, that, viewed in itself, the power of the *Episcopate* is sovereign and independent; but that, viewed as distributed through the hands of the several individual bishops, the *episcopal power* is limited and dependent in each. No individual bishop, as such, possesses a sovereign and independent power. Sovereign and independent power is the prerogative of the whole episcopal body; and the power which each bishop possesses, he possesses simply as a member of that body. But that body consists of bishops corporately united, not only one with another, but with one as their head and connecting bond. This head and bond is the bishop of Rome, the successor of St. Peter. The apostles, of whom the bishops are the successors, were not individuals merely, but a college, an organized

body. They were not separate and independent sovereigns. The power which they possessed, extraordinary as it was, they possessed, not as individuals, but as members and organs of that body of which St. Peter was the head and necessary bond. Except as united with this body, or, which is the same thing, with St. Peter, who was its head, they could not rightly exercise their apostolic powers. Their power depended on their union—union, not only with each other, but with Peter. Though invested by Christ with universal mission, “they had no power” (as I have remarked in another place*) “to form separate, independent societies, but to propagate and organize that one body, the several members of which, as they came into existence, were *virtually* and *prospectively* in union with each other, and bound by the very necessity of their corporate existence to acknowledge and adhere to the head which Christ had appointed to be the origin and representative of the oneness of His Church.” St. Optatus says (De Schism. Donat. lib. ii. n. 2) that, “in the city of Rome, on Peter the First was the episcopal chair conferred, wherein might sit of all the apostles

* Remarks on Certain Anglican Theories of Unity, p. 78.

the head, Peter ; whence also he was called Cephas ; that in that one chair unity might be preserved by all, *nor the other apostles each contend for a distinct chair for himself* ; and that whoso should set up another chair against the single chair, might at once be a schismatic and a sinner." Peter was complete in himself ; the rest without him would have been incomplete, as is a body without its head. In all things else they were his equals, that only thing excepted which *he* was to *them*, and not *they* to *him*. One only could be that which Peter was—the centre of the system, the keystone of the arch.

This is the doctrine of the Fathers ; and the passages which Mr. A. himself adduces, are sufficient to prove it. I will now briefly examine certain of them one by one.

And foremost stands that passage of St. Cyprian, which Mr. A. assumes (p. 22) as so admirably expressing his view of the Episcopate, but which I must also claim as exactly defining the Catholic doctrine, "*Episcopatus unus est, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur.*" This he renders, "The Episcopate is one ; it is a whole in which each enjoys full possession ;" a statement true in itself, but falling far short of the true idea embodied in

the passage. By it he means (as do all Anglicans*) that every bishop *by himself* enjoys full possession of the Episcopate: a meaning which is both imperfect and incorrect. It is not "*qui tenetur*," but "*cujus pars tenetur*;" not "a singulis" only, but "*in solidum*;" the meaning being, not that each bishop has a whole Episcopate to himself, nor that *the* Episcopate is distributed among the bishops generally, so that each has an equal share out of it; but that the Episcopate is one, and that a share of it is held by each, so as to form and preserve a solid whole.† All the bishops of the Church have a share in the Episcopate, but they have it not separately, but corporately—not as individuals, but as members of the episcopal body.

With this interpretation agrees the passage which Mr. A. cites immediately after from St. Isidore of Seville, in which the other apostles are said to have "received a like *fellowship* of honour and power *with Peter* (par consortium cum Petro); not each a sovereign and

* Comp. *Oxf. Translation*, p. 134. "Catholicity of the English Church," *British Critic*, Jan. 1840, p. 61.

† "Communiter, non singulariter." See Bolgeni, *L'Episcopato*, Tom. i. Cap. ii. Art. v. This work seems singularly calculated to remove the prejudices of those who reject the claims of the Papal See, on the ground of their interfering with the rights of the episcopate.

independent authority, but a fellowship of power in union and joint possession with Peter. Just before, this author had been saying: "After Christ the sacerdotal order began from Peter; for to him first was given the pontificate in the Church of Christ."*

Mr. A. next adduces, in confirmation of his views of the equality of Bishops with the Pope, the words of Pope Symmachus: "After the likeness of the Trinity, whose power is one and indivisible, the priesthood is one in the hands of various prelates" (per diversos antisites). But these words are used with reference, not to the bishops spread throughout the world, but to the succession of Roman Pontiffs, and, therefore, the meaning which Mr. A. would put upon them is simply irrelevant. But whatever their immediate reference may be, it is the unity of the Episcopate of which Pope Symmachus is speaking, not the equality of bishops. The unity of the Episcopate is frequently used by the holy Fathers as an image of the hypostatic union of the undivided Trinity. The Episcopate is formed upon the model of the Trinity. Now the unity of the

* See "*The Character of the Rev. W. Palmer as a Controversialist Considered*," p. 10-12, in which the full force of this passage is set forth.

Trinity is in unity of origin ; for as St. Basil says, (Hom. xxiv.) “ The Father is the root and fountain (*radix et fons*) of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ; and St. Gregory Nazianzen says, (Orat. xxix.) “ There is one God, for the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from one cause” (*ad unam causam referuntur*). So the unity of the Episcopate is in the unity of its origin ; it is one in essence, as being one in origin ; its origin is one, viz., Peter ; hence the see of Peter is called the *radix* and *matrix* of the Catholic Church. This is the Catholic doctrine, that there is one only Episcopate, as there is one only nature in the Godhead ; that as there are Three Persons and One God, so there are many bishops but one Episcopate.* It is not, therefore, that bishops individually or separately endued with equality of sovereign

* It can be taken as no contradiction to this doctrine, that the *individual* bishop should be also spoken of as the image of the First Person in the Holy Trinity, (comp. p. 48, of Mr. A.’s book.) The unity of a *particular* Church is built on its bishop, as the unity of the *whole* Church is built on Peter’s successor. And if by “ the priesthood” is meant the second order of the sacred ministry, of course it is the bishop who “ communicates” it, as being the fountain of sacerdotal grace. If the passage to which Mr. A. alludes, mean only that the “ fulness of the priesthood, and with it all power to govern the Church, reside in the *whole episcopal body*,” that is none other than the doctrine maintained in these pages.

power, but that their sovereignty is in their unity. They possess their sovereign power as being corporately united and acting together in that unity.

On Mr. A.'s theory the episcopal power is sovereign and independent in every individual bishop ; i. e., there are as many independent sovereignties, as many episcopates, as there are bishops ; and therefore, if the similitude corresponds, there are as many natures in the Godhead as there are Persons, or as many Gods as there are Persons.

The quotation which follows from Pope Hormisdas shows how the unity of the Episcopate originated, and on what it depends. In the "formulary of faith and of Catholic communion" which he "prescribed, and all the bishops of the east subscribed," it is stated, "that as all churches make but one church, so all the thrones of the apostolate and all the sees of the episcopate, spread through all the earth, are but one apostolic see, *inseparable from the see of Peter.*" Strange, indeed, it is that any one could adduce these words in support of the independent sovereignty of each individual bishop, where the unity of the episcopate and all its sovereign and common power is represented as not existing save in

corporate form, and inseparable from the see of Peter.

Without noticing this remarkable expression, Mr. A. proceeds to observe that St. Augustine makes St. Peter the representative of the Church, as if to suggest that by the see of Peter was meant, not the actual see of which Peter was the occupant, and to which the bishop of Rome had succeeded, but something merely figurative and typical of unity—a sense which, it is needless to say, the passage cannot possibly bear. For, if by the “sees of the episcopate” are meant not figurative but actual sees, occupied by the bishops of the Church, the “see of Peter” must also mean some actual see occupied by Peter and his successors. That St. Peter (in a sense) represented the Church, and that the keys which he received were also given to the rest of the apostles, has never been denied by any Roman Catholic. But both these truths are perfectly reconcilable with his personal supremacy. Peter received the keys ; he received them personally and separately. And this invested him with a character, a power, a capacity ; this made him what he was not before ; this constituted him the foundation and head of Christ’s Church. All that he received,

he received personally and alone. But he was not to remain alone ; the rest of the apostles were to be made partakers with him. Nor was the office and power which he received to cease and perish with him : for he was to have successors to whom it should descend, and in whom he should (as it were) continue to the world's end. What Peter received, the Church received ; not Peter first, and *then* the Church, but the Church *with* and *in* Peter, as being built on him. This is St. Augustine's doctrine. He is writing against those who denied to the Church the power of remitting great offences, and who maintained that the power given to the apostles was personal only, and had not descended to the Church. He says, not that the power was given to John, and James, and Paul, *separately* from Peter, but simply that they received *as well* as he. He says, not that it was given to the Church, and not to Peter singly, but to Peter singly, and so to the church which was built on him and began in him : " Peter was representing the church, and what was given to him singly was given to the church." Mr. A. would say that it was given to the church, and not to Peter singly ; St. Augustine says " to Peter singly and to the church." Mr. A. would say, that what was given to Peter

was given also to the church as *distinct from Peter* ; the doctrine of the Fathers is, that what was given to Peter was given *in him* to the Church, or what was given to him was also given to all, not separately, but together with him.

And with this agree those words of the same Father quoted by Mr. A., (p. 57,) in which he says, “These keys not one man, but the unity of the Church received.” What Peter received, the unity of the Church received. The keys were given to Peter personally ; but they were given because of the character and office with which he was invested, viz., the headship of the Church. In this character it was that the keys were given. They were given to the unity which began in him, and was centered in him. He was no longer a common person, or an individual Apostle, but the chief organ, or head, of a body—the origin and bond of corporate oneness—the beginning and source of that Episcopate, which was one by beginning in one, and Catholic by being communicated to the rest of the Apostles, who were united to him, and through them to the bishops of the universal church. “Here, therefore, the eminence of Peter is set forth, because he *represented the very universality and unity of the Church*,

when it was said to him, I give to thee what was given to all."

The idea is a very simple idea. No one attributes supremacy to the Pope, because he is Leo, or Gregory, or Pius, but because he is Pope, the successor of Peter, the visible head of the Church. The keys were given to Peter, not as he was Simon son of Jonas, but as he was that which his name imported—the *rock* on which Christ founded His Church, and on which the structure was to rest. They were not his personal, but official property. They were not lost to the Church at his decease, but passed to his successors, in whom he continues to live on until the end. St. Augustine distinguishes between what he was as an individual Apostle, and what he was as head of the Apostolic body; as it is common to distinguish between the man and the minister. The keys were not given to Peter as a mere man, or as a single Apostle, but as being invested with that character and office, by virtue of which the whole Apostolic and Episcopal body, i. e., the whole Church, was put in possession of them.

Here then again the same essential truth is seen. As Peter received the keys not as a single Apostle, but as the head of the Apos-

tolic body ; so the rest received not as single Apostles, but as members of that body in union with Peter. The keys were given not to one, not to many, but to *unity*—to the undivided and indivisible unity which subsists in the body with its head.

And the same necessity of unity both of source and bond is admirably conceived and represented by St. Chrysostom, when he compares the choir of the apostles to a lyre in which there are different strings, but one harmony. Had he meant to express the mutual independence and separate sovereignty of each respective bishop or apostle, he would rather have represented it under the figure of many instruments, accordant though diverse.

Thus the passages which Mr. A. adduces to prove that the power of each individual bishop is sovereign and independent, prove only this, which every Catholic maintains—that the Episcopate in itself is one and supreme ; and that the office of bishops is one and the same in all, as being “invested with the plenitude of that royal priesthood which the Son of God set up on earth in his own Person.” (p. 16.) But they prove this also, that they possessed, and could rightly exercise this power, not separately, or of independent right,

but only as corporately united with each other, and with their head.

St. Jerome's words, to which Mr. A. refers, (p. 24,) most aptly testify to the same great truth in which, not denying that the Church was "founded on St. Peter," he maintains that it was "consolidated equally upon all the apostles." I find nothing here of "distinct descent." The Church was built on Peter singly, but on the rest of the apostles, not singly, but as *consolidated** with that foundation which Christ laid in His chief apostle. It was built on John, and James, and Andrew, not as separate distinct foundations, but as united one with the other, and with Peter. It is one solid mass, of which Peter is the first-laid stone, and not the first-laid only, but that on which the structure rests, and out of which it springs—the stone which is imperishable, and which cannot be moved out of its place.

It is thus that the unity of the Episcopate and of the whole Church originated, and was established for ever. Where this foundation lies, there is the Church. On it Christ placed His Church, and on the rest only as they were in solid union with it. Unity, perpetuity, solidity, there could be none without it. If each were

* This expression seems to be identical with that (in *solidum*,) which is used by St. Cyprian.

independent, if each had a separate subsistence, schism would be inevitable and interminable. "For this reason," adds St. Jerome, "out of the twelve one is selected, that by the appointment of a head, the occasion of schism may be taken away;" otherwise, as he says in another place, "there would be as many schisms as there were bishops." The unity of the Episcopate is in fact the unity of the Church. By making the power of every individual bishop, viewed in itself, sovereign and independent, Mr. A. does in effect, as will be shown more at length in the sequel, destroy the oneness of the Church, and render schism in a bishop, or in an Episcopal communion, absolutely impossible.

I cannot leave this branch of the subject without some further remarks upon the notion which Mr. A. entertains of the primacy, and the mode in which he seems to understand the passages which speak of the prerogatives of St. Peter.

In the first place, it is remarkable, that, although he grants to St. Peter a certain actual primacy in respect to the rest of the apostles, he never explains in what it consisted. In like manner, although he allows, or rather maintains, that the bishop of Rome possessed from the earliest times a certain primacy—"a

real thing, not a mere title of honour" (p. 120)—as being St. Peter's successor, he no where positively states what the nature of that dignity and authority was. Was it divine, or was it merely ecclesiastical? Mr. A. cautiously abstains from explaining.

Nor is this an omission merely, though even as such it would be significant. There is a plain and palpable inconsistency in the different statements which he makes on the subject. One while he asserts, (p. 19,) that the bishop of Rome is "in a special sense successor of St. Peter," and maintains (p. 32) with St. Cyprian, "certain high prerogatives to be lodged in the Roman Pontiff, as St. Peter's successor, which did not belong to any other bishop." Here, therefore, he asserts that the being in a special sense St. Peter's successor, was the source of certain high prerogatives. At another time he declares, (p. 17,) that "every individual bishop is the successor of Peter;" and calls it, (p. 57,) "that old view of Cyprian, that every bishop's chair is the chair of St. Peter." Now these passages are reconcilable only by understanding them to mean, that whatever privileges and powers accrued to other bishops from being Peter's successors, accrued to the bishop of Rome in a special sense and in a higher degree. But

whatever these were, they were certainly *divine* in their origin, as being given to Peter by Christ himself. It follows, therefore, that the privileges and powers which other bishops possessed by divine right, as successors of St. Peter, the bishop of Rome possessed by divine right in a higher degree, as being St. Peter's successor in a special sense ; that is, he had by divine right, "certain high prerogatives, which did not belong to any other bishop." But this amounts to an acknowledgment that the primacy of the Pope, whatever it be, is as inalienable a right, and as essential a part of the divine constitution of the Church, as is the power and authority of ordinary bishops ; in other words, the Primacy is as divine in its origin as is Episcopacy itself.

Successor of St. Peter, in a special sense, the bishop of Rome might have been, as occupying the actual local see over which St. Peter presided ; but if this *in itself* conferred upon him higher prerogatives than belonged to any other bishop, such prerogatives were divine in their origin. Either, therefore, it was not succession from St. Peter which conferred these higher prerogatives, or being so conferred they were nothing less than divine. One or other of these alternatives Mr. A. must

adopt ; he cannot take up with either, as suits his convenience.

Yet this is what he certainly does. One while he makes the Primacy of the Roman See a mere ecclesiastical creation, an element, but no more, in the great patriarchal system, which was an ecclesiastical institution, and not of divine appointment. At another he declares that the “precedence and prerogative of Rome was certainly, notwithstanding the famous 28th canon of Chalcedon, not either claimed or granted merely because Rome was the imperial city. It was explicitly claimed by the bishop of Rome himself, and as freely conceded by others to him, as *in a special sense successor of St. Peter.*” (p. 19.) Again he speaks (p. 47) of the See “of Rome having the undoubted primacy, not derived from the gift of councils, or the rank of the imperial city, but *from immemorial tradition as the See of St. Peter.*” It would seem as if Mr. A. had taken the characteristic features of two antagonist systems, and endeavoured to amalgamate them in one ; the two sides of his theory are irreconcilable one with the other, and do not cohere together. Nay, his latter assertions are not only inconsistent with the former, but contain all that is neces-

sary as a basis to establish the legitimacy of the present Papal claims.*

He seems, however, to suppose that in declaring (p. 31) that "if the see of Peter means the local see of Rome, it also means the see of every bishop who holds that office whereof Peter is the great type, example, and source," he has said all that is sufficient to account for the language of the Fathers, and to disprove the supremacy of the actual successor

* A writer in the "*Christian Remembrancer*," Oct. 1846, in a review of Mr. A.'s work, remarks upon these inconsistencies with considerable effect; and perceiving that the two statements are manifestly contradictory, makes no doubt that the author intended to express only that which is opposed to the doctrine of the supremacy. Accordingly the reviewer treats the matter as an oversight, and a casual infelicity of expression, which may be easily rectified in another edition; not perceiving, or wishing not to see, that Mr. A. considers these particular points quite as important and as incontrovertible as any thing else which he advances. Indeed, should he adopt the suggestion proposed, it is plain that he would have to cancel the characteristic features of his theory, and re-write his whole book.

It is true that should Mr. A. perceive what these particular points involve, and thus discover their thorough irreconcilableness with his other statements, he would have to choose between the two systems; but this is altogether another matter. That he has obtained but a very narrow and partial view of a wide and deep subject, these inconsistencies sufficiently show; but the honesty of purpose which he exhibits, gives ground for confidence, that when convinced that one or other alternative must be adopted, he will embrace the truth and reject the error.

of St. Peter. The less definite statements he refers to the *actual* Peter, and those which are more positive and direct to the *typical* one—a mere arbitrary distribution, in order to force the language of the Fathers into an agreement with his preconceived judgment of the question. It seems never to have occurred to him, that, as expressing the Anglican view, or as accommodated to the Anglican system, that language would be simply unmeaning and unintelligible. What would the allusion to St. Peter and his see, even as the type of unity, mean? In what sense can Peter be regarded as representing the Church, or as typifying unity, if his office and power had no reference thereto? The constituting him a type of unity either supposes something in his previous history to make him eminently calculated to represent it, of which it would be difficult to find any indication ; or it is prospective, looking on to some future office of the kind to be fulfilled by him ; and if so, he must be something more than the mere figure and type ; he must in some way fulfil that which he figures and represents. Whence is it again, that if the opinion of the ancient Fathers was simply that St. Peter was the figure of the Church, and the representative of its “very universality and unity,” in the manner that

Mr. A. conceives, they have so repeatedly spoken of the bishops of Rome *personally* under the name of Peter? How is it that they did not generalize the idea as equally applicable to every individual bishop? Mr. A. has not produced one single passage in which any bishop is called the successor of St. Peter, *in his individual capacity*, the bishop of Rome excepted. The truth is, that the see of Peter is never spoken of by the Fathers in any other sense than as the particular local see of Peter;* or as representing the actual unity of the Church, and its essential indivisibility, as existing in the whole Episcopate, necessarily

* Mr. A. resolves St. Jerome's well-known strong language, (p. 26.) into a mere matter of respect for the particular Roman See, because "up to that time it had been free from all suspicion of heresy, and he himself, of full manhood, had been baptized, and had lived at Rome." He does not seem to have observed that St. Jerome incidentally states the *ground* of his confidence; viz. that the See of Rome was the "*See of Peter*;" not that it had simply as a matter of fact been exempt from error, but that as being the See of Peter, it could not fail. "*The chair of St. Peter* is to be by me consulted, and that *faith* which is praised by the Apostle's mouth I speak with *the successor of the fisherman* I am associated in communion with thy blessedness; that is, with the *See of Peter*. *On that rock the Church is built* I know. *Whoso shall eat the Lamb outside that house is profane.*" "*Whoso gathereth not with thee, scattereth; that is, he who is not of Christ, is of Antichrist.*" Are these the words of one merely referring to an historical fact?

including Peter's personal successors. It is never applied to the *single see* of any other individual bishop.

But further, if by Peter was meant not a personal, but a mere typical successor of that apostle, how could it have been said that "out of the twelve one was selected, that by the appointment of a head, the occasion of schism might be taken away?" Or if he be merely a figure of unity in the Church, and not also its bond and source, what would be the meaning of such a passage as the following quoted by Mr. A., (p. 57.)? "Peter himself, to whom He intrusted His sheep as to another Self, He willed to make *one with Himself*, that so He might intrust His sheep to him, that He might be the Head, the other bear the figure of the Body, that is, the Church, and that, as man and wife, they might be two in one flesh." If Peter be taken merely as a type or image of something which was to exist external to him, this language of St. Augustine is exaggerated and unnatural; but if as living on in his successors he be an actually component and essential part of the divine framework of the Church, the language of the holy father exactly expresses the idea. And how naturally does it accord with the

striking words of Pope St. Leo, also quoted by Mr. A., (p. 111,) when he says that Christ “*assumed*” St. Peter “*into the participation of His indivisible unity*,” that the rearing of the eternal temple might consist in the solidity of Peter.”

The truth is, that the sense in which St. Peter is regarded by the Fathers as representing the Church, and typifying unity, is a much deeper sense than Anglicans conceive. In the new dispensation nothing remains a mere outward type and empty figure. It is a dispensation of grace, a sacramental dispensation ; the figures contain and convey that of which they are the figures and signs ; or rather in one sense they are signs, and in another sacraments and mysterious realities. Even the outward elements—the accidents of bread and wine in the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar, are in one sense, signs, as representing ; but in another, and the very deepest and truest sense, they are what they signify and show forth. So also the Church is the figure of the Body of Christ, and is also in a mystical sense that Body itself. Thus in fine St. Peter represents the unity of that Body, and is himself the ordained head and source of it. He represents that which also consists in, and depends upon him. He

is the centre of unity, and its origin. Unity *begins* from him, not merely in matter of time, but in its essence. Bossuet, as quoted by Mr. A., (p. 73,) says that Œcumenical Synods, “*contain all the virtue and power*” of the Catholic Church, “*which we are wont to mean by the word represent.*” And in this sense Peter represented the unity and universality of the Church. It was *contained* in him. The *germ* of it was in him, and remains in his successors. Reduce it to its original elements, or trace it back to its first source, and its ultimate form is in Peter. Mr. A. supposes that Peter is a figure of something which exists externally to him, and independently of him; the Fathers always regard him as, in a manner, containing and embodying that of which he bears the figure. As the unity of each particular church exists in, and depends upon its bishop, so the unity of the universal church exists in, and depends upon St. Peter, or his successor.

If, on the one hand, then, the language of the Fathers is irreconcilable with the Anglican view, it is really, when fairly considered, perfectly in harmony with, and essentially the same as, the Roman. As the unity of each particular church is in its bishop, so all particular

churches form unity upon an universal bishop, St. Peter, and his successors. It is the succession of his successors which preserves and perpetuates unity through all ages. This is the doctrine of the Fathers, to which their language agrees, and separate from which it is inexplicable. Thus only can be understood St. Augustine's words: "For he says to Peter, *in whom, being one, He forms the Church* (in quo uno format ecclesiam)..... Feed my sheep; and in one, Peter, is figured the unity of all pastors." (Sermo 137, cap. 3.) The unity of the Church is not only represented by Peter, but formed *in* him. This is his true meaning when he speaks of the care of the sheep being given to Peter alone, in the passage quoted by Mr. A. (p. 58.) "When Christ speaks to one, unity is commended; and to Peter above all (primitus), because Peter is the first among the apostles." It is this idea of unity in and through Peter, which it is his object to express; not, as Mr. A. supposes, to establish the equality of the rest with Peter. His object being to prove to the Donatists that they were external to that Church of which Peter was the bond of unity, a laboured argument to prove the individual equality of the apostles to St. Peter would be

perfectly irrelevant. His aim is to show that the words of Christ were not addressed singly to St. Peter, as though they found their ultimate application in something merely personal, but that they were spoken with reference to, and for the benefit of, the whole Church, whose unity was to be perpetuated in him. How otherwise should we understand Tertullian when he calls the Church “allied to Peter” (*Petri propinquam*); or St. Ambrose when he says, “Where Peter is, there the Church is (*Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia*); or St. Optatus in the words already quoted, “On Peter first was the episcopal chair conferred.....that *in that one chair* unity might be preserved by all, nor the other apostles each contend for a distinct chair for himself;” or, again, where he employs the very argument which would be used by a modern Catholic, to prove to the Donatists that they were separated from the true Church, treating it as a pretension on their part to claim to be in possession of the keys of heaven, “which *Peter alone received*, in order to their being communicated to the rest (*quas solus Petrus communicandas cæteris accepit*)?” Can any one misunderstand these words, “Whence is it that you strive to usurp to yourselves the keys of the kingdom of

heaven, who wage a sacrilegious war against the chair of Peter, with your presumptions and audacities?" Or how, again, are we to understand St. Pacian where he says (Epist. ad Sympos. 3, 26,) that "the Lord spake to one, in order that he might *lay the foundation of unity from one* (ad unum ideo ut unitatem fundaret ex uno); afterwards delivering the same injunction to all in common, so as that still he begins from Peter?"

To add one other instance, how evident it is that St. Cyprian* considered that the unity of the church was formed from the unity of its head, St. Peter, speaking, as he does, of

* "St. Cyprian considers the apostle Peter as the depository of the episcopacy, as well as of the supremacy; he derives the power of bishops from the high authority with which he was invested, and every bishop is a successor of St. Peter, as he is an inheritor of his power of binding and loosing, and is the foundation of the Church committed to his care; all the members of this Church must therefore be united with him and subjected to him." Dollinger's *History of the Church*, Vol. 1. p. 258.

St. Cyprian "very frequently makes reference to the promise of Christ to build His Church upon a rock, and invariably understands Peter to be the rock, and recognizes in the address to Peter the principle of unity, which he most strongly affirms to be the essential characteristic of the true Church. He uses it to show the necessity of the union of the flock and clergy with the bishop in each diocese; but this must be considered as a consequence of the general unity which results from the commission to Peter, inasmuch as Christ having showed His will that His Church should be one, by giving to Peter the relation of foundation to a building, and of ruler to a kingdom,

the see of Peter as that “*out of which sacerdotal unity arose*” (unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est); and even identifying the unity of the episcopate with the unity of the Church. It is with him the expression of one and the same idea to say, “The episcopate is one” (Episcopatus unus est), and to say, “*The beginning proceeds from unity*, and the primacy is given to Peter that the Church of Christ may be manifested as one, and the chair one,” (“Exordium ab unitate proficiscitur, et primatus Petro datur, ut una Christi ecclesia, et cathedra una monstretur.”) In all things else the other apostles were Peter’s equals (pari consortio præditi et honoris et potestatis), with this only exception, that unity began in him, was formed upon him, and in him was to be made visible to the world. The end for which the Church had its origin in one, to whom also the primacy was given, was the visible unity of the church and of the episcopate. How significant is it, that they who deny the true doctrine of the primacy or supremacy, and reject the claims of the Papal See, are forced to admit that the visible unity of the Church is lost, or, at least, has been

each portion of the Church must be compact and united, that it may rest on that foundation, and be a part of that kingdom.” Kenrick *on the Primacy*, p. 52.

suspended for many hundred years. It is immediately after this that St. Cyprian shows that the unity of which he speaks is an unity of root and origin. This he signifies by various illustrations, "as of many rays of light all centering in the sun, of many branches depending for their support upon one tenacious root, and many rivulets deriving their waters from one fountain. As then the sun, the root, and the spring, by their vital influence support their dependent rays, branches, and streams; so power and authority were vested in St. Peter to support and preserve that unity which began from himself, and was of necessity to continue in dependent connexion with him. The apostles had an equal power over all other Christians; but to preserve unity our Lord made St. Peter the source and centre of it to the other apostles."*

One of the objections frequently dwelt upon by Mr. A. is the silence of the Fathers, when he considers that, had they held the Roman view, they must have expressed it in definite terms. This silence is to his mind most expressive, and on some occasions perfectly conclusive in favour of his argument.

But a little consideration, I think, will show

* Husenbeth, *St. Cyprian Vindicated*, p. 25.

that this nature of proof may be pressed too far. In the first place, it would be unfair to interpret silence on a point comparatively at rest, because not the subject of dispute at the time a particular Father wrote, as proof against the truth or antiquity of any doctrine. It is unnecessary to say, that strict attention should be paid to the scope and object of a writer, and the particular idea to which he is giving expression, before we are hasty in drawing conclusions from his bare words. Regard must be had to the circumstances of the church at the time, and the prevailing forms of error, likely from their activity to be most formidable in the eyes of the writer, and at which it is probable he would be constantly aiming. It has been common, for instance, for the opponents of the papal claims, failing to consider the *intention* of the holy Fathers, to lay much stress on the *words* of St. Chrysostom and others, who assert that Christ built His Church on Peter's *confession*, and to urge this as a proof that the literal sense of Scripture was not then held. Mr. A. has himself made use of it (p. 56) as confirmatory of his view; but I believe it is true to say that, up to the time of the Arian heresy, the passage in the Gospel was constantly interpreted of Peter *personally*;

but when the grand fundamental doctrine of the Lord's Divine Sonship began to be disputed by heretics, the fuller interpretation was naturally brought forward and insisted upon ; and the simple idea of communion with Peter was proved to involve that of communion with Peter, not in fact only, but in faith. This is a point which such opponents seem entirely to have overlooked. The fathers do not say that Christ founded His Church on the mere confession, or the doctrine which it contained, nor on faith, internal or professed, but on *Peter's* faith and *Peter's* confession. What they hold to be necessary is an open profession of Peter's faith. Communion with Peter must be both in faith and in fact. They are heretics and schismatics who think to hold the communion of Peter without the faith of Peter, or to hold the faith of Peter without the communion of Peter. Mr. A. seems to suppose that one idea excludes the other, whereas both are contained in one. It is not Peter only, but Peter confessing the faith on which the church rests. Christ not only laid the foundation of His Church in Peter, but promised that his faith should not fail, and that he should be the "strength" of His Church, both in unity and

in faith.* Hence St. Augustine says, interpreting Christ's words, "I will build my church not upon Peter, which thou art, but upon the Rock which thou hast confessed." And St. Ambrose says, "Faith, then, is the foundation of the Church; for not of the flesh of Peter, but of (his) faith it was said, that the gates of hell should not prevail against it," (*non de carne Petri, sed de fide dictum est, &c.*) (*De Incarnatione*, 5, 34.) The case is similar to that of St. Augustine asserting (as has been remarked already) that St. Peter received the keys as representing unity, or as representing the Church, and that the rest received them equally with him; when writing against those heretics who denied that the apostolic powers had continued in the Church, and wished to have them regarded as merely personal to St. Peter.

But further, a very slight acquaintance with the Fathers will lead us to observe that their mode of treating subjects differed much from the modern. An absence of system prevails in it; and even when dogmatic statements are introduced, it is chiefly with a view to their

* *Ait autem Dominus: Simon, Simon, ecce Satanas expetivit vos ut cribaret sicut triticum; Ego autem rogavi pro te ut non deficiat fides tua, &c.* Luc. xxii. 31, 32.

practical bearing. I allude more particularly to the large class of homilies which have come down to us. Let any one, for example, open at random upon any one of the homilies of St. Chrysostom, and he will observe what I mean. The particular practical point which the Fathers are considering, seems exclusively to occupy their attention, and Scripture is employed more to illustrate than to prove it. This gives the appearance of what to modern notions must often look like a forced application, and at times disappoints our expectations by the interpretation of passages, in which we are accustomed to see the deepest and most mysterious doctrines, in what we should call a superficial and insufficient sense; the reason being that they do not intend their homily or commentary for a formal system of theology and complete exposition of the full sense of Scripture. Such a notion seems not to occur to them. Rather do they seem to regard the Holy Scripture as a well, in which you may draw water at any depth, dipping your vessel, if you please, on the surface, or lowering it into the profound abyss; though its waters are still unexhausted and inexhaustible.

And this mode of dealing with Scripture extends to everything connected with it. Mr.

A. notices (p. 68) that in five Sermons of St. Augustine, on the day of St. Peter and St. Paul, there is "not one allusion to the Roman Pontiff, not a word as to his being the heir of a power not committed to the other apostles." He considers that such a wonderful power and commission being passed over *sub silentio* is a proof that the doctrine was not held. To me, however, it appears that it would be unreasonable to expect a dogmatic definition of the specific powers of the primacy in a sermon the whole subject of which are the personal graces, labours, and martyrdom of the two apostles. It would be unreasonable to argue, from its absence in a patristic discourse, that the doctrine was unknown to the church of that day. Besides, there is a certain notice* of St. Peter's office, which, as I contend, strictly harmonizes with Catholic teaching, and exemplifies the special aspect under which the unity of the church was viewed by the Fathers, viz., as based upon the whole apostolic body in necessary conjunction with St. Peter.

* "Therefore hath the Lord commended his sheep to us, because He commended them to Peter." These words Mr. A. rightly interprets, without perceiving their force. "Thus Peter's commission," he remarks, "is viewed not as excluding, but including that of all the rest."

In consequence of his misconception respecting the episcopate, Mr. A. supposes that there are capital omissions where there are none. He is continually setting the Church against the Pope, and anything that is said of the authority of the former, he interprets as irreconcilable with the supremacy of the latter. He does not see that they are one and the same thing under two different aspects. He argues as if the church and the see of Peter, the body and the head, were separable one from another: the truth being that, as organically united, they form one idea in the mind of the Fathers; and therefore, the passages which he quotes absolutely prove nothing to his purpose. The Fathers had no idea of the Church, or of the Catholic Episcopate, as separate from the see of Peter. It never entered into their minds to contrast one with the other, seeing that they were in essence indissolubly united. Mr. A. thinks it enough to show that the Fathers considered the government of the Church and the determination of matters of faith to reside in the whole episcopal body; whereas to prove his own theory, or rather to disprove the present Roman doctrine, he should show that they considered that the episcopal body was a whole,

or had any proper power, separate from the Pope. The episcopate, like the body of Christ, the Church itself, was in their minds one, incorrupt, and indissoluble. It was based on unity ; it began from unity ; and existed in unity, of which the see of Peter was the effectual sign, the actual necessary bond, the central spring, the essential principle.

CHAPTER II.

EXTENSION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO THE SUBJECT OF JURISDICTION.

HAVING considered thus far the unity of the episcopate, as originating in one, viz. Peter, and existing in him alone, or in the whole episcopal body with its head, I will proceed to the question of jurisdiction.

On this subject Mr. A.'s statement is, that every individual bishop is the "successor of the apostles, and of Peter the centre of unity;" and "able moreover to communicate the authority" which he has—"a power unlimited in its nature"—"to others, and to become the source of a long line of spiritual descendants." Thus he makes every bishop the source of jurisdiction. It is true that afterwards (p. 58,) he says, that "jurisdiction is derived from

the See of Rome, and the other apostolic sees in conjunction"—a statement which would be irreconcilable with the former, but that, on his theory, every bishop possesses, in the abstract, powers which for the sake of unity and order, he actually exercises under restraint, and subject to certain ecclesiastical conditions. He maintains that every bishop is *jure divino*, the source of jurisdiction, but that by the regulations of the patriarchal system, jurisdiction was derived from the See of Rome, and the other apostolic sees.

In contrast with this, I will state the Catholic doctrine. That doctrine is, that Christ conferred the episcopate, i. e. the full and universal power of governing His church, upon the apostles. He conferred it upon them, as I have said, not individually, but corporately, not separately, but collectively, and in inseparable union with Peter. To the apostolic body with Peter at its head, succeeds the episcopal body with the Pope his successor at its head. The episcopal body thus indissolubly united, possesses all that full and sovereign power which the apostles possessed. In this sense it is that the bishops are *the successors of the apostles*; every bishop, as a member of the episcopal body, has part in the sovereignty of the episcopate. And although

he cannot exercise it apart from the episcopal body, yet in its nature it is inalienable, and though suspended in schism, cannot be lost.

It is in virtue of this power that every bishop sits and judges in general council, decides in matters of faith, and legislates for the whole Church, together with his assembled brethren. Bishops *in partibus*, and even suffragan bishops who are without dioceses, possess this power as inherently belonging to their episcopal character. This power is exercised also in another shape, when by the unanimous consent of Catholic bishops, not assembled in council but dispersed throughout the world, the mind of the Church makes known itself in some general judgment of doctrine and discipline.*

* "It is on no other principle that unity and consent have force in councils or in the assembled Church, than because they have equal force in the Church spread through the whole world. For the council itself hath force, because it represents the whole Church; nor is the Church assembled in order that consent and unity may have force; but it is therefore assembled, that the unity which in itself has force in the Church, every where spread abroad, may be more clearly demonstrated in the same Church assembled by bishops, the doctors of the churches, as being the proper witnesses thereto. Hence, therefore, is perceived a double method of recognising Catholic truth; the first, from the consent of the Church every where spread abroad; the second, from the consent of the Church united in ecumenical or general council." Bossuet, quoted by Mr. A. p. 71.

But besides the powers which are inherent in and inalienable from the episcopal character, every bishop, when he is placed over a diocese, receives particular jurisdiction over it. This jurisdiction, which according to Mr. A.'s view, must be a limitation of that power which he possesses by divine right, and which he considers is supreme, not only in the episcopate, but also in each separate bishop, is according to the Catholic view, not a restriction of what he already possesses, but a fresh power which is conferred upon him—a power in its nature not supreme, but subject to that authority which confers it, not universal, but restrained within limits. The sovereignty of the episcopate residing in its unity, and that unity being a corporate unity, it cannot belong to that power which is particular and individual. Bishops, therefore, considered individually, and as they possess particular jurisdiction, are not sovereign and independent: it is the *episcopate* which is sovereign and independent.

The Catholic doctrine, therefore, does not render necessary the self-contradictory expedient of limiting divine rights by human laws, and controlling supreme and independent power by a power which is consequently its inferior. The Catholic doctrine leaves the

divine rights of bishops free and uncontrolled, while the theory which Mr. A. advances, in reality coerces and neutralizes them. The powers which are inseparable from the episcopal character, being divine, cannot be restricted or taken away; whereas the particular power which a bishop has over a limited district, not being inherent in the episcopal character, but conferred upon him by ecclesiastical authority, can be withheld, contracted, and even altogether withdrawn.

It may be objected, however, that the power of the keys, i. e. of binding and loosing, which is conferred in consecration, is a jurisdictional power, and that, therefore, jurisdiction is inseparable from the episcopal character. To this I reply, that the Catholic doctrine is, that every bishop receives in consecration a *capacity* to exercise such jurisdiction, but not the jurisdiction itself; since jurisdiction is a relative idea, implying not only capacity to exercise power, but *subjects* over whom that power can be exercised. As in consecration no subjects are assigned to a bishop as an individual, jurisdiction is therefore not conferred upon him therein, but a separate act is necessary in order that he may receive it. If jurisdictional power were inseparable from the

episcopal character, its acts, even when illegal, would be valid. But the Catholic Church has never esteemed them to be so, but has always drawn the strongest distinction between the validity of acts belonging to the episcopal character, even when illegally performed, and the utter nullity of jurisdictional acts done under similar circumstances.*

But it must next be inquired from whence bishops derive their jurisdiction. It has been already observed, that jurisdiction is no part of the episcopal character, not being conveyed in consecration, but conferred by some competent authority. If it be answered, that a bishop derives his jurisdiction from his metropolitan, the question still remains, from whom does the metropolitan derive his jurisdiction, as well as the power, in virtue of which he is able to confer jurisdiction upon others? It cannot be an *original* power which he possesses, for in that case he receives some-

* It will have appeared from the above, that there is a sense in which it is true that (as Mr. A. says, p. 17,) "every bishop is able to become the source of a long line of spiritual descendants," since the episcopal character and the power of order are conveyed even by schismatical ordination. But no individual bishop has the power in himself of "*communicating authority*," as though he were an original fountain of jurisdiction: and in schism he cannot communicate it at all.

thing in consecration which other bishops do not, and the episcopal character in him differs essentially from what it is in his suffragans.

There is, however, a theory of jurisdiction, to which it may be well to make passing allusion, a theory which makes it a power not really derived from, although for order sake conferred by, some ecclesiastical superior, but a power residing generally in the Church at large, the Body of Christ, and exercised for its benefit by ministers lawfully appointed, i. e. according to the existing laws established in different national churches. But this is in fact the Protestant view, that democratic view of the Church, which places the supreme authority, not in the episcopate, but in the people, and makes the whole hierarchy their representatives and ministers ; a view which, if closely examined, will be found to justify Presbyterians and Lutherans, as much as it does the Anglican communion, and which has been by them more consistently acted upon and carried out.

It remains that jurisdiction must be conferred by some definite superior power. I will now proceed to trace it to its source, and to state the Catholic doctrine on the subject.

While on earth, our Lord was not only, as

He ever is, the Head of His mystical Body, and the true Source of all power in it, but He was also the *visible* Head, and *visible* Source of jurisdiction. Ere He ascended up into heaven, He commissioned Peter, and made him the supreme pastor and visible head of His Church, when He said to him, "Feed my lambs," "Feed my sheep." Then also He commissioned the rest of His apostles in conjunction with Peter. He conferred upon them an universal mission. He conferred it upon them corporately in union with Peter. He did not give the whole world to each singly. He did not say to each, "Go *thou*, &c.," but He said to all, "Go *ye*, &c." Neither did He divide the world into twelve equal portions, and give to each a twelfth, but He gave it first to Peter, and then he gave it to the rest in union with Peter; so that each had, not a separate limited share to himself, but a share in the whole, with the rest, and with Peter. In other words, each had an universal mission, and an universal jurisdiction. Christ did not assign them particular dioceses, but gave them in corporate union with Peter, that jurisdiction over the whole world, which he had given to Peter by himself. The jurisdiction which the other apostles possessed, they possessed by union with Peter; but the

jurisdiction which Peter possessed, he possessed in himself. The jurisdiction of the rest depended upon their union with Peter, not Peter's jurisdiction upon his union with them. Hence Peter may be said to be the *source* of their jurisdiction, not as if it were *conferred* by him, but because, though conferred immediately by Christ, it was conferred upon them *only as united with Peter*.

I now come to speak of the jurisdiction of bishops. The jurisdiction which the first bishops of the Church received, was not conferred upon them immediately by Christ, but by the apostles. This power of conferring jurisdiction, the apostles had in virtue of their universal mission. But the mission or jurisdiction which bishops received, was not universal but particular only. When the apostles founded churches, they did not communicate to those whom they placed over them that universal mission which they themselves had received, but conferred upon them a restricted and limited power. And moreover, in conferring it, they did it not of their single independent authority, but in virtue of their corporate union with one as their head, viz., Peter.

Now a little reflection would convince us that nothing less than *apostolic* power could bestow jurisdiction; and that the question,

therefore, is, *where* that apostolic power has continued to reside. And consequently, it might be sufficient to observe, that, as there were not many episcopates, but one episcopate, so there were not many sources of jurisdiction, but one source; in other words, that the twelve apostles were not twelve original sources of jurisdiction, but that, as the episcopate had its origin in one, viz., Peter, so the source of jurisdiction was in the same; and that, in fact, he alone of all the apostles left an actual successor, who therefore succeeded not only to his apostolic power, but to his headship, or supremacy over the Church. But for clearness' sake, I will prove it in detail thus:

The bishops appointed by the apostles, although they ordained others, as necessity required, and exercised authority over them, were endued, as I have said, only with a particular or limited jurisdiction. Now as these subordinate bishops derived their jurisdiction from their metropolitan, and were not independent, but remained in subjection to him; so their metropolitan himself, as he originally derived his jurisdiction from an apostle, and remained in subjection to him, so long as he was alive, would still remain in a state of de-

pendence and subjection, when the Church was deprived of the apostle's presence; the decease of the apostle would not make that power which he had received with restraint no longer restrained, but independent and supreme. Upon the decease of a metropolitan no power short of that of an apostle could appoint another in his place; and when the apostle himself was deceased, no one succeeded to his apostolic power; he left no one in his place invested with an universal mission. No particular apostle, Peter excepted, left any actual successor. If it was James the apostle who was bishop of Jerusalem, his successor in that see possessed not his apostolic, but his episcopal or diocesan power. No metropolitan or patriarch became endued with *apostolic* power (strictly so called) on the decease of an apostle. His particular jurisdiction did not, and could not, become universal. The highest metropolitan, as such, would not regard himself as endued with an independent sovereignty or unlimited power; but would hold himself in subordination to that higher power which had resided in the apostle, and would act as in implied submission to it, wherever it might continue to reside. Whatever exertion of power the interests or the exigencies

of the Church required, as, for instance, combining and subdividing sees, and sending missionary bishops into heathen lands, he would make as being virtually authorized by that higher power, from which he had himself originally received his jurisdiction. He could not claim to have an universal mission. Much less could any bishop of an inferior and subordinate see lay claim to any jurisdiction so extended. Each had been placed in his see with restricted powers, and could not of himself enlarge or exalt them without encroaching upon the dominions of others, or assuming a power which did not belong to him.

No lapse of time could alter these relations. As the bishops whom the apostles appointed had only such particular portions of God's Church to rule as were by them conferred, so succeeding bishops could have only such rights and powers as originally were given to them. The metropolitan, although the immediate superior of his own suffragans, could not confer upon them their jurisdiction, as if he were the ultimate source of such jurisdiction. That power which was derived could not become suddenly inherent. The power which he himself possessed, he received with restraint from a superior power, and no one can from

himself confer that which he does not possess in himself.

For the same reason it cannot be argued, that the collective episcopate of every particular Church possesses in itself the power which had resided in the particular apostle, by whom it was directly or indirectly founded—i. e. that the episcopate of a particular Church possesses an universal mission, and has authority of itself to confer jurisdiction upon its own metropolitan, and upon bishops generally. For the bishops of a particular Church, however large in extent, being severally endued with restricted powers, possess, even when combined, only a limited jurisdiction. And no amount of limited power, however numerous its possessors, can, even when combined, become commensurate with that which is unlimited. No combination of particular jurisdictions, (so to speak,) can amount to a jurisdiction which is universal.

And since this is true in the case of the episcopate of *every* particular Church, it follows that a combination of the episcopates of *all* particular Churches would not possess the power which belonged to the apostolic body. Not all combined together could become original fountains of a power which they received themselves by derivation.

But if the ultimate and authoritative source of jurisdiction lies not in any ordinary bishop, nor in any metropolitan or patriarch, nor in the collective episcopate of any particular Church, nor in the combined episcopates of all particular Churches—where does it lie? It lies not in *combination*, but in *unity*;—not in the combination of particular episcopates, but in the *unity of the episcopal body*. On this unity depends the subsistence in the Church of the supreme and sovereign power of the episcopate. The power of the Church is in its unity.

But this unity has its origin in one, viz., Peter. The episcopal body so exists in Peter as without him to have no corporate existence. Peter lives on in his successors, and so unity is indissolubly preserved. Had Peter left no successors, the Church would have lost its universal mission; the power of conferring jurisdiction would have ceased. When the other apostles departed, their apostolic power departed with them; but Peter remained in his successors, and preserved to the Church its universal sovereignty.* The jurisdiction which no particular bishop, or metropolitan, nor the

* Compare the words of Bellarmine quoted by Mr. A. pp. 177-8, and alluded to by him p. 92.

episcopate of any particular Church, nor the combined episcopate of all particular Churches, possessed in themselves, they possessed by union with Peter in his successors. Through whatever channels it came, or by whomsoever exercised, to him it was referable at last. Other metropolitans were as lesser fountains of jurisdiction, of which Peter in his successors was the ultimate and authoritative source. But for that central spring, but for that immoveable rock, the very principle of their authority would have been gone.*

* "The Pope's universal jurisdiction comes immediately from God. The Pope being deceased, there is no one in the Church of God who has universal jurisdiction over all the bishops and Christian people. Not even the body of all the bishops has it; since without the Pope it does not represent the universal Church, and is not that body on which in the person of the apostles united together with Peter, Jesus Christ immediately from Himself conferred the episcopate for the general governance of His Church. Therefore the Roman Pontiff being deceased, there is neither individual, nor body, which has universal and full power to govern the Church, and consequently no one can give it to the successor who is to be elected; for it is an incontrovertible truth, that no one gives to another that power which he has not of himself." Bolgeni, Tom. i. Cap. vi. Art. v.

It is not meant of course by this, that the Church loses its divine jurisdictional power upon the decease of the Pope, or that the power of the bishops is in abeyance, while the see of Peter is without an occupant. The power which the bishops possess is a real power, and cannot be withdrawn except by the supreme authority of the Church.

Whatever, therefore, may have been the discipline of the Church at different times, the real ultimate source of jurisdiction has ever been the same. By whomsoever *conferred*, jurisdiction has always been *derived* from the source which Christ established at the beginning, viz., Peter and his successors. Each of the apostles, in virtue of their universal mission, had, in union with Peter, the power of bestowing jurisdiction. But since they departed from the Church, the Pope alone, as successor of St. Peter, possesses that power *singly*, which the episcopal body possesses in its *corporate union* with him ; for it is thus only that the bishops are successors of the apostles. The Pope is, therefore, *jure divino*, the *ultimate* source of all ordinary jurisdiction,*

Not only does their particular jurisdiction remain in force, but the powers which they possess as members of the episcopal body are essentially the same. For though not *actually* by reason of the Pope's deccase, yet *potentially* in virtue of Christ's promise, they are in communion with Peter in his successor. All that is meant is, that not being that body complete to which *universal* jurisdiction was given, the bishops of the Church cannot *confer* such universal jurisdiction; neither during the vacancy of the Apostolic See, can they impose any doctrines as articles of faith, nor enact laws obliging the whole Church. Hence even Bossuet maintained that the See of Rome was indefectible.

* When the Pope is spoken of as the ultimate source of the jurisdiction which the universal Church possesses,

whether it be actually conferred by him or not. In the present discipline of the Church it is actually conferred by him.

With this view of jurisdiction the language of the fathers will be found really in harmony when rightly understood. As with regard to the unity of the episcopate I contended that their language is irreconcilable with Anglican views, so on the subject of jurisdiction I maintain that it is equally so, and that it witnesses for the Roman, and against the Anglican theory.

The passages before adduced to show that the unity of the episcopate, and so of the whole Church, was formed upon Peter, and depends upon him, also imply that the source of jurisdiction is in him. Thus I might adduce a passage from St. Cyprian, which Mr. A.

it is not meant that he confers it upon the whole Church, so that the Church has only a *delegated* jurisdictional power. The whole Church in union with the Pope, has it as really as the Pope has it, but it is union with the Pope which is the source of it. And even with regard to particular jurisdiction, although this does not come immediately from God, but is conferred, and therefore held in due subordination to the supreme power in the Church, yet when once conferred it is not a delegated, but an actual divine power which a bishop exercises in his diocese; he is called to a share in that rule which is divine and supreme. Otherwise, there would be no difference between a *diocese* and a *vicariate*.

makes use of in favour of his own theory (p. 31): "Our Lord, whose precepts and warnings we are bound to observe, regulating the honour of the bishop, and the constitution of His Church, speaks in the Gospel, and says to Peter, 'I say to thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, &c.' Thence, according to the change of times and successions, the ordination of bishops, and the constitution of the Church has descended, so that the Church is established upon the bishops, and every act of the Church is directed by the same its governors." St. Cyprian here declares that the Church was founded on Peter, and *thence*, as from a fixed and central spring, the order of bishops and the constitution of the Church descended; or, as from a sure foundation they arose; "so that the Church became established upon the bishops." Peter is spoken of as the source* both of unity and of power; not as a mere type and example, but as the actual rock on which the episcopate and the Church were founded—the elementary germ and principle

* Mr. A. seems to allow on the strength of this passage, that Peter was the "*source*," as well as the "great type and example" of the episcopal "office." But as this would be admitting the very thing against which he is writing, he must use the term in an inferior and secondary sense.

from which the whole episcopal body was formed, and out of which it grew: “unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est.”

So St. Isidore (in a passage already quoted) says that “after Christ *sacerdotal order began from Peter*, for the Pontificate was given first to him.” So John of Ravenna, speaking of the See of Rome, calls it “that See which *transmits its rights* to the universal Church.” “Se des illa quæ Ecclesiæ universali jura sua transmittit.” Intr. Epist. S. Gregor. lviii.

So St. Augustine speaks of the Apostolic See being the continuous source and conserving principle of the Church’s sovereign power, by means of the succession of its bishops.

“Et dubitabimus nos ejus Ecclesiæ condere gremio, quæ usque ad confessionem generis humani ab Apostolicâ sede per successiones Episcoporum frustra hæreticis circumlatrantibus.....culmen auctoritatis obtinuit?” De utilit. credendi C. xvii. N. 36.

“In Catholica Ecclesia.....tenet me ab ipsa Sede Petri Apostoli, cui pascendas oves suas post resurrectionem Dominus commendavit, usque ad præsentem Episcopatum successio sacerdotum.” Contr. Epis. Fundam. C. iv. N. 5.

Mr. A. says, (p. 56,) that he has searched

in vain for a single passage in the works of this holy father which considers the Pope as anything more than the first bishop. It may be doubted whether any words could be strong enough to work conviction in his mind, when it is considered how he disposes (pp. 59-60) of a testimony which, though not contained in St. Augustine's own words, is to be found inserted in his works. I mean the "two letters of Pope St. Innocent, written in answer to the synodical letters of the Council Milevi." In these letters the Pope says, "Guarding according to the duty of priests, the institutions of the Fathers, ye resolve that these regulations should not be trodden under foot, which they *with no human but divine voice decreed : viz., that whatever was being carried on, although in the most distant and remote provinces, should not be terminated before it was brought to the knowledge of this see : by the full authority of which the just sentence should be confirmed, and that thence all other churches might derive what they should order ;* whom they should absolve ; whom as being bemired with ineffaceable pollution, the stream, that is worthy only of pure bodies, should avoid ; so that, *as from their parent source, all waters should flow, and through the different regions of the*

whole world the pure streams of the fountain well forth uncorrupted."

Nor can these be taken as mere rhetorical expressions; the language which he uses to the bishops of Numidia, though less figurative, is quite as full and strong. He addresses them "as knowing that throughout all provinces answers are ever *emanating as from the Apostolic fountain* to inquirers." And then he adds, "Especially so often as a matter of faith is under inquiry, I conceive that all our brethren and fellow-bishops, sought not to refer, *save to Peter*, that is, *the source of their own name and honour*, just as your affection hath now referred, for what may benefit all churches in common, throughout the whole world. For the inventors of evil must necessarily become more cautious, when they see that at the reference of a double synod they have been *severed from ecclesiastical communion by our sentence*."

This clear and positive testimony to the Papal Supremacy, Mr. A. dismisses with the comment that, "there is certainly an indefiniteness about these expressions, which may be made to embrace anything; but they do not fairly mean more than that supervision of the faith which belonged to the office of the

first of the patriarchs." To any one who understands words in their obvious sense, there is no indefiniteness whatever. Not one word is there of Patriarchs, or of the patriarchal system; St. Innocent writes as if it was the acknowledged and undoubted belief throughout the Church, that the Pope, as successor of St. Peter, was the supreme ecclesiastical ruler, the final judge in all controversies of faith, the fountain of jurisdiction, nay, the real ultimate source of all power in the Episcopate.

Mr. A. tries to weaken the force of the expressions by remarking that "they come from a Pope; in St. Augustine's mouth, they would have much more force." But we have direct testimony to the fact that this holy father approved the language and conduct of Pope Innocent. He had been one of the five African bishops who had written to the Pope, and to whom the answer was addressed; and in his own account of the correspondence he says, "In all things he wrote back to us *in such manner as was fitting, and as became the Prelate of the Apostolic See.*"* How strong must be the force of prejudice upon a candid mind, when Mr. A. can deal with such striking facts

* See *Dublin Review*, Dec. 1844, pp. 467-8. Marshall's *Letter to Rev. Cecil Wray*, pp. 73-5.

and testimonies as anomalies and difficulties to be simply set aside and left unanswered. If he can so fail of perceiving the import of passages like these, what wonder that he should seek in vain for words that signify anything more than the idea with which his mind is prepossessed, and reckon even St. Augustine among the authorities who “consider the Pope as first bishop, and *no more.*”

The Fathers to whom Mr. A. appeals in the words of Bossuet, (p. 180,) speak the same language, and teach the very doctrine which I have been endeavouring to state. Thus St. Innocent (just quoted) says, “that Peter is the *author of the Episcopal name and honour.*” And again, “*whence the Episcopate itself and all the authority of that name sprung.*” And St. Optatus, “For the good of unity, the blessed Peter was thought worthy to be preferred to all the apostles, and *alone* received the keys of the kingdom of heaven *to be imparted to the rest.*” And St. Gregory of Nyssa, “*Through Peter* He gave to the bishops the keys of heavenly honours.” And St. Cæsarius of Arles to Pope Symmachus, “*As from the person of the blessed Apostle Peter, the Episcopate takes its beginning,* so is it necessary that by suitable rules of discipline your

holiness should plainly show to every church what they ought to observe.”

It has already been shown that the true Catholic doctrine involves none of those false opinions to which Bossuet has adverted, and which he supposed were maintained by those who held the ultramontane view. The true doctrine is, not that the apostles were appointed by Peter, or by Christ through Peter, but that the Episcopate and all its authority was given first to Peter, and to the rest as members of the body of which Peter was the head. The keys “which were given to Peter in the 16th Matt., were to be imparted afterwards to the apostles, Matt. 18th, and John 20th,” and “imparted not by Peter but by Christ,” yet not to each singly, as to Peter, but to all corporately in union with Peter.

These passages which have an easy and natural interpretation on the Catholic view, contain difficulties which, especially as taken collectively, are insuperable on the Anglican hypothesis. But unhappily it is not possible to take a false view of one part of a system without displacing the perspective of the whole. The misunderstanding of a single doctrine leads to the distortion and misapplication of a whole class of authorities. Mr. A., therefore,

sees nothing in these passages, which plainly trace episcopal jurisdiction to its source, except the representative and typical character of St. Peter; and thus he employs against the authority of the Papal See, the very testimonies which antiquity furnishes in favour of its claims. What can be plainer than that private interpretation is as unsafe and deceptive a rule for understanding the Fathers, as it is for understanding the Holy Scriptures? Unless the inquirer be provided with the key to unlock their meaning, i. e., is in possession of the true idea, he will but find a confirmation to his own preconceived opinions.

One circumstance, however, is too remarkable to be overlooked, which is, that the powers of the very sees—the two great patriarchal sees of Alexandria and Antioch—which Mr. A. so often represents as independent, and resting on their own foundation, are clearly traceable to the honour paid to St. Peter's high prerogatives; both these sees having been founded by him, and one of them occupied by him. St. Innocent* speaking of the Church of Antioch, attributes its authority to this cause; not to the grandeur of the city itself, but to the fact that it was the first see of

* Epist. xxiv. ad Alexand. Antioch.

the first apostle. And St. Leo, (quoted by Mr. A., p. 142,) speaking of Alexandria, says, that its dignity was derived “through the holy evangelist, Mark, the disciple of blessed Peter.” St. Gregory again says that Peter “conferred honour upon the see to which he sent his disciple the Evangelist ; and imparted solidity to the see in which he sat himself for seven years, though with no intention of remaining.” And then after saying that the See of Rome was highest in authority by virtue of its own supremacy, he adds, “it is one man’s see in three places,”—“it is one man’s see and one see, over which, by divine authority, three bishops now preside.”* It is plain that these Fathers did not consider these patriarchal sees as independent sources of authority ; but by calling the see one in all three, and tracing their authority to Peter, they connect them with their true source in him.

How convincing from their very force and beauty are the words of St. Leo, which Mr. A. not only quotes, but with singular candour makes conspicuous. “*Though there be among the people of God many priests and many shepherds, yet Peter rules all by personal commission, (proprié,) whom Christ also rules by sovereign power. Beloved, it is a great and*

* Epist. xi. ad Eulog. Alexand.

wonderful participation of His own power which the Divine condescendance gave to this man : and if He willed that other rulers should enjoy ought together with him, yet never did He give, save through him, what He denied not to others." (p. 97.) "*So then in Peter the strength of all is protected, and the help of Divine grace is so ordered, that the stability, which through Christ is given to Peter, through Peter is conveyed to the Apostles."* (p. 99.) Again, "The Lord hath willed that the mystery of this gift, (of announcing the Gospel,) should belong to the office of all the apostles, on the condition of its being chiefly seated in the most blessed Peter, first of all the apostles ; and from him, as it were from the head, it is His pleasure that His gifts should flow into the whole body, that whoever dares to recede from the rock of Peter may know that he has no part in the divine mystery. For him hath He assumed into the participation of His indivisible unity, and willed that he should be named what He Himself is, saying, 'Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church :' that the rearing of the eternal temple by the wonderful gift of the grace of God might consist in the solidity of Peter,* strength-

* So St. Augustine calls Peter "the rock of the churches, because he first laid the foundations of the faith,

ening with this firmness His Church, that neither the rashness of man might attempt it, nor the gates of hell prevail against it." (p. 111.) To these words nothing need be added. Well may Mr. A. admit, as he honestly does, (p. 113.) that "the germ of something very like the present papal system is discernible" in them. To what "more wonderful concentration and absorption of power," could the Roman See possibly lay claim?

But Mr. A. thinks that something still further is claimed by the present Roman Church; and of this I am about to speak; though even the view which is embodied in these words of St. Leo he considers to be so far beyond the teaching and acts of the earlier church, as in effect, when "vigorously carried out," to "substitute St. Peter singly for St. Peter and his brethren." If, however, the *idea* of the Church and the principles of its constitution and government, which I have endeavoured to state, be the same as were all along entertained and acted upon by the

among the nations, and like an immoveable stone, holds together the jointed mass of the whole fabric of Christianity." "Ecclesiarum petra dicitur eo quod primus nationibus fidei fundamenta posuerit, et tanquam saxum immobile totius operis Christiani compagem molemque contineat." In Festo Cathedræ, S. Petri. Sermon. 1. quoted by Husenbeth, p. 77.

Church, and expressed by the holy Fathers as circumstances required, it will already have been made plain to any one who has a true conception of that idea, and will pursue those principles to their consequences, that the present practice of the Church, as it is a true development of St. Leo's view, is also in exact accordance with the doctrine of the Fathers; and, therefore, that the claims of the Papal See are perfectly compatible with the divine rights of the episcopate;—in short, that the supremacy is not an usurpation, and that the doctrine which traces jurisdiction to the Pope, as its ultimate authoritative source, involves no absorption of the inherent powers of the episcopal body. The form under which the government of the Church is at present administered, has made no real change in its constitution, nor in the relative position of the bishops to the Pope. The Catholic doctrine, even in its extremest form, does not make the Pope the fountain of *grace*, as Mr. A. seems to suppose (p. 172), but of *jurisdiction*;—not of their common power, as members of the episcopal body, to govern the Church, but of the *particular* jurisdiction which they exercise in their several dioceses.

It is not denied that the patriarchal or me-

tropolitan system was that on which, *practically*, the Church was for a long time governed ; but it is contended that that system was based upon a *principle* which Anglicans and all other separated bodies, not only do not recognize, but absolutely reject—the principle of unity, both of bond and source. Many of Mr. A.'s statements I could willingly adopt, as respects the actual practice of the Church during the first six centuries, but that they involve, on his theory, doctrines and principles which no Catholic could admit, as being subversive of the original constitution of the Church, and abhorrent to the mind of its Divine Author. Thus, at page 58, he says, “That jurisdiction is derived from the see of Rome and the other patriarchal sees in conjunction, is the truth of the patriarchal system ; that it is derived from the see of Rome, as distinct from them, is the exaggeration of the papal system.” This statement I cannot adopt as a true representation of the Roman or Catholic doctrine, in the sense which Mr. A. intends. The Catholic doctrine is not that jurisdiction is derived from the see of Rome, as *distinct from* the other apostolic sees, and *without* them, as though, when incorporated together in Catholic communion, the other sees had no part in the

sovereign power of the episcopate ; but rather that, except in Catholic communion,—i. e., except in communion with the see of Rome, as being the see of Peter—the other apostolic sees (in which I include not only the sees of Antioch and Alexandria, but all metropolitan and patriarchal sees,) possess no jurisdiction ; and that, even in Catholic communion, they do not possess it *individually*, or in combination with each other, but only as they have part in the one indivisible episcopate. Jurisdiction is dependent upon unity. The episcopate is one and indivisible ; and it is lodged in all its fulness in Peter, and in the apostolic body in communion with Peter. In this sense only is it true that “ all spiritual jurisdiction throughout the whole church is derived from the see of Rome *alone*.” The source of jurisdiction is one ; and that source is the see of Peter, the *head* of the apostolic body.

It is not true, then, to say that there is “ a specific denial of the present Roman doctrine” in the words of St. Augustine. The doctrine is, in fact, one and the same ; and St. Leo’s view, if it differs from that of St. Cyprian, St. Augustine, St. Vincent of Lerins, and other Fathers, differs only in the aspect in which it is regarded ; the former contemplating the head

as the source of jurisdiction, the latter the whole body in conjunction with the head. Even had Mr. A. succeeded in showing that the whole episcopal body, in connection with the see of Peter, is regarded by certain Fathers as the source of jurisdiction, he would not have disproved the Roman doctrine; because the point necessary to be proved is this;—that the source of jurisdiction was considered to be in the other apostolic sees, (whether separate or combined,) exclusive and independent of the see of Rome. This Mr. A. does not, and cannot, show.

Before I conclude this part of the subject, it will conduce to the progress of the argument to consider the question of jurisdiction on Mr. A.'s own ground. In the passage just quoted he says that, during the first six centuries, jurisdiction was derived from the see of Rome and the other apostolic sees. This suggests two observations :

1. If the jurisdiction of bishops, being derived from the five great patriarchal sees, or the three greatest, (whichever here is meant,) which, he says, is the truth of the patriarchal system, does not involve the violation or the absorption of the inherent powers of the episcopate, and thus subvert the order which

Christ established, why should its derivation from one see have this effect?" Either he means that all jurisdiction comes immediately from God with the episcopal character, and that its being received mediately through men is subversive of Christ's ordinance,—in which case it matters not through how many or how few the jurisdiction is conveyed; or he means that it is not of Divine appointment that jurisdiction should be conferred by the Pope, and, therefore, that it is an usurpation on his part. But neither does he think that the patriarchal system was of Divine right, though, in his judgment, it "approaches very nearly to it." (p. 54.) His account of the matter is as follows (p. 15, 16): that the Christian people who, in the earliest ages, were scattered through the wide precincts of the Roman empire, though apparently constituting separate societies, were, in fact, "one living Body;" that so long as the Church was engaged in conflict with Paganism, she could hardly exhibit to the world her complete outward organization; but at length she is found acting as one body, and the power which had seemed to be distributed through several separate and independent parts, is found to be one, and to reside in the collective assemblage

of bishops ; and by the mutual communication of the several patriarchs and metropolitans, as so many ecclesiastical centres, to be exercised over the whole Church. (p. 117.) The authority of general councils appears ; the patriarchal system stands revealed ; and “the history of the Church during the three hundred years following the Nicene Council is but a development of this constitution.” (p. 48.) Why then, I may ask, might not the power thus exercised by the patriarchal system have in after ages become still further concentrated in the papal ? The course would be a natural one, and the principle the same, even on Mr. A.’s own showing. If the independent sovereignty—the “high-priesthood” (p. 54) by Divine right—of individual bishops was not invaded by the “preponderating influence” of the greater patriarchs—a power so great, so universal, that “no general council could be binding without their presence in person, or by deputy, or their subsequent ratification” (p. 18)—why was it invaded by the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff ? The patriarchs who possessed this extraordinary power were, as he says, only three in number ; and of these “the bishop of Rome, as successor of St. Peter, had a decided pre-eminence,” the extent of which

had not been defined. If, then, the power of the *three*—this controlling, coactive power, (for such it was, if it had a veto on the decrees of general councils,)—was no violation of the rights of individual bishops, each of whom was possessed of a sovereign and independent power—nay, the rights of the whole episcopal body, assembled in general council—why should the supremacy of *one*? The principle is the same; it is only a further concentration of power corresponding with the altered circumstances of the Church. At all events, if any violation or absorption took place, it would be rather of patriarchal, than of episcopal rights, and the former are not divine. The parties aggrieved by the usurpations of the bishop of Rome would be rather the other two patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria, than the bishops in general, for these were subordinate and dependent anyhow.

If, however, he believes that the patriarchal system, though “not strictly of Divine right,” “was the effluence of the Spirit of God, ruling and guiding the Church of the Fathers” (p. 54), and as such had a claim on the submission of all, what difficulty can he have in believing that, the “problem” being “how to combine in the harmonious action of one organized

body those apostolical powers which resided in the bishops generally" (p. 48)—of which problem the result, in the first instance, was this same patriarchal system—it might also be "an effluence of the Spirit of God, ruling and guiding the Church" of later times, which led to the condensation of this power in one see; allowing, as he does, that, as the Church increased in extent, and her rulers increased in number, it required, in proportion to the consequent augmentation of the centrifugal force, an increased energy in the centripetal? And why should he hesitate to allow that such an arrangement would have equal claims in its turn on the submission of the Church—especially after its peaceful acquiescence in that discipline for a length of time—granting, as he does (p. 19), that "from the very first the Roman Pontiff seems possessed himself, as from a living tradition which had thoroughly penetrated the local Roman Church, with a consciousness of some peculiar influence he was to exercise on the whole Church?" Why is the one to be accounted a providential arrangement, and the other an usurpation, nay, an invasion of the Divine rights of the episcopate?

Further, Mr. A. declares (p. 173) that,

were it merely a question of usurpation, it were “better to endure almost any degree” of it, “provided only it be not anti-christian, than to make a schism ;” but that the usurpation of which the bishop of Rome is guilty, in having invaded and absorbed into himself the Divine rights of other bishops, is, from its very nature, such an usurpation as is anti-christian. But such, I contend, is the nature of the very authority which, according to Mr. A., was exercised by the greater patriarchates, if the rights of bishops generally be such as he declares them to be in the beginning of his book. If every individual bishop be *jure divino*, and, in virtue of his episcopal character, possessed of a power which is “sovereign and independent,” and “able to communicate it to others,” even the authority which Mr. A. allows was exercised by the Bishop of Rome and the other patriarchs, was an invasion of his Divine rights. If every bishop be, in virtue of the power lodged in him at ordination, an original source of jurisdiction, any system on which it was pretended that jurisdiction was “derived from the see of Rome, and the other apostolic sees in conjunction,” was a “violation of the Church’s Divine constitution.” (p. 76.) It limited and curtailed the sovereignty

which every bishop had by Divine right, and deprived him of his original independence.

2. The other observation suggested by the passage above quoted is this: Mr. A. says, that “the truth of the patriarchal system is, that jurisdiction is derived from the see of Rome and the other apostolic sees in conjunction.” Previously (p. 54) he had said that, “*in the Greek and Russian Church*” this system “*continues down to this day,*” and “*whatever ecclesiastical constitution we still have ourselves is a part of this system.*” Now, without entering into the question in what sense the Greek and Russian Churches can be said still to adhere to a system, the “truth” of which he defines to be, “that jurisdiction is derived from the *see of Rome* and the other sees *in conjunction*,”* I would ask, in what possible or imaginable sense it can be said, that the ecclesiastical constitution of the Anglican Church is a part of this system. Of what system?—a system the very truth of which was, that jurisdiction was derived from the see of Rome and the other apostolic sees! It would be quite intelligible—had not the

* At page 195, Mr. A. says that “the very system for which they (the Eastern Churches) are witnesses, is *not complete without the Bishop of Rome stands at the head of it.*”

thorough unreality of Anglican pretensions accustomed the minds of even earnest and thoughtful men to the plainest practical contradictions—that any one should acquiesce in an assertion so unmeaning, or rather in one which is utterly opposed to the actual facts of the case.

But it may be answered, that Mr. A. does not say that the system is preserved entire in the English Church, but that such ecclesiastical constitution as is preserved, is a *part* of that system. In what sense, however, can it be said to be even a part of it? To make good the assertion, it would at least be necessary that some general feature or essential portion of this system should remain; it were at least to be expected, that, as the conjunction of the three great sees in conferring jurisdiction was formerly the truth of the system, the power of that see which Mr. A. owns to be the greatest, and whose ancient occupants were possessed of a consciousness of some peculiar influence it was to exercise on the whole Church, should still be *practically* acknowledged, especially since the English Church was situated within its immediate patriarchate; and Mr. A. himself allows that its bishop was, on the patriarchal theory, the common father of the whole West. What-

ever Mr. A.'s theories may be, as to what *ought* to be the source of jurisdiction, can he affirm that the Anglican Church really *does* derive her jurisdiction from the See of Rome? (I say nothing of the sees of Alexandria and Antioch.) And if not, in what sense can the ecclesiastical constitution of a Church, with a solitary metropolitan at its head, owning submission to no patriarchate, connected with nothing but its own dependencies, national in extent, Protestant by universal consent, (the opinion of a few individuals excepted,) in relation to the very powers, be they in East or West, from which it originally derived its jurisdiction, and disowned, nay, denounced by all Catholic Christendom—how can the constitution of such a Church, such in character and such in position, possibly be said to be a part of the system of the first six centuries? Surely, did the Anglican Church even hold, as Mr. A. supposes it to do, what he considers to be the true theory of jurisdiction, that would be no justification of its ecclesiastical position. Does the mere holding the true theory, make it part of the true system? The question is not merely what theory it holds on the subject of jurisdiction, but whence does it actually derive its own. Par-

ticular jurisdiction, not belonging essentially to the episcopal character, must have been specifically conferred at some definite time, explicitly or implicitly, by some definite act. There must have been a moment at which it was received, and before which it was not received. In the case, then, of a solitary metropolitan, or any number of metropolitans, who are separated from the visible unity of the Church, no particular jurisdiction can have been received by them, or at least can remain with them. It is not conferred in virtue of their consecration, and they do not stand in relation to any power superior to them, and competent to confer it. If the Archbishop of Canterbury confers jurisdiction on his suffragans, who confers it upon him? It is in vain to answer that he receives it from the Church, i. e., that it is *implied* that he so receives it. These are mere words when a definite act is concerned. In fact he receives it from no one, nor can he point to any power from which he can pretend to receive it. Neither can it be supposed to be an inheritance attached to his particular see, once conferred when the Church was one; for “Ecclesia in Episcopo est,” “Ecclesia super Episcopos constituitur;”—the Church is in

the Episcopate, not the Episcopate in the Church. The see derives its rights from the bishop, not the bishop from the see.*

* There is an indefinite notion entertained by some Anglicans, as if the actual material sees were the seat or depository of jurisdiction, as well as of certain inalienable privileges. It is plain, however, that when the Fathers use the terms ‘sedes,’ ‘cathedra,’ &c., they mean either the succession of bishops in a particular see, or the personal occupants of it for the time being. It is the *person*, and not the locality, in which the episcopal power resides; it is the king and not the throne, which is the seat of royal authority; though in common parlance such terms are used to express the perpetuity of prerogatives passing successively from one person to another.

So it is not the See of Rome which gives to the Pope the primacy over the Church, but it is the Pope, who, as successor of St. Peter, makes the See of Rome the primatial see. Though it is as bishop of Rome that the Pope is successor of St. Peter, yet strictly speaking, it is the succession to St. Peter and not the succession to the see, by which he derives his prerogatives. As a matter of fact, the Pope is *demonstrated* to be the successor of St. Peter, by succeeding to the see in the possession of which St. Peter died; but as the prerogatives were personal in St. Peter, so they continue to be personal in his successors.

It is important to dwell upon this for several reasons, because a want of perceiving this distinction has been the source of much confusion of ideas, and consequent error. For example, Mr. A. quotes (p. 115,) a passage from St. Jerome, which he considers, contains an implicit denial of the Papal claims. That holy father is complaining of the pride of the Roman deacons for requiring that the practice of their city should regulate that of the whole Church, and remarks that “the world is greater than the city.” This expression Mr. A. supposes directly contradicts the language of St. Leo. But it is plain that St. Jerome is here speaking of the *local* Roman Church. Had Mr. A.

It is not necessary to suppose, as it is not here maintained, that the exact relations between St. Peter's successor and his episcopal brethren, were formally determined or specifically defined in the earlier ages. These would be gradually developed and more accurately stated, as the circumstances of the Church brought them under consideration. I do not mean that the supremacy itself would be developed, for that existed by Christ's institution from the beginning, but that the Church, as a *living* body, would exert whatever powers she possessed inherently in herself as occasion required ; and in the course of such exertion, would demonstrate *where* they resided, and cause them to be more clearly ascertained and defined. Thus the Church seems to have been possessed from the first with the simple primary idea, that the apostolic body in indissoluble union with

borne in mind that the prerogatives of St. Peter's successor were personal, not the property of the particular See, or Church, of Rome, he never would have drawn so unfounded a conclusion. See Kenrick *on the Primacy*, pp. 92-4. As this distinction must necessarily have been even more palpable in the earlier ages, when there was greater difference in the practice of local churches, the consideration suggested may help to throw light upon the opposition of St. Cyprian and other bishops to St. Stephen's injunction on the question of re-baptism. See Appendix.

Peter, as its head, composed the one episcopate, and was the source of all authority and jurisdiction. The early fathers might not have as clear and definite an idea as now consciously possesses the Catholic mind, that the fulness of those powers resided in the Pope as acting by himself,* but though not as *clear* and *definite*, the *true* idea they certainly possessed—and I am far from allowing that *every* truth that has not been from the first in the mind of the Church—as shown indisputably when emergencies arose, and called for final adjustment and decision. Whenever such emergencies arose, the mind of the Church immediately *felt* where her appeal and help lay. She turned to the See of Peter. This Mr. A. allows, though he does not appear to

* When I speak of the Pope *acting by himself*, I must be understood to mean, neither, on the one hand, that the rights of the episcopate were absorbed in him; nor, on the other, that he is the mere representative of the members of the episcopal body; but that, as when the bishop of any particular church acts, that whole particular church, which is built on him, and has its unity in him, acts in him; so when the Pope, upon whom all particular churches are built, and in whom they have their unity, acts, it is the whole Church that acts in him, not only because it co-operates with him by a virtual and tacit consent, but because the whole Church is in him, as each particular church is in its bishop. On this point more is said hereafter in the text; but it is necessary to guard expressions in a subject so little understood, and which are so liable to misconstruction when the true idea is not entertained.

perceive the cause of it. The cause was this, that the Church implicitly held, what she holds now, that the See of Peter is the source and the seat of her supreme authority. She was habitually acting upon that knowledge in the manner and degree which circumstances called for ; and as the truths at the foundation of this her constant practice were impugned and denied, she who, like the wise householder, can produce from her treasures things new and old, brought forward into prominent teaching that which from the first she had implicitly held and acted upon. How otherwise is to be accounted for the constant turning of the Church in her distresses and difficulties—whether from heresy or injustice—to the See of Peter? why should such turning be natural to her, but for a divine instinct deeply seated in the heart of the Church, upon which as yet she had not consciously reasoned, which told her where lay the rock and foundation of her strength. To deny her knowledge on that account would be unphilosophical and untrue ; conscious reasoning is but one form and shape in which knowledge expresses itself, and naturally not the first. Neither let it be said that this implies that the Church herself was in her infancy, and had a limited understanding ; the

truth rather being, that her *state* at first was an infant state, and that she put forth only such powers as that state required. Surely it is not to degrade the Church to argue thus, since He, Whose Body she is, and Whose Life she represents, condescended Himself—Who was Infinite Wisdom—to become an “Infant of days,” and to display His divine knowledge by a sort of economy, increasing in wisdom, as in stature.

I do not mean that there was nothing more than an instinct and a feeling; for the mind of the Church at times expressed itself in the very strongest terms. Still there was more in these terms of the expression of a feeling, or the incidental allusion to a well recognized principle, undisputed, and unquestioned, and therefore the less defined and analyzed, than of precise dogmatic statement. We are perhaps less capable of speaking clearly upon the primary principles upon which we act, which being, as it were, the starting points of our action, are therefore neither questioned, nor reflected upon, than any others. The more the whole moral being of a person is at unity with itself, the less he seems capable of dissecting and examining the springs of action, and the principles by which his life is gov-

erned. The deepest feelings express themselves the most spontaneously, and therefore, unconsciously ; and the process by its rapidity evades the eye. And thus it was with the Church in her youth, as, we may conceive, it may be with man in his primeval state ; her actions embodied deep thoughts and prophecies ; her feelings were divine instincts.

But to return to the constitution of the church in the primitive ages, as we find it at the first General Council of Nicæa. When, as Mr. A. observes, (pp. 16-18,) the whole church for the first time met in representation, we find the metropolitan system already in operation—"a preponderating influence exercised by certain sees, viz., by Rome in the West, and by Alexandria and Antioch in the East," and "under these leading bishops a great number of metropolitans," &c. "The source of this preponderating influence," he says, "is to be traced to the fact that the apostles laid hold of the principal cities, and founded churches in them, which became centres of light to their several provinces, and naturally exercised a parental authority over their children." Now here it is important to inquire, *why* the apostles constituted the church in this shape in preference to any other ;—why

did they establish *centres* from which the church was to be propagated, and round which its branches were to cluster ; and not rather disperse the seed evenly over the surface, so that each might grow up a separate and independent plant ? On Mr. A.'s theory, the latter would have been the natural and appropriate course ; it would have been in keeping with the general constitution of the Church, as he conceives of it ; according to which “ *every individual bishop* was the successor to the apostles, and of Peter, the *centre of unity*,” and “ *each independent centres of authority*.” (p. 17.) I answer, however, in the words of St. Leo, quoted by Mr. A. (p. 112) : “ Even amongst the most blessed apostles, as there was a likeness of honour, so was there a certain distinction of power ; and the election of all being equal, *pre-eminence over the rest was given to one. From which type (forma)* the distinction between bishops also has arisen, and it was provided by an important arrangement that all should not claim to themselves power over all, but that in every province there should be one, whose sentence should be considered the first among his brethren ; and others again seated in the greater cities should undertake a larger care, through whom

the direction of the Universal Church should *converge to the one See of Peter*, and nothing any where disagree from its head." Here we have a clue to the whole matter. Pope St. Leo considers the Patriarchal and Metropolitan system as an exemplification of the Primacy,—a development suggested by it, and formed upon its model. Instead of the Papal theory being the exaggeration of the Metropolitan, it was the Metropolitan which was produced by, and grew up upon the pattern of, the Papal. So Thomassinus* "traces the present discipline of the Catholic Church in the confirmation of all bishops by the Pope exclusively," to the same source:—"When metropolitans were created by them, (the apostles,) they did not divest themselves of their pristine right over bishops and metropolitans. Again and again it is to be inculcated, that the power of some bishops over other bishops, all being alike successors of the apostles, *proceeds from the imitation and expression of that prerogative with which Christ distinguished Peter, and exalted him above the other apostles.* Therefore, those three bishops of the greater nations, who were the peculiar

* *Vet. et Nov. Discipl. p. 2, l. 2, c. VIII.*, quoted by Husenbeth, p. 48.

successors of Peter in the three patriarchal churches, always retained great authority and jurisdiction over all metropolitans and bishops of the several provinces subject to themselves." Instead then of the Papal power being the "excessive development" of one of the parts of the metropolitan system, as Mr. A. supposes, (p. 54,) it was itself the divine original upon which that system was formed. The one was human although apostolic; the other was Christ's institution. The one might be modified and changed, as the circumstances of the church required; the other was immutable, and was to endure throughout all ages. The Papal power might be less palpable and obvious to the common eye, when working in and through the metropolitan, but it was one and the same central power, whether acting singly or through its organs. It was indeed natural, or rather we may well believe it to have been the result of "the effluence of the Spirit of God," that the Fathers of the earlier centuries should conduct the government of the church upon this principle, and establish it in heathen lands on the same divine model.

CHAPTER III.

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO PARTICULAR OBJECTIONS.

PART I.

The power of the Pope in relation to the Episcopate generally.

I WILL now briefly show that the principle which has been stated and expanded in the foregoing chapters, destroys the point and force of the objections which Mr. A. brings against the Catholic doctrine, and the claims of the Papal See. These objections, as it seems to me, are founded upon a misunderstanding, and are sufficiently removed when the misunderstanding is removed.

Mr. A.'s main argument rests upon the belief that the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff absorbs the divine rights of the Episcopate. The cause of all the confusion in his mind upon this subject may be explained, I think, in this way.

Mr. A. perceives that certain divine powers are lodged in the Episcopate, of which sovereignty is one ; but he starts with an erroneous view as to *where* that sovereignty resides, and *in what manner* it is exercised. This error pervades his whole argument, and makes him

apply to *each individual bishop*, words spoken in their fulness of *the Episcopal body*. Hence he is led to suppose, that the supreme power attributed to the Pope is an infringement of the separate rights of individual bishops. For along with the erroneous view just mentioned, there exists another closely connected with it, that of considering the Episcopate as having been conferred on Peter in no other manner than it was conferred upon the rest of the apostles—a view which is utterly destructive of the idea of unity. It is true that he acknowledges a certain undefined pre-eminence in Peter, and allows him to be the type of unity, but he does not seem to perceive that the Episcopate was conferred upon Peter singly, whereas it was conferred upon the rest corporately, in conjunction with Peter. And hence, I say, springs his great error on the subject of jurisdiction. He conceives that when the Pope is spoken of as the source of jurisdiction, the rest of the Episcopal body have their power infringed upon, and taken from them. And rightly so with his views; since he considers the Pope simply in his Episcopal character, and as being individually only what all other bishops are. Were any other bishop but the Pope to assume to be the source of jurisdic-

tion, and the supreme pastor of the church, this *would* be an absorbing and destroying of the rights of the Episcopal body. But it is not so in the case of the Pope, because, as successor of St. Peter, to whom first Christ gave the keys of his kingdom, he possesses singly—not another power, but the same power, which the rest possess in union with him.

Mr. A.'s error, in fact, transforms every individual apostle, and their successors the bishops, separately, into that which Peter was singly, and the Church with him collectively; and although he fails to perceive that he is thus making many heads and many episcopates, that is, many churches, instead of the One Church; yet, perceiving, as he does, that such a system could practically never work in harmony or unity—that, in fact, its tendency was to “diversity” (p. 17)—he is driven to the strange resource of supposing that it was necessary to control and limit a *divine* power by a merely human institution, which he calls “the preponderating influence” of the patriarchal system; and that it was left to man’s wisdom to solve, what he may well call a “*problem*” (p. 48), “how to combine in the harmonious action of one organized body those

apostolical powers which resided in the bishops generally.”

To one who holds the true idea of the unity of the episcopate, the subject is encumbered with none of these difficulties. On the true view, a sovereign, independent, and divine power is not controlled by human or ecclesiastical arrangement; neither are the rights of any absorbed or invaded. Peter is the source of jurisdiction, because the fulness of the episcopate resides in him—that same episcopate, and no other, which resides in the whole body. Bishops are not mere *delegates* or *vicars*;* as if, because their authority is derived or subordinate, it was not, therefore, at the same time a real authority. Bishops do not act merely *for* the Pope, and as his *representatives*; they act *with* him—in *essential union* with him—as organs of that divine system of which he is the head. They are given an actual share in that authority which is supreme. They are actual parts of that body which is sovereign. “*Episcopatus unus est cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur.*” In a true sense they are what Mr. A. insists they are (p. 22), *Brethren* and *Fellow-bishops*, (*Fratres et Co-episcopi*,) at the same time that they are

* See *supra*, note to p. 95.

dependent and subordinate. Although, under the present discipline, the Pope confers jurisdiction, yet he does it, not as one single bishop taking such power to himself (comp. pp. 64-5), and thus arrogating to his sole person that which belongs to others, but as possessing in himself the fulness of the episcopate, which fulness dwells also in the body in union with him; and thus, whether the Pope alone confers it, or the Pope and the episcopal college united, it is still the supreme power of the Church which in reality confers. These are but two organs of the same sovereign power, in unison with each other. They are not two sources, but one and the same source; for, as I have so often said, the Church is one, the Episcopate one, and its source one.

Where unity is, there (as I have shown) is supreme power; and as Christ, when about to establish his church, set up unity in one, viz. Peter, so when He associated the other apostles in this unity, and in the fulness of the episcopate, He did not take away from Peter any part of that which he had already conferred upon him. By associating them with him, He did not make him divide amongst them that which he already possessed as a whole; but as he already possessed in himself the

unity and fulness of the episcopate, so he continued to possess it, as well as the supreme power which resides in that unity. This idea is embodied in the following passage from Bossuet:* “ You have seen this unity (of the church and of the episcopate) in the Holy See, do you wish to see it in the whole order, and in the whole episcopal college? but it is still in St. Peter that it appears, and still in these words: Quodcumque ligaveritis, &c. Yes, my brethren, these great words, in which you have seen so clearly the primacy of St. Peter, produced the bishops.....And you see thus in passing the whole order of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, because the same who said to St. Peter, Quodcumque ligaveritis, &c., said the same thing to all the apostles:.....and the same who gives to St. Peter this power, gives it also with his own mouth to all the apostles.... It is, therefore, manifestly the design of Jesus Christ to place first in one alone that which afterwards He willed to place in many. *But that which comes afterward does not destroy that which was done first, and the first (who receives this power) does not lose his post.* This first word, Quodcumque ligaveritis, spoken to one alone, *has already placed under the*

* *Sermon on the Unity of the Church*, quoted by Bolgeni, Tom. III. App. F.

power of this one each one of those, to whom will be said afterwards, *Quæcumque solveritis* : since the promises of Jesus Christ, even as his gifts, are without repentance ; and that which has been given once, *indefinitely and universally*, is irrevocable. Besides, the power given to many carries its restriction in its very division ; on the contrary, *the power given to one alone, and over all, and without exception, carries with it fulness*, (and, consequently, universality ;) and not having to be divided with any other, has no other limits and restrictions but those which the rule gives (prescribed by Jesus Christ). Therefore our ancient doctors of Paris, whom I might here name with honour, have all recognized, in unanimous language, in the see of St. Peter, *the fulness of the apostolic authority* ; this is a point decided and certain. Thus the mystery must be understood. All receive the same power, and receive it all from the same fountain ; but not all in the same degree, nor in the same extension : because Jesus Christ communicates himself in such measure as he pleases, and always in that manner which is best fitted to establish the unity of his church. For this cause he begins from one first, and *in this first He forms the whole*, and He himself de-

velopes with order that which He has placed in one only.”

Thus the power of the Supreme Pontiff does not absorb the powers of the collective episcopate. The Pope does not so “unite in his single person all those powers which belong to Peter and the apostles collectively,” as to leave to other bishops only a delegated and representative office, and rob them of their inherent prerogatives, as Mr. A. supposes, (p. 123.) He simply so possesses that episcopate, which all other bishops possess with him, *as to form unity*, which, without him, would not exist. Without him the Church would be made up of separate flocks, separate pastors, separate sources of jurisdiction, separate centres of unity; instead of the unity, and consequently the power, of the whole being preserved in its head, as the unity and power of each particular church is preserved in its own proper bishop.

Neither let it be objected that, if this does not absorb the rights of the general episcopate, it makes two bishops in each diocese. This would be so, did the Pope pretend to be *particular* bishop in the several dioceses: in that case unity *would* be invaded. Whereas, as possessing in himself the fulness of the

episcopate, in which fulness the whole episcopal body has part, and so being bishop over all, he takes up (as it were) these several unities, and knits them together (in solidum) into a whole and perfect unity.

From what has been said it will have appeared in what sense the title of *universal bishop* has been applied to the Bishop of Rome by certain Catholic theologians, and indeed, as Mr. A. himself admits (p. 166), by earlier and higher authorities.* There is one fact, however, which is supposed to set aside the strongest testimony and the most convincing reasoning—St. Gregory's condemnation of the title, as claimed by the patriarch of Constantinople, and his rejection of it as applied even to himself. But, in the first place, it appears, even from the passages which Mr. A. has produced, that St. Gregory did not disclaim his *right* to the title, as successor of St. Peter. There is not a vestige of proof that he condemned the council of Chalcedon for offering the title to St. Leo ; though both he and his predecessor thought fit to decline it, as liable to be construed in a sense subversive of the rights of their episcopal brethren. He did

* See Dublin Review, Dec. 1844, p. 473. Sept. 1846, p. 268.

not, then, disclaim it as inapplicable to himself in *every* sense, but in a *certain* sense.

The term universal bishop is certainly susceptible of two interpretations, as applied to the Pope. It may be used in a right sense ; viz., that as successor of St. Peter, upon whom the same episcopate, which is one, was conferred, both singly, and in conjunction with the other apostles, and as possessing in himself the fulness of the apostolic authority, he is Bishop of Bishops, and Pastor of Pastors. Or it may be conceived to mean, that he is *sole bishop*—one who is, as it were, *particular* bishop over the whole Church, and has the whole world for his diocese—whilst other bishops who should be his brethren, are merely his delegates. If it was in this latter sense, as Mr. A. supposes (p. 173), that the patriarch John claimed the title—not, indeed, in relation to the whole church, but to the bishops of the East—it was in a sense which excluded and superseded their rights and authority. In this sense, at least, St. Gregory seems to have understood the claim ; and, indeed, this was the only sense which the title could bear in the case of the patriarch of Constantinople, or in that of any individual bishop, St. Peter's successor excepted. “In this

sense, the title of universal bishop, even as applied to the Pope, is impious, sacrilegious, and heretical. No Pope, however jealous of his prerogative, no canonist or theologian, however high his views of papal authority, ever claimed or defended it when so understood.”* Indeed, it would be difficult to show that any Pope has ever assumed the obnoxious title.† At all events, it is incumbent upon Mr. A. to prove that subsequent Popes have advanced the pretension which St. Gregory denounces ; and also that St. Gregory himself did not exercise the very power which later Popes have both claimed and exercised—a power which, though independent and supreme, does not exclude the power of the bishops generally, but includes it, coexists with it, and is the principle and uniting bond of it.

But Mr. A. considers that certain powers which later Pontiffs have claimed, as exhibited in particular acts which they have themselves performed, and in the general sentiments which the mind of the Church has from time to time taken up and expressed, are an invasion of the

* Dublin Review, Dec. 1844, p. 473.

† Yet a writer in the “*Ecclesiastic*,” Sept. 1846, asserts that the title of “Universal Bishop” is “now claimed as *jure divino* by the Popes of Rome.”

proper rights of the episcopate. Such, for instance, are the deposing of bishops, the suppressing of their sees, and the changing the relation of one to the other. And yet Mr. A. must allow that such a power both can, and must, be exercised, if necessity requires. The ordinary or particular jurisdiction of bishops, as it is not inherent in the episcopal character, and is limited in its nature, may be suspended on such occasions, and entirely taken away, as the fault of the individual or the exigencies of the Church may demand. And surely the relative extent and amount of jurisdiction which particular bishops possess, are matters of ecclesiastical regulation, and not the creations of divine and immutable laws. I am speaking simply of power and right; of course I do not defend the capricious and tyrannical exercise of it. The power which Christ's Church possesses, she possesses for edification, and not for destruction. In a sense, therefore, it is untrue to say, that the supreme authority in the Church, wherever it resides, has a right to do as it pleases with bishops and bishoprics. They have their rights, their subordinate rights, which it would be wrong to invade; but such rights, being subordinate, ought in justice to give way on occasions to the gene-

ral advantage of the church. Of such occasions some judge there must be, who is also the depository of the power which is competent to execute the necessary measures. The power of suspending and removing bishops, and of remodelling and even suppressing their sees, must exist somewhere in the Church ; and the only question is, *where*.

Now, no single bishop, metropolitan or other, had in himself the power of suspending or deposing his episcopal brethren, or of suppressing or combining their several sees. This power resided in the whole episcopal body ; but in that body, not separate from, but united with, the bishop of Rome, as successor of St. Peter. Hence, though the power was exercised in the early ages by metropolitans and other superiors, especially in provincial councils, it was exercised by them, not of their own immediate and independent right, but in virtual dependence upon the sovereign authority which resided in the episcopate. The power, then, which the Pope now exercises, he exercises, not as a single bishop, but as the head of the episcopal body, as the organ of that divine supremacy, which, as successor of St. Peter, he possesses originally in himself, and which the general members of that body

can exercise only in union with him and in dependence upon him.

At all events it is not easy to see how Mr. A.'s theory can stand. For, if once it be granted that such a power exists—and no one can deny either the necessity of its existence, or its exercise in the early ages—if once it be allowed that bishops may be suspended and removed, and their dioceses re-adjusted to suit the circumstances of the Church, it is in vain to talk of the independent sovereignty of every individual bishop. To some superior authority he is amenable, whether it be exercised by his immediate metropolitan, a council of the Church, provincial or general, or by the chief Pontiff as the head of the episcopal body, and the supreme judge in all ecclesiastical causes. Mr. A. does in fact allow that the Church possesses this power; but from failing to understand rightly the unity of the episcopate, and where sovereignty really resides, he is led into the error of supposing that the rights of individual bishops are invaded, and their true powers absorbed, because an authority, which was once commonly exercised by certain chief organs of the episcopal body, is now reserved to the immediate exercise of one who is *jure divino* head of all.

The Church of Christ is not an institution of the past, but an ever-present, energizing body ; and, therefore, she can adapt herself to the varying circumstances of every age and country, and to fresh territorial divisions, nay, is ready to accommodate her external regulations to civil and political changes, for the avoiding of schism, and advancing the kingdom of God upon earth. She is a *living* body, and therefore flexible, unbending only where principle requires it, and she wills to be so. She knows when faithfulness to her Heavenly Spouse, and the sacredness of her own essential prerogatives, call upon her to resist the secular power ; and she knows when she has the liberty, if she will, to yield and to make concessions. And large concessions she has not unfrequently made to temporal princes ; but never have they been wrung from her fears, but deliberately granted from charity to souls, and love of unity and peace.* How

* Mr. A. like many others, alludes to the case of the suppression and re-distribution of sees in the Gallican Church by Pope Pius the Seventh, and seems to regard this and such like acts of power on the part of the Sovereign Pontiff, as acts of tyranny and oppression, and not measures taken advisedly and solemnly for the general good of the Church ; as though the rights of bishops were their own private possession. Such is not the conclusion which the mind of the Gallican, nay, of the whole Catho-

different is the state of a church cast in a rigid, unyielding mould, imprisoned, nay, (as it were,) petrified, within the forms and regulations of bygone days, no longer adapted to the present circumstances and growing necessities of the times—a church which, being separated from Catholic unity, has lost the living power of development from within, and, like inorganic matter, admits only of rude changes from without, or of the more silent, but less destructive action of some natural law tending to its decomposition and dissolution. Such a church, powerless to move, or to perform any one function of life, trembles, as well she may, when the unhallowed hand of the state prepares to effect in its own godless fashion those changes which she neither will nor can make herself; suppressing ancient sees, sweeping away pious foundations, new-modelling systems, the true principles of which

lic Church, has formed on the subject. What now says the unanimous voice of the whole Episcopate of France? What thinks the whole sacred order of bishops throughout the world, of such defences of their episcopal rights? Do they not regard them simply as a plea for rebellion and schism; and reject the ecclesiastical liberty which Anglicans would offer them, as energetically as every true patriot and loyal subject rejected the civil and political liberty which revolutionary France would have forced upon the world?

it does not understand, or substituting schemes and inventions of its own, formed on false principles, or on no principles whatever—and all to further some object, however plausible, altogether short of the deep spiritual aim of Christ's Church, if not to advance some secular purpose, or to subserve some temporary interest of its own.

And such in fact has been the result of that act of self-will, by which the Church of the Reformation pretended to free herself from the tyranny of the supreme ecclesiastical power, and to assert her independence, and right of self-government. Severed from the one central spring of power and vitality, and confined within the limits of a separate national existence, she has been forced to bind herself to the obsolete past, not to the true spirit and meaning of antiquity, (for that were well,) but to just so much of its letter and form as serves her for an apparent support and stay; and to exchange the cramping fetters of the State for that service of perfect freedom, which, as part of the one fold under the one shepherd, it was once her privilege and glory to share. Surely, if the claim of the Pope, the acknowledged successor of St. Peter, be so anti-christian an usurpation upon the rights of the Episcopate, what

is to be said of a system which not only tolerates, but sanctions, a Royal Supremacy, and a State-jurisdiction? What—need it be asked—would be the judgment of Catholic Fathers and Councils upon a church so passive under secular domination, so impatient of spiritual control?

It enters not into any part of my plan to adduce instances from antiquity of that particular exercise of Papal power to which I have alluded, or to explain any apparent historical discrepancies. This has been done again and again, and I only regret that so candid a writer as Mr. A. did not, when repeating the usual assertions and objections, at least acknowledge the explanations that have been given by Catholic divines and historians. But I will now add some observations by way of showing, that the admissions which he himself has made, really prove, if words are to be taken in their obvious sense, the very point against which he is contending.

It is strange that Mr. A. should so constantly assert that the Pope was nothing more than the first of the patriarchs, their elder brother, one whose authority differed not in kind, but only in degree, from that of his colleagues.

The very instances which he alleges of the

Pope's interference, are acts, not of mere precedence, but of authority over all. In consistency, therefore, he ought to show that the other patriarchs in their several degrees exercised authority over those whom they excelled in rank, and of whom they took general precedence in the hierarchy of the Church. If the Bishop of Rome exercised authority over the rest of the patriarchs, simply by virtue of his primacy, it is incumbent upon Mr. A. to prove, in order to make good his theory, that the Bishop of Alexandria exercised an authority the same in kind, and second only in degree to that of the Bishop of Rome, over the Bishop of Antioch and other subordinate patriarchs. But if this be not so, and precedence in their case was only one of rank and honour, then the pre-eminence of Rome, involving as Mr. A. allows, a certain authority over all, by whatever name he may designate it, was really a supremacy, and not a mere primacy.

And in fact nothing is more evident than that whenever the Pope's authority was exerted or appealed to, it was upon the ground of his universal power and general right of supervision, as being not the first among equals, but one over all. Mr. A. labours to confound the question of appeals to the Pope, with that

of appeals to other patriarchs ; and after strenuously denying the interference of the Bishop of Rome in the affairs of the East on ordinary occasions, which he regards as a positive proof that his power was limited to his own patriarchate, adds, (p. 116,) that in questions which concerned “ the general faith of the church, in any peculiar emergency, or violation of the usual order of procedure, there was an appeal, if not lawful, at least exercised, to any of the patriarchs.” Now among such appeals many may be found from the East, and from the subjects of other patriarchates, to the Pope ; but can Mr. A. find any from the patriarchates of the West to the thrones of the East ? If not, how is this singular fact to be accounted for, but on the ground of the Pope being the supreme ultimate authority in all matters that concerned the universal church ?* And even

*At p. 25, Mr. A. says, that “ the bishops of the great sees, especially Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch, announced their accession to each other, together with a profession of the orthodox faith,” &c. ; from which one would suppose, that the communications that passed between the Pope and the bishops, were precisely similar in their character and object ; whereas the letters of communion which the Popes sent to a bishop on his election, were in fact the instruments which approved his consecration, and confirmed him in his episcopal authority ; but the letters which the Pope addressed to the bishops and patriarchs, upon his

when the appeal to him is made from the subject of his own immediate patriarchate, I can hardly see that it is to be regarded as a “disingenuous trick,” (p. v.) to quote such appeals in proof of the Supremacy, when they are made upon the general ground of his universal authority, as successor of St. Peter, and not simply on that of his high patriarchal pre-eminence.*

own exaltation to the chair of St. Peter, were merely letters of announcement ; in which, so far from requesting confirmation in his see, he at once asserted the rights of his position, and claimed authority over those to whom he wrote.

* It has been sometimes said by defenders of the papal prerogatives, that the Bishops of Rome, together with the jurisdiction of supremacy over the universal Church, possessed patriarchal powers over a portion of the same ; a form of expression which is true in itself, and in the intention of those who use it, and one which affords a distinct reply to ordinary objectors ; as, for instance, to such as draw inferences to the prejudice of the Pope’s supremacy from the 6th canon of Nice, and the 28th of Chalcedon, which have reference solely to the particular patriarchal powers which were exercised by the Bishops of Rome over the churches of the West. But such an account of the matter is not only insufficient but inaccurate, when there is question of the *origin* of the papal jurisdiction, and of the *principle* on which it rests, and might lead persons to conclusions the most erroneous and unorthodox. There is a sense in which it is wrong to distinguish between the patriarchal power of the Pope and his supremacy ; viz., when by such a distinction it is implied that he possesses the latter by divine right, and the former merely by ecclesiastical concession ; and that he

To prove that the Pope did not interfere in the internal government of the Eastern, or any other patriarchates, or infringe the laws established in thy church, is surely no proof that his power was not supreme. Every kingdom, even an absolute monarchy, must be conducted according to certain general laws; and supreme authority does not otherwise make itself felt, than in general supervision to protect the rights of all, and in interference in cases of emergency or when the laws are infringed. This is just the power which Mr. A. allows that the Pope actually exercised even as respected the affairs of the East; and in allowing thus

is enabled to exercise powers in his patriarchal capacity, which he would not have been in virtue of his supremacy alone. Such a view, it is plain, would essentially affect the supremacy itself. Since the necessity of delegated power, in order to the legitimate exercise of certain ecclesiastical acts, is incompatible with the original possession, by divine right, of an independent sovereign power.

The true mode of viewing the matter is this. The power which the Bishops of Rome exercised over the churches of the West, was not a lower and delegated power which they possessed in addition to the power which they possessed by divine right, but the very same sovereign power which resided in them as successors of St. Peter, and supreme heads of the universal Church. Their patriarchal power was a *reservation* of their own, not a *concession* of the Church. They had reserved the West for their own immediate and proper patriarchate, and it is in this sense only that they can be rightly styled Patriarchs of the West.

much, he allows that his power was supreme. A power which possesses the right of interference in emergencies, must also possess the right of deciding *when* those emergencies occur, and is, therefore, in reality independent and supreme. Whence that right was derived, whether from the personal prerogatives of St. Peter, or from the general consent of the Church from the beginning, or from separate grants, as occasion required, Mr. A. never clearly lays down, but seems to incline one while to one theory, and at another to another. From the language which he occasionally uses, he would seem to assert, that an extraordinary power was at times conferred on the Pope, similar to that which was given to the dictators of ancient Rome, though by whom, and in what manner conferred, he does not explain. Yet this is absolutely necessary, if he would prove that the power was a trust from a higher authority, and not an original part of the Papal prerogative. At all events, granting, as he does, that from whatever source derived, the Bishop of Rome, and he only of all the patriarchs, actually exercised a power in the church, to which for the time at least none was superior, he does in reality allow that on occasions he was in possession

of an authority differing in *kind* from that of his brethren. The only general radical difference conceivable in authority is, that one kind is dependent, and owns a superior, and another is independent, without superiors, and therefore supreme. If then the power which the Pope exercised on occasions was a supreme authority, it differed not only in degree, but in kind, from that of any bishop or patriarch whatever. This at least is apparent on Mr. A.'s own showing. And the most natural, as well as the most reasonable, conclusion to be drawn from it is, that the extraordinary, and (as Mr. A. himself perceives) from the nature of the case, *indefinite* power, which we find in the hands of the Pope in times of peculiar danger and emergency, belonged to him, not merely by consent, but of right as St. Peter's successor. I contend, therefore, that the very practice of appeals to the Pope from all parts of Christendom, and his intervention in peculiar emergencies, and general government over the Church, presupposes his possession *jure divino* of a power which is universal and supreme.

Another argument which Mr. A. urges against the Papal Supremacy, is grounded on the mistaken supposition, that the decrees of

General Councils *conferred powers*, when in reality they only *regulated practice*, and confirmed the constitution which they found established. Thus he supposes that the power of hearing appeals was granted by the Council of Sardica, and not considered as inherent in the See of Rome. "This one fact," he says, (p. 51,) "is fatal to the present claim of the supremacy." It is strange that in the face of history, he can consider that this was "the modest commencement of that power of hearing Episcopal causes on appeal, which has been the instrument of obtaining the wonderful authority, concentrated by a long series of ages in the See of Rome." He himself allows that it was "conformable to the practice of preceding centuries;" *prima facie*, therefore, it is unreasonable to suppose that a power was then first granted, which had been exercised so long without protest. But, as I have said, a law regulating the exercise of power is not to be confounded with the conferring of the power itself. This is a confusion which seems constantly to exist in the writer's mind. The object of these pages is not to adduce facts, or to reason from them, but simply to state principles, and to show their natural connexion with a certain great primary idea; but

Mr. A. insists so much upon these particular canons, that I will quote a simple account of the matter from the work of Bishop Kenrick on the Primacy.* “It has been said by some that the Council of Sardica conceded the right of appeal; but a close inspection of the two canons that regard this matter, will show that they merely recognized its existence. The first enactment which they made on this subject, was intended to correct an abuse, not to confer a privilege. Before this, a condemned bishop had the facility of obtaining a new trial from the bishops of the neighbouring province, without alleging satisfactory reasons. To prevent this, it was enacted that no new trial should be granted, unless by the special authority of the Holy See, who should appoint the judges. This enactment abridged the power of the metropolitans, who could no longer grant a new trial, which, before, was left to their discretion. With regard to appeals to the Pope, “from the judgment of those bishops who belonged to the neighbouring parts,” the council, at the suggestion of Gaudentius, decreed, that if a bishop “should proclaim that his cause should be heard in the city of Rome, another bishop should not, after

* pp. 204, 205.

his appeal, by any means, be ordained in the place of him who appears to be deposed, unless the cause be determined by the judgment of the Roman bishop." This enactment supposes the right of appeal, and does not create it, but it restrains the provincial bishops from proceeding to the ordination of a new bishop, even after a second trial, should the condemned bishop interpose an appeal for a final hearing in the Roman court. It determines this appeal to have the effect of *suspending* all provincial acts."

The truth of the matter simply was this, that by the first enactment, the intervention of that which was already recognized as the supreme authority in the Church, was henceforward to be called in at an earlier stage, to remedy a practical abuse which had been the cause of dissension and confusion. If this canon proved anything against the Supremacy, the very existence of inferior courts would equally disprove the supreme power of the higher; and any law passed by which causes hitherto decided in the inferior courts were referred to the supreme one, must be considered not as regulating practice, but as conferring authority. As then the first canon was to prevent the multiplicity of trials on the spot

and in the neighbourhood, without satisfactory reasons, so the second was evidently framed in order that the bishops might not be deprived by this new law, of the privilege which they had always enjoyed, of referring their cause in person to Rome, and to hinder the confusion which would have ensued, had the provincial acts not been suspended in their absence. Both the canons, therefore, recognize both the right and practice of appeals.

It is sometimes alleged, that the very existence of laws in the Church, is a proof that the supreme power does not reside in the Pope ; as if, were he the supreme authority, his individual will would be the sole law. But in the first place it may be observed, that general laws regulate the machinery of ordinary practice, which must be conducted according to some fixed rule, and may differ in different ages. A bishop can claim only canonical obedience from the subjects of his rule ; he must govern according to the canons ; but this does not detract from his supreme authority within the limits of his own proper diocese. Wherever Mr. A. may place the supreme authority in Christ's Church, it must have its rules and conditions. No Catholic supposes that the Pope possesses an absolute

despotic authority ; such authority has no place in Christ's Church. Many ere now have appealed against a papal decision, and claimed a re-hearing of their cause ; nay, they have rebuked and resisted the Pope, not as denying his supremacy, but as protesting against a particular exercise of it.* Every bishop, (as

* Compare *Dublin Review*, Dec. 1844, p. 457, with Mr. A.'s own words, p. 101.

The principle stated above applies to all cases of protest or resistance to the acts of the Pope, whether the discontented parties were in the right or not. Thus to take the instance of the African bishops in the matter of Apiarius. "The whole tenor of this controversy," writes Bishop Kenrick *On the Primacy*, pp. 209-213, "shows that the superior power of the Pope was indisputable. He received the appeal of Apiarius: he sent his legates to see him reinstated, and to insist on the correction of the bishop who had excommunicated him. The fathers of the council were persuaded that Apiarius had practised deception, and they remonstrated against the appeal. The legate Faustinus insisted that he should be received to communion, as having been absolved by the Holy See ; and the council was content to receive from him a confession of his guilt, with declaration of sorrow, and to effect a compromise. The bishops submitted *ad interim* to the claims of the Pontiff, and when they afterwards thought that these were not sustained by the canons, they confine themselves within the limits of earnest remonstrance. This is not the mode usually observed when authority is manifestly usurped.

From the review of this controversy it is plain that the power of receiving appeals was exercised and acknowledged, and that the question agitated regarded its expediency. If the African bishops did not recognize the primacy of the Pontiff, their opposition to his claims would have

I have already remarked,) nay, every member of the Church has his rights, and although not resting upon the same divine foundation

been determined, unconditional and unqualified. In asserting them, he could have relied simply on the right flowing from his office, but it was more consistent with the meekness and justice of ecclesiastical government, to point to the canons of a General Council, wherein the mode itself of exercising this authority had to all seemed just and equitable." "The Pope had referred to the canons because he was willing to exercise his power moderately and wisely as the assembled fathers had pointed out; and the bishops hesitated to change the established usages of their churches, until they had seen the canons themselves. The abstract point of the power of the Pope to force these regulations on the African churches was not in question. He had not rested on it, that he might not appear arbitrary in its use."

Mr. A. speaks (p. 109) of "the original and acknowledged rights of bishops and metropolitans," as if they were inherent in them, and absolutely belonged to them—something existing from the very first which the recently developed power of the Roman See gradually encroached upon, and ultimately superseded. This is a pure fiction to suit a theory. They had no *original* rights strictly so called; they had no rights at all but such as were *conferred* upon them.

Thus in the case of the churches of Gaul, the metropolitan system it appears had not been introduced until the end of the 4th century; and it was not until the year 417 that the primacy was adjudged to Arles by Pope Zosimus. Up to that time there was no acknowledged patriarch, (see note to Oxford Translation of Fleury,) and a contest had subsisted between Arles and Vienne for the primacy. "Pope Zosimus," says Fleury, (Book xxiii. chap. xlv.) "preserves to the Bishop of Arles the right of Metropolitan over the province of Vienne, and over Narbonensis, Prima and Secunda, as well for the ordination

as the supreme power, and therefore capable of being set aside, as they would certainly be willingly relinquished by every faithful son of

of bishops, as the decision of causes; *except*," saith he, "*the greatness of the cause may require us to take cognizance of it.*" *Thus we see the greater causes reserved for the Pope.* He grounds the prerogative of the church of Arles on the dignity of St. Trophimus, who was established its first bishop by the Holy See, and who first spread the faith in Gaul." "The succeeding pontiffs," (writes Dr. Dollinger, vol. ii. p. 237,) "Boniface and Celestine, acting on the principle that no metropolitan should possess more than one province, and that the ecclesiastical should not exceed in extent the civil provinces, took from the church of Arles the two provinces of Narbonne."

It is plain from all this that the whole metropolitan system of Gaul, so far from being an ancient well-established system, which the Popes invaded and finally subverted, was actually in process of formation during the time in which Mr. A. imagines that the first encroachments were attempted upon immemorial rights; and the main instrument in its formation was the very Papal power which Mr. A. sets against it as its antagonist. That some bishops, as Proculus, should have been refractory, and even successful in their opposition to the power of the Popes, cannot surely be adduced as a proof that opposition was lawful, or grounded upon real and understood rights.

Upon the merits of the particular case of St. Hilary which occurred later, it is irrelevant to enter. How far St. Hilary was in fault, whether St. Leo misunderstood him, or judged him hastily, it is at this time perhaps difficult to ascertain, and does not affect the principle itself, which is the right of the Papal power to interfere in metropolitan arrangements. The justice or injustice with which such power was exercised in any particular case, is beside the point. The rights of which St. Leo deprived St. Hilary were such as, having been conferred by the supreme power in the Church, were liable to be controlled

the Church for the greater general good, yet rights they are, and have ever been considered and treated as such, and jealously guarded, and fearlessly contended for when invaded. We find the Popes defending and protecting them on this very ground ; as for instance, in the famous case of the transfer of precedency by the council of Chalcedon to the See of Constantinople,* to the prejudice of Alexan-

and readjusted by it. Such a power (as has been said above) must exist somewhere in the Church ; and such a power St. Leo thought fit to exercise in the case of St. Hilary. The same power which adjudged the primacy to Arles, thought fit to transfer it for a time to Vienne.

* With reference to this act of the Council, Mr. A. remarks, (p. 140) that St. Leo bases his opposition to it throughout on its being a violation of the Nicene Canons : there is not a word in all the three letters about any violation of the rights of St. Peter....So the Emperor Marcian, Anatolius, Julian of Cos, beseech Leo to grant this, without so much as imagining that they are injuring *his* rank by asking it. I see not how it is possible to avoid the conclusion, that the power of the First See, even as its most zealous occupant viewed it, was quite different from that power which was set up in the middle ages."

The very contrary, however, seems to be the obvious conclusion. The power which the Pope, as successor of St. Peter, possessed over the whole Church, was in no way affected by the power which the Council conceded to the Bishop of Constantinople over the churches of the East. The increase or extension of merely patriarchal authority within a particular and limited sphere, as it had no connection, so it could not possibly interfere, with the supremacy of the Pope over the Universal Church. It is in this respect that the fathers considered that they were

dria and Antioch. Mr. A. himself makes use of this opposition of the council to the Pope, as an argument against the supremacy, for-

raising the privileges of Constantinople to an equality with those of old Rome; viz., as confirming to the bishop of that see the same *patriarchal* authority in the East, which the Bishop of Rome exercised in the West. The matter was altogether beside the question of the Pope's supreme and universal power. The prerogative which the Pope possessed, and the influence he exercised on the whole Church, not being derived from the gift of Councils, (and some such "prerogative" and "influence" Mr. A. himself allows (p. 197) that he had,) could not be the subject of a Council's decision, or affected by its legislative acts.

Had the rights of the Pope been in St. Leo's estimation grounded only upon his high position among the patriarchs, and "quite different in kind from that power which was set up in the middle ages," he would not have failed to remonstrate against the canon of the Council, as raising another patriarch to an equality with himself, and leaving him only a titular precedence. I see not, therefore, how it is possible to escape from the conclusion that the power which St. Leo believed himself to possess, and to which the Church acknowledged his right as successor of St. Peter, differed altogether, not only in degree, but also in kind, from that of every other bishop and patriarch.

Besides, the nature of St. Leo's remonstrance suggests one important reflection, strongly confirmatory of what has been already stated respecting the origin of patriarchal power, and the gradations of rank among the patriarchs; which is, that his very ground of objection against the canon was that the honour of St. Peter was indirectly assailed, by withholding from Alexandria and Antioch the pre-eminence which they had enjoyed from their connection with that apostle. It was only in this respect that the canon intrenched upon the honour due to St. Peter in his successors. And thus, I may observe by the way, we learn, that though patriarchal arrangements were not

getting that one thing it certainly proves, viz. that the rights of patriarchs were not inviolable, nor the laws of the Church immutable; and if so, the existence of such rights and laws does not disprove the coexistence of a supreme power to which they were subordinate.

Moreover the Kingdom of Christ is a Kingdom of *righteousness*. The power which was given to the Church by her Divine Spouse, was not mere power, mere authority, a lordship such as the Gentiles exercised over their subjects, but a rule of justice, and meekness, and love. The commission which Peter received was not only to govern, but to *feed* the flock; and it was given him after he had made his confession, not only of faith, but of love, thrice repeated. This was the kingdom he received; in righteousness it began, and in righteousness it was to ride on and prosper. This attribute was as much pledged to it as its perpetuity. Righteousness was not so much its characteristic as its essence. It

of divine appointment, and therefore not strictly immutable, yet that the high respect with which they were regarded, sprung from the fact that they were reflections of that which *was* divine and immutable. (For the explanation of the 6th Canon of Nice, and the 28th of Chalcedon, see Dr. Dollinger's *History of the Church*, vol. ii. pp. 250-253.)

could no more cease to be righteous, than it could cease to be a kingdom. It was the Kingdom of heaven on earth—the Kingdom of God’s dear Son—of Him who was meek and lowly in heart. Such in the world has the Church ever been, and he that was first has been servant of all; and such are still the sentiments of those who continue to exercise Christ’s authority among men, and such the order of their rule. The present Papal claims are no violation of these principles; the present Bishop of Rome, in common with all his predecessors, though asserting with St. Gregory, “the right of his see to call *any* bishop to account, in case of a violation of the canons,” would still “declare at the same time that, when the canons are kept, the meanest bishop is his equal in the estimation of humility.” The assertion which Mr. A. makes to the contrary (p. 170), is grounded upon a total misunderstanding of the nature of the papal claims, and of the titles which have been given to the Pope by certain Roman divines. The only proof which he produces of the charge which he makes, is his own interpretation of an ambiguous term, and the deductions which his own mind has formed from certain theo-

logical statements. Although, under the present discipline, the supreme central power has drawn to itself the exercise of certain ecclesiastical acts, which in earlier ages were performed through intermediate organs, this practical change must not be regarded as the usurpation of pride or ambition, but as a modification of the former system, with a view to the greater advantage of the Church. The law of righteousness, though it commands in the supreme power a due regard to the rights of individuals, yet enjoins above all a general care for the good of the whole body. The rights of individuals in Christ's Church are not their personal property, but were conferred for the edification of all, and ought, therefore, to give way to the general advantage. The law of righteousness enjoins not a servile adherence to certain specific regulations and constitutions, but prescribes the principles upon which the government is to be administered. And so, also, the law of humility is not a law forbidding the exercise of power, and a due superiority over others: it may be observed by those who command as well as by those who obey, and dictates only the spirit and temper with which that power is to be exercised. The conclusion is, that sovereign

power, which is thus limited by the law of righteousness, and guided by the spirit of humility, is not the less sovereign and supreme; neither is that power, which on occasions sets aside individual rights, necessarily unrighteous and tyrannical.

PART II.

The power of the Pope in connection with General Councils.

I must now speak of the authority of the Pope in connection with General Councils.

The supreme power may be considered under two aspects, as presiding over and enforcing the execution of the laws, or as framing, enacting, and establishing those laws. The former power, that is to say, the executive, Mr. A. seems at times willing to concede to the Pope in some especial sense: the legislative he claims exclusively for councils. Now although in human governments power may be subdivided, balanced, and parcelled out, it cannot be so in that government which is organically one. The unity of the Church consists in the unity of the Episcopate: in that Episcopate the legislative and executive power

is one, supreme, and indivisible. Wherever the supreme power resides in either of these senses, there it resides in both: the government is one, as the power is one. If the Pope, therefore, be supreme in one sense, he must be so in both. If he wields the sovereign power of the Episcopate in one respect, he must in the other also. The Episcopate cannot be divided.

But now let me ask: What constitutes a General Council, and what is the source of its power? whom does the Council represent? The Church. What is meant by the Church in this sense? Surely not the whole body of Christians, priests, deacons, laity—the subjects as well as the rulers of the Church—for this is the Protestant view; but the apostolic college, the episcopal body—not this or that particular number of bishops, but the body itself. But what is this apostolic or episcopal body which is thus supreme? It is, as I have shown, the bishops of the Church in union with Peter as their head: it is their union with their head, which constitutes their corporate existence. The supreme power, then, is in the bishops of the Church in union with St. Peter or his successor. No council, therefore, is General, considered apart from the

Pope, any more than the episcopate is complete apart from the Pope. The power of councils is not a different power from that of the episcopate, but one and the same. The power of the episcopal body does not spring from the fact of its members being assembled in general council, but they assemble in council in order to exercise more efficiently the power which they equally possess in their corporate capacity when they are spread throughout the world.

Hence we see the impropriety of arguing that a council without the Pope is superior to the Pope, on the ground that the *whole* is greater than a *part*. A council without the Pope is not a whole : it does not represent the episcopal body. The Pope is not simply a member of that body, but he is that which gives to the body its corporate existence, and constitutes it a whole. However numerous the assembled bishops may be, separate from the Pope they do not represent that body in which the sovereign power of the episcopate resides. A council so composed is not a General, or Œcumenical* Council. It is

* Mr. A. (in a note to p. 118) draws attention to the expression "Ecumenical" applied to "a synod of purely *Eastern* bishops," "before it was received by the West." The term is evidently used in an accommodated sense, to

altogether an improper statement which Mr. A. makes, (p. 37,) as if Catholics asserted that the supreme power is “lodged in the See of Rome, as *distinct from an œcumenical council* ;” the truth really being, that Catholics deny that a council to which the Pope’s authority is wanting is really œcumenical. It is his “presence in person, or by deputy,” or his “subsequent ratification,” which makes an assembly of bishops a general council of the Church, and renders its decrees authoritative and binding.

But besides the power of legislation, a general council of the Church possesses the power of deciding in matters of faith. In this

indicate that the synod was such as fairly represented the orthodox bishops of the East. If it meant more it would be as strongly opposed to Mr. A.’s general statement, as to the Catholic idea of an œcumenical council.

But this is not the only instance in which he is led to sacrifice his own consistency, from a desire of establishing a point against Rome. Thus, in the very next page, in quoting a passage in which the Church of Jerusalem is styled “*the mother of all Churches*,” he puts the words significantly in italics. Here again, if the expression denote any thing to the disadvantage of Rome, it proves too much for Mr. A.’s purpose ; as it destroys his own notion of the primacy of the Papal See. It is unnecessary to remark that Jerusalem is called the mother of all Churches, in the most obvious sense, inasmuch as it was in the holy city that the Christian Church was founded, and from which it was propagated in all the world.

case also the same argument applies. Infallibility is not promised to every separate bishop, but to the Church, i. e., to the whole episcopate. But as I have shown, the episcopate is that body which adheres to the successor of St. Peter ; when, therefore, individual bishops differ from that body so united, they give only their individual opinion ; but when they agree with it, they judge as members of that body which is sovereign and infallible, and their judgment is, therefore, an infallible judgment.

It cannot be said, that if the judgment of bishops be true and authoritative, only when given in agreement with that of the Pope, they are, therefore, not true *judges* of faith, but merely his counsellors and assistants. For it is a true judgment which they pronounce, not a mere acquiescence in the judgment of another. Their voice is the voice of the Holy Ghost, who declares the same judgment in all. It is one thing that no really general council can define differently from what the Pope defines, and another that the bishops of the Church in such cases are not true judges. Mr. A. seems to think there cannot be real freedom of judgment, unless there be freedom to differ ; whereas in dogmas of faith, which are absolute truth, such an idea is inadmissible. Infallible

judges, how many soever in number, can from the nature of the case, only speak the same thing ; and yet this does not prevent its being the free and deliberate judgment of each separate mind. Now should it be made known to these individuals, by some means or other, that the judgment which they pronounce is infallible, because in accordance with the judgment of the Holy Ghost, this does not interfere in the slightest degree with the freedom of their judgment. As well might we say that the revelation of God's moral law destroys in us that free judgment of our minds, by which we condemn what is wrong, and approve what is right.* Mr. A. confounds our means of knowing when a true judgment is given, with what constitutes the truth of that judgment. The judgment is *true*, because it is the infallible judgment of the Holy Ghost ; and it is *known* to be true, because declared

* If such were the effect of Revelation, the mind of man would sink, as it were, in the scale of intelligence, in proportion as it had a clear vision of absolute Truth ; and an imperfect and ignorant state would be the only sphere for the operations of his higher moral and intellectual faculties. The same argument might also be applied to the will, and the will be considered free only when free to sin, and its freedom destroyed when brought into conformity with the will of God. This view, if pressed to its consequences, would lead to the denial of the true personality of man, or that of God Himself.

through His appointed organ—the episcopal body in union with St. Peter's successor.

The Catholic, then, is furnished with a certain touchstone of truth ; he can both see and hear the Church. To this Mr. A. (p. 70) opposes, as the primitive test, (what, rightly understood, is in no way contrary to it,) *universal consent*. But what does he mean by universal consent? Does he mean that to render decrees in matters of faith binding on the church, the consent of every single bishop is requisite? This is impossible. But let us hear his own words (p. 18): “No general council would be binding without their (i. e., ‘the three great bishops’) presence in person, or by deputy, or their subsequent ratification.” Now on what ground was the consent of these three individual patriarchs requisite? Not surely because without their agreement the decrees would not possess universal consent, as wanting that of three bishops; such a supposition were absurd. It must have been on the ground, therefore, of those three bishops possessing some power and authority which others did not—a power of controlling by their three single voices the united decisions of the rest of the Church. Here, then, we behold the divine rights, not

only of single bishops, but of the whole collected episcopate, subjected to the control of three metropolitans, who, on Mr. A.'s view, possessed *jure divino* (St. Peter's successor included,) no higher powers than were lodged in every single bishop of the Church. It is plain, then, that Mr. A. holds a theory utterly incompatible with the assertion that universal consent was the sole test of truth in the earlier ages. Still the question remains,—what does he mean, or what can any Anglican mean, by *universal consent*?

As used by Catholics, the meaning of the term is literal and plain. Universal consent—Catholic consent—is the consent of the whole Church, i. e., of the whole episcopal body in union with the Pope. This body constitutes the true Church: it is a visible body, easily discernible. Every member of this body agrees in holding the same doctrine, which is, therefore, a matter of universal consent.

But what is the meaning of the term as used by Anglicans? It cannot possibly mean that every bishop, as such, will consent to the truth. It must mean, therefore, that some particular portion of the episcopal body will consent; which particular portion, therefore, constitutes the true Church. This imposes upon

an Anglican the necessity of inquiring *which* particular portion consents to the truth ; that is to say, it throws him back upon his private judgment, first to decide for himself what is truth, and thence to determine which is the body consenting thereto. So that, whereas men were to learn truth by the teaching of the Church, the Anglican has to find out the Church by it's teaching the truth—of which truth he is himself the sole judge.

It may be replied, however, that the truth will always be held by a *majority*, at least, of the episcopal body ; that, seeing Christ has promised that the gates of hell shall not prevail against His Church, error will not be *pre-dominant* in her. But how is this majority to be ascertained, especially by the common run of men ? It must be matter, at least, of computation and inquiry. The Church has not met in general council for above three hundred years ; according to Anglicans not for more than a thousand. Thus the burden is laid on every one of discovering the Church by a kind of calculation ; and as such a calculation must be, under ordinary circumstances, impossible even to be attempted, men are necessarily driven to the resource of deciding which is the true Church by their own

notions of truth. To them the true Church is the body which teaches that doctrine which *they believe* to be Catholic truth.

But, in fact, no Anglican ever attempts to apply the much-vaunted rule of St. Vincentius fairly. He forgets, or neglects, the "*quod semper*" altogether, while he misapplies and misunderstands the "*quod ubique*," and "*ab omnibus*." He never dreams of supposing himself bound to hold what the majority of true bishops teach *now*; he merely arbitrarily applies the rule, or fancies he applies it, to some past time. Whereas it has been well shown,* it was intended for a living rule, to be applicable and true in *all* times.

An Anglican may reply, however, that he does not hold the view above-mentioned—that the majority will teach all truth without mixture of error; but that he believes that when all differences are deducted, the *residuum* which all agree in holding is Catholic truth. But this, it need hardly be observed, leaves to men the lowest possible amount of faith, and, indeed, plunges them into the depths of heresy at once.

Or he may hold the opinion that all will

* *The Exercise of Faith impossible except in the Catholic Church*, by W. G. Penny, pp. 93-102.

agree in teaching what he calls the *essential* truths of the Gospel ; and that when the Church is spoken of as the pillar and ground of the truth, and as having Christ's promise of perpetuity, all that is meant is that she, or rather a certain section within her, shall constantly hold and maintain certain cardinal verities necessary to salvation. But here, again, is it not plain that he must take upon himself the office of deciding what is, and what is not, an essential truth ?

In short, whatever view an Anglican may hold, and however Catholic the language he uses may be, he still applies the principle of *selection* ; and misuses the rule which the Church follows to guide her into truth, to his own discovery of the Church, which was to be his teacher.

All that I have been hitherto explicitly contending for, is the necessity of the Papal consent to the constitution and authority of a general council—a point upon which all Catholics are agreed. But something still further is implied in the argument, I mean the doctrine of the *Papal infallibility*.* This, it

* It may be necessary to state, that when theologians speak of the infallibility of the Pope, they mean not that he is exempt from liability to error in affairs of ordinary

is scarcely necessary to say, is not a formally ruled doctrine of the Church, and, therefore, not an article of faith among Catholics; but it is that which is very generally entertained by the divines of the Church at the present day, as it certainly follows by necessary logical consequence from the theological truth which has been stated in these pages. It is the true logical development of that idea of

discretion or private opinion, nor in mere matters of fact, or judgment of persons, but only as speaking *ex cathedra*, and formally pronouncing judgment in questions of faith and morals.

“A decision of the Pope in order that it may oblige the faith of the heart, and the profession of the mouth of all Christians, must be a decision made solemnly, and, as the usual saying is, *ex cathedra*; i. e. it must be made by him as master, head, and pastor of all the faithful. I declare this condition in the words of the ‘Defence of the Declaration of the Gallican Clergy,’ which is said to be Bossuet’s. The first condition required is, that the matter defined should belong to the doctrine of revealed religion, or should treat of speculative points to be believed, or of practical (moral) points to be performed. In fine, it must be a doctrinal decision, not a command of a thing to be done. For example, Pope St. Stephen against the rebaptizers decided “*nihil innovetur*.” This decision commands a practice to be observed, and does not define a speculative point to be believed. The speculative point would have been thus defined, “baptism conferred by heretics is valid.” The second condition is, that the Pontiff expressly declare that he defines the matter as *of faith*, and exact on the point defined the submission of the intellect. Bolgeni, tom. ii. cap. xi. Art. vi. (See Appendix on the case of St. Cyprian.)

the episcopate, which, as I maintain, is the ancient Catholic idea, and was expressed by those very Fathers and Councils, by whose language and testimony Mr. A. seeks to justify the Anglican Church in her rejection of the claims of the Papal See. The episcopate is one ; it was given to one, viz., Peter, by Christ Himself ; the rest had part in it by union with Peter ; they had part in the whole by union with him to whom the whole was given. Now one of the attributes of the episcopate is infallibility ;* hence Peter, who received it as a whole, received also in himself the power of infallible judgment. But to Peter were added the rest of the Apostles, who, in virtue of their extraordinary powers, were all

* Whether Mr. A. positively holds that the Church is infallible in matters of faith he no where expressly states, though it is implied in many passages which he quotes with approbation. However there are many High Churchmen who do, who also maintain the common Anglican theory of the independent sovereignty, by divine right, of every individual bishop, so that every bishop's see, is a perfect independent church sufficient for itself, and containing in itself " the full proportions of the indivisible body of Christ." Yet if every bishop possesses the episcopate in himself, he must also possess infallibility as well as sovereignty ; if not, the episcopate is divided, and its attributes separated from itself, as well as from each other. This is one of the many inconsistencies which are the result of supposing that the one episcopate resides in its fulness in every separate bishop.

personally infallible judges in matters of faith. Yet they were so, not separately, but only in union with Peter. Peter had singly that and all other attributes, of which they also had full possession as united with him. But, as has been shown in the case of sovereignty and universal jurisdiction, no bishop, or union of bishops, succeeded to the powers of any apostle or number of apostles. It is only in their corporate capacity that the bishops of the Church succeed to the apostolic college, and to those attributes which are inseparable from the one episcopate ; but the Pope as successor of St. Peter, possessing all the personal prerogatives of the head of the apostolic body, possesses in himself the fulness of the episcopate, and with it the inseparable attribute of infallibility.

But it is contended by Mr. A. that, if the Pope be endued with an universal and infallible authority, a general council would never have been needed, and would never have been resorted to ; the judgment of the Pope alone would have been final and binding, without the consent of the bishops of the Church.

Now, in the first place, that general councils were actually held, and were considered requisite in order to the framing new definitions

of faith, and making them binding upon the universal church, is no positive proof that they were accounted absolutely and abstractedly necessary. Every practice of the Church is not to be taken as equivalent to the enunciation of a doctrine. That under *certain* circumstances, councils *ought* to be convened, is one thing; that, under *all* circumstances, they *must* be convened, is another. Mr. A. has produced no testimony to show that the Church of the first six centuries held that nothing but a general council, or the whole collective episcopate, could make laws or pronounce judgments which were binding on the Church. All that he has even attempted to show is, that, as a matter of fact, in all important dissensions and questions of faith, no complete and final settlement was made, and no decision was considered authoritative and irreversible, until to the sentence of the Roman Pontiff was added the consenting voice of the bishops of the Church. On this negative testimony he grounds his positive assertion, that the doctrine of the papal infallibility is irreconcilable with the teaching of the Fathers, and the decrees of general councils.

But more than this: in the testimony which he adduces (p. 77), he establishes this im-

portant fact, not only that the Roman Pontiff actually pronounced “very many judgments *on matters of faith*,” with an authority to which no parallel can be found in the acts of other bishops ; but that his judgments under ordinary circumstances would have been sufficient of themselves without the assembling of a general council—that is to say, not only was the consent of the Pope necessary to the validity of a general council, but his judgment given independently was a *positive authoritative judgment*. So far, therefore, from proving the incapacity of the Pope to judge alone, Mr. A. has himself pointed to the conclusion, and adduced presumptive evidence in its support, that, under other conditions and circumstances, the successor of St. Peter might take to himself the sole determination of all causes, even questions of faith, as concentrating in his own person the supreme authority of the episcócate. If any one will carefully examine and candidly weigh the authorities to which Mr. A. has appealed, as given by himself, he will see that not only do they prove nothing against the present papal claims, but that they imply a kind of authority in the see of Rome, of which the later practice and teaching of the Church is the natural development.

Mr. A. seems to suppose that a general council was assembled because there was no other way in which the truth could be ascertained, declared, and enforced; and that, short of such an object, its assembling was useless. He fails to perceive another great object which it fulfilled, viz., the exhibition and exemplification of the unity of the faith of the Church in the agreement of all. The unity and consent of the Church was a fact which had to be brought before the eyes of men, and made a matter of observation. They had to learn it by present experience. It was not sufficient to have it declared by the result; it had to be acted out before them in order that it might be seen and felt to be a reality. Bossuet set forth this very principle where he says (quoted by Mr. A., p. 71): "Nor is the Church assembled, that unity and consent may have force, but it is therefore assembled that the unity, which in itself has force in the Church, everywhere spread abroad, may be more clearly demonstrated in the same Church assembled." Here it is declared that the decision of the Church was not less infallible and binding when dispersed throughout the world, than when assembled in general council. Now, if the necessity of assembling a general council

be not incompatible with the infallibility of the “*Ecclesia dispersa*,” how is it incompatible with the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff? * If for six centuries the consent of the Church united in council was necessary, although the “*Ecclesia dispersa*” was itself a supreme authority, and capable of giving infallible judgment, why may not that consent have also been necessary, although the authority of the Roman Pontiff was an infallible authority, and of force by itself in the Church? The reason which Bossuet assigns in the one case may be assigned in the other, viz., the clearer demonstration of the unity and consent of the Church. If, in the one case was demonstrated the agreement of the members with each other, in the other was demonstrated their agreement with their head.

Of the truth of these statements we have an incontestable evidence in the first council held at Jerusalem† by the apostles which is

* It cannot be argued that the voice of the “*Ecclesia dispersa*” cannot make itself heard except in a General Council, because, not to make the obvious answer that this deprives the “*Ecclesia dispersa*” of all authority and force, and merges its voice in that of a General Council, such an argument is not in accordance with fact; the “*Ecclesia dispersa*” *has* spoken with infallible authority, for instance (as Anglicans will say) in its condemnation of the heresy of Pelagius.

† In a note to p. 179, Mr. A. quotes a passage from St. Chrysostom in reference to this council, which he thinks

appealed to as affording the type and form of all œcumenical councils. This council was composed of apostles, who were personally infallible, and of elders or bishops, who individually were not so. If, then, there existed a necessity for the assembling an apostolic council, though each apostle was infallible, there might be a like necessity for the assembling an episcopal council, though the Pope, as successor of St. Peter, was by himself a supreme and infallible judge ; and that the assent of the bishops of the Church should have been necessary, under circumstances, in addition to the decision of the

flatly contradicts Bellarmine's doctrine. He seems to infer from the words of the holy father, that St. James as bishop of Jerusalem had a right to be heard before St. Peter. The person "intrusted with the government" he supposes to be St. James. This however is not so evident. Mr. Waterworth, in his "*Faith of Catholics*," I perceive, applies the words to St. Peter. But even granting Mr. A.'s construction of the passage to be the true one, the person not rebuked is not St. Peter, but *St. Paul*. The notice, therefore, which St. Chrysostom makes of the fact of St. Peter having spoken first, without any such comment as Mr. A. imagines, would rather be a proof that he had a right on some other ground to speak before all. Let Mr. A. compare this passage with the language of the same father respecting St. Peter in the matter of St. Matthias' election, in which he declares that, had he pleased, that apostle might of himself have elected Matthias into Judas's place.

Pope, is no more incompatible with the absolute power of the Pope to judge alone, than the necessity of a general apostolic council is with the personal infallibility of each individual apostle, and his capacity of deciding of himself in all matters of faith.

The simple account of the matter seems to be, that the consent of the Church was more clearly demonstrated in the agreement of all than in the judgment of one. Ere the council was held, we read (Acts xv. 2) there was “no small dissension and disputation,” and when it was assembled, there was “much disputing” (v. 7): there was need, therefore, of a deliberate and solemn judgment from the whole apostolic body for the more perfect assurance and satisfaction of the faithful. Though Paul and Barnabas had power of themselves to decide the matter in dispute, because, in virtue of their apostolic infallibility, their judgment in matters of faith must have coincided with that of the whole apostolic body, yet, for the surer healing of dissension and confirmation of the truth, they referred the decision of the question to the judgment of the assembled Church.

And the same reason may be given for the gathering of general councils from time to

time. The Church was to be a spectacle to men and angels, and by it was to be learned the manifold wisdom of God. In every earthly kingdom was confusion and division. The infallibility and unity of the Church was exhibited in the consent and unerring decisions of the collected episcopate, in which is "the visible display of the presence of the Holy Ghost." General councils, therefore, were assembled, not because the judgment of the Pope was held to be unauthoritative or insufficient in itself, but in order that the consent of the Church might be more fully and evidently made manifest. Thus in the case of Nestorius, Pope Celestine being requested by St. Cyril to unfold his testimony, proceeds to pronounce sentence "on a matter of faith, under threat of deposition and excommunication." "We confess plainly," says Bossuet (quoted p. 79), "that the sentence of Celestine would have been sufficient, as Cyril hoped, to repress the new heresy, had not great commotions arisen, and the matter seemed of such a nature as to be referred to an ecumenical council." Although, therefore, as a matter of fact, the sentence of the Pope was not a final sentence, there is nothing in the account opposed to the belief that he possessed the power of himself

to pronounce a final and irrevocable judgment, had the interests or the necessities of the Church so required. But to heal divisions, and to restore internal unity and peace, it was necessary, not only that a final judgment should be pronounced, but that the consent of the Church should be exhibited. The assembling of a council, therefore, was the most effectual measure to “unite the most holy Church,” and “most fully consolidate and restore the tottering.”

The same is evident from the fact of the general council of Chalcedon, as stated also by Bossuet. St. Flavian of Constantinople begs St. Leo to “decree that the condemnation which he (Flavian) had pronounced upon Eutyches, was regularly passed ;” and thus to give the question final settlement, and render unnecessary a general council. St. Leo did, in consequence, “most fully and clearly set forth” the orthodox doctrine ; and this, under ordinary circumstances, would have been sufficient, and “the question might have been terminated.” But “when the episcopal order had been divided, and the whole Church thrown into confusion, under the name of the Second Ecumenical Council of Ephesus, Leo admitted that a new general council must be

held, which should either remove or mitigate all offences, so that there should no longer be either any doubt as to faith, or division in charity." He perceived that his authoritative judgment would not be sufficient to remove "such a fluctuation of mind respecting the faith itself," but that the consent of the whole Church must be clearly made known; and "thus," still to use the words of Bossuet, "from Peter, the head and source of unity, the sentence began, and then became of full force by common agreement of the bishops, just as that first council of the apostles is always re-presented." Here again, then, there is no positive testimony against the *power* of the Roman Pontiff, but simply to the fact that, in a particular case, he did not insist upon his own judgment as final, but summoned a general council for the better satisfaction of the Church. This is St. Leo's own account of the matter, where he says (p. 132): "What God had before set forth by our ministry, He hath confirmed by the irreversible assent of the whole brotherhood, to show that what was first put forth in form by the First See of all, and then received by the judgment of the whole Christian world, really proceeded from Himself, (that in this, too, the members might

agree with the Head). For, *in order that the consent of other sees to that which the Lord appointed to preside over all the rest, should not appear flattery, or any other adverse suspicion creep in*, persons were found who doubted concerning our judgment.....The truth, likewise, itself is both *more clearly conspicuous, and more strongly maintained*, when after-examination confirms what previous faith had taught." In these words of St. Leo is expressed all that I seek to establish. The decision of a general council is regarded as rendering the truth "more clearly conspicuous," and causing it to be "more strongly maintained," and also as exhibiting and attesting the supreme infallible authority of the papal judgments. So far, therefore, from supplying testimony against the present Roman doctrine, they implicitly contain and assert it.

I have shown that the judgment of the Pope was held to be a real, authoritative judgment, sufficient, under circumstances, without the consent of a general council; which amounts to a presumption that, though not *actually* final, *potentially* it was so. In confirmation of this, another point is very worthy of observation, which is, that in the instances adduced the Pope consented to, and

promoted, nay, “demanded” the assembling of a general council. He authorized its sitting, presided at it by deputy, and confirmed its acts by its legates. It is one thing, therefore, for the Pope, of his own will and judgment, to suspend or defer the execution of his sentence, and refer the final settlement of the matter to the decision of a general council, himself presiding thereat, acting therewith, and consenting thereto ; and another thing for a (so-called) general council to take to itself the re-examination of a question already deliberately discussed, and finally decided by the Pope. This was not the case in the councils either of Ephesus, or of Chalcedon. They were not held to reconsider a question upon which the Pope had finally pronounced, or which he declared to be decided, and to need no further consideration.

Mr. A., however, will maintain that the judgments which had previously been pronounced by the Popes were reconsidered and examined by the assembled bishops, which act alone affords positive testimony against the supreme authority and infallibility of papal decrees. But here he seems to confound two things, which are essentially different—the examining of a papal judgment, and the de-

liberating on the matter which was the subject of that judgment. It was the latter which was the office of bishops assembled in council.* The council did not re-consider the papal decision ; they *re-considered* nothing. They deliberated, as *ab initio*, on the subject proposed to them. They did not sit in judgment on the Pope, but gave sentence *with* the Pope, as true judges of faith. They would not have been *judges*, had they not been free to deliberate, free to examine. They were called together neither to assent to a papal judgment, nor to confirm it. When the Pope, as Peter's successor, gave judgment, whether in person, or by deputy, or by letter, whether as then first pronouncing, or as repeating the judg-

* The only case in which a council can be said (strictly speaking) to examine a papal letter or decree, is that in which the matter laid before them for judgment is *contained* in that letter or decree. The assembled bishops could pass no judgment upon the subject-matter of St. Leo's letter, any more than upon the writings of Nestorius or any other heretic, without reading, examining, and judging ; but who will therefore say that they read, examined and judged in the same sense ? To examine in order to give judgment with another, is quite a different matter to examining whether a party accused is guilty or not guilty. It is a mistaken view, therefore, to represent the procedure at a council of the Church as of the nature of a trial, in which there is "a presumption in favour" of the Pope's decree, which does not exist in favour of the suspected heretic ;—there is all the difference between a criminal and his judge.

ment already pronounced, the rest, as in the first assembly of the apostles, did not “so proceed as if they were altogether bound by the authority of the first sentence” (p. 72); “plainly deliberating, not blindly subscribing out of mere obedience” (p. 129). Bound, indeed, they were, but by an unconscious and divine necessity, which left them free to decide, free to consent—a necessity which ensured their concurrence with the sentence of Peter, and gave to that concurrence “the most certain authority of the Holy Spirit, by which they were led captive to obedience” (p. 70, 71). They judged, not as by the authority of the Pope, nor yet as possessing a power which was superior to his, nor as adding to his authority a force which it had not before; they sat not as counsellors of the Pope, nor yet as judges of papal decrees, but as princes of the Church, successors of the apostles, true judges of faith, by the authority of Christ and of the Spirit of Truth. And thus decreeing together, judging together, the sentence of the council was the sentence of the Pope, and became (as thus only it could become,) a confirmation of the truth, and a final decision. By their free and deliberate judgment, the bishops and the Pope united demonstrated to the

world the unity and consent of the universal Church.

And, together, with this, another truth was demonstrated, which, though not formally stated, was always implied—the infallible authority of the Supreme Pontiff.* The decisions

* 1. Mr. A. alludes (p. 148) to the case of Pope Vigilius. It is allowed on all hands that as regarded the “substance of the faith,” both parties were agreed. The question between the council and the Pope was one of prudence and expediency; and in such questions no Catholic imagines that the Pope is impeccable, or that opposition is schism. In such matters the opinion of the council might prevail over that of the Pope, and the Pope give way and acknowledge himself wrong, without impeaching either his supremacy or his infallibility.

Upon the point of faith Vigilius never wavered; he simply vacillated in a question of prudence, whether, situated as he was between contending parties, one of which feared “lest the Nestorian, the other lest the Eutychæan, enemies of the Council of Chalcedon should prevail,” he should condemn the Three Articles or no. “His changings,” says Dr. Dollinger, vol. ii. p. 187, “had no reference to dogmas of faith; in these he was ever the same; for even in his *Constitutum* he condemned the propositions drawn from the writings of Theodore, and all that Theodoret had written against St. Cyril. He varied only on this question of ecclesiastical economy, whether it were prudent to condemn writings which the Council of Chalcedon had spared, and to anathematize a man who had died in the communion of the Church.” See Bolgeni, *Tom. ii Art. vii. Cap. xi.*

2. Though not falling within the centuries to which he makes his appeals, Mr. A. also introduces (p. 174) the “fact of Honorius condemned by the sixth Ecumenical Council in 681, as having connived at and favoured the

which proved the consent of the Church, proved also—not simply declared but *proved*, with an amount of moral certainty not to be resisted—this marvellous fact that the judgment of the Pope was the judgment of the

Monothelite heresy”—“a fact which (he thinks) utterly destroys” the dogma of the Papal infallibility.

This case, like the last, cannot be here entered upon fully. The reader is referred to Kenrick *on the Primacy*, —pp. 149–151. Dollinger's *History of the Church*, vol. ii. pp. 196–7. Ballerini *de Primatu*, pp. 415–426, and Bolgeni *L'Episcopato*, as above. It will be sufficient to observe that so far from Pope Honorius having pronounced any heretical definition, the very ground of his condemnation (so to call it) by the council, was that he had forbore to pass any formal sentence, and had discouraged the agitation of the question. His own letters, which are still extant, express the orthodox *doctrine* on the subject of the “two operations,” but he had enjoined silence as to the *terms*, and so had favoured, rather than condemned the Monothelite heresy.

It is in no way necessary to the dogma of the Pope's infallibility that he may not be betrayed by the artifices of heretics into measures prejudicial to the interests of the Church, and through a misconception of his private judgment express himself in terms which by their ambiguity may fail to repress the error against which they are directed. What is guaranteed to him by Christ's promise is not a personal absolute infallibility, but such as may be called *relative* to the Church; i. e. that, in his official capacity and speaking *ex cathedra*, he shall never maintain error, or fail to enforce the truth. The council by anathematizing Pope Honorius as a heretic, condemned not his faith but his conduct. The fathers would censure as a “*heretic*” one who by his situation was bound to repress heresy, but who by his negligence had contributed to embolden or foster it.

Church. It is a matter of notoriety that, wherever a council has opposed the Pope in matters of faith, the council has yielded at length, and been proved to be wrong; but that, whenever a Pope has refused to ratify the decrees of a council, his judgment has been accepted to the end, and proved to be right. This exemption from error Mr. A. remarks upon (p. 55), attributing the great "moral weight" which "the voice of the bishop of Rome" obtained in the Church, to a "concurrence of events," in all which he "was beheld immovable, supporting with his whole authority what *turned out* to be the orthodox view." Rather, I would say, it was thus that the feeling which had possessed the Church from the beginning, gradually assumed the form of a conscious and settled conviction. And what, I would ask, could have so firmly fixed in the mind of the Church a belief in the infallibility of her head, as this constant experience of the unerring orthodoxy of his authoritative judgments? As, then, it was part of God's providential dealings with His Church, that the unity of her faith should be more clearly demonstrated by the consent of her bishops, so He would show to the world, rather by experience than by express declara-

tion, that the infallibility which resided in the whole collective episcopate, resided also in him, who, as Peter's successor, was "the head and pillar of the Faith, and foundation of the Catholic Church ;"* and that it was the same Spirit of Truth who spoke, whether the whole body concurred in an audible judgment, or the head alone gave utterance to His word. And still to this day, whether the Pope give judgment, or the whole episcopal body in union with him, it is consent in which the supreme and indefectible power resides ;—i. e. in the Pope as expressing the judgment of the Church, or in the Church, which is the body united with its head, giving unanimous judgment. "This is the supreme authority—the supreme power—that the members be joined with each other, and to the Roman Pontiff, as their head." (Bossuet, quoted p. 90.) "It is on no other principle that unity and consent have force in councils, or in the assembled Church, than because they have equal force in the church spread through the whole world." Such unity and consent the Church now exhibits, united in communion with the holy Pontiff, in willing subjection to his paternal

* Words of Philip the legate to the Council of Ephesus, quoted by Mr. A. in the words of Bossuet, p. 91.

control and government, and concurring spontaneously in all his acts and judgments—one body attached to one head, one fold under one shepherd.

The main object of Mr. A.'s work is to contrast what he considers to have been the ancient constitution of the Church with that which he characterizes as a later "corruption." (p. 66.) In his advertisement" he says that the Fathers "unanimously held the Roman *primacy* and the *patriarchal* system, but as unanimously did not hold, nor even contemplate, that supremacy or *monarchy*" which Rome now claims. At page 172 he says that "it has been no longer left in the choice of any to accept the Pope's *primacy* without accepting his *monarchy*." All I have hitherto laid down while stating the Catholic view of the episcopate, and subsequently when treating of the subject of jurisdiction, will have tended to refute this charge, and dispose of this difficulty. But it may be well to offer a few further observations upon the different points of view, from which, owing to difference of situation, the Fathers regarded the constitution and government of the Church.

It is unnecessary to remark, that a wide difference exists between statements that simply

differ from each other, but are compatible, and such as are diametrically opposed, and, therefore, incapable of being reconciled. Had Mr. A.'s view of the episcopate been correct, and had the consequences flowing from the Roman doctrine been such as he supposes, this irreconcilable difference would have indeed existed. But if these points have been, as I have endeavoured to show, misunderstood by him, no such insurmountable difficulty remains. There remains only that of which he himself suggests the solution (p. 169)—an absence of precise, dogmatic statements upon certain truths which were implicitly held in the mind of the Church, and occasionally a vagueness and indistinctness of expression, perhaps also of thought, and what in the present day, when the rise of heresies has made stricter definitions necessary, would be loose and inaccurate language. The truth is, that the Fathers did not hold any different view, but regarded the same view under a different aspect; or the point to which their attention was directed, appeared in the strongest light, like that object upon which our eyes rest in a landscape, though the whole is pictured on the retina. Holding that the episcopate was one, and that that episcopate was

lodged in the apostolic college, with St. Peter at its head, and was inseparable from him, they held in reality that which includes and implies later developments. Vain is it to object that their view of the government of the Church was the patriarchal, whereas the present Roman view is purely monarchical. Human affairs and earthly forms of government are but a faint shadow and type of the divine ; and that which would be impossible to be realized in the one, is not so in the other. Earthly finite things are what they are, exclusive of every thing else : it is not so with divine. The kingdom of God is not a simple aristocracy, nor a monarchy tempered by an aristocracy. But, regarded from one point of view—i. e., considered in its head, St. Peter—it is a pure monarchy ; regarded from another—i. e., viewed in the aspect in which it was regarded in the earlier ages, as a corporate body, an apostolic college reigning together, and together exercising the sovereign authority—it is an aristocracy with a presiding head. But this sovereign authority was one and indivisible, and could not, therefore, be separated from its head, which was the source of its unity. The body could not be set against the head, nor the head set against the body ;

that was impossible, because the body was that, and that only, which clave to the head, and was not a body, except as cleaving to the head. Strictly speaking, therefore, the Church from the beginning was a monarchy, though practically it assumed a more aristocratic or patriarchal form.

The apostles themselves while on earth, seem to have furnished an example of these two aspects of the government of the Church. During twelve years, as tradition says, by the command of their Lord, they did not depart from Palestine, but ruled, in one united college, with Peter at their head, the Church of Christ. During this period, we have the example of the first general council, when the princes of the Church sat on their thrones judging. There was the sovereign episcopate, the one power which Christ had left on earth—one in the unity of its one head, and one shepherd. But the Church was to be universal, as well as one. The apostles, therefore, dispersed themselves through the world on their universal mission, and began to plant churches; but still (as St. Optatus says) in virtual subjection to St. Peter, and still (as St. Leo says) after that type and form of unity, of which the apostolic college, with its head,

contained the divine original. The power of the head would thus naturally come more into active exercise (as Mr. A. observes) to keep the whole body together, when dispersed in its operations over a large surface. The centripetal force would increase (as he himself allows) in proportion to the increase of the centrifugal ; but this, not from any mere natural law of consequences, but by the exercise of a living energy and power always present in the Church from the beginning. And thus, even, during the apostles' lifetime, would an example be presented of both forms and aspects of the government of the Church.

And the same account may be given of the absence of all precise statements in the earlier Fathers, with respect to the actual relations of the See of St. Peter to the rest of the Church. Thus they conceived that jurisdiction, and all other powers of the episcopate, belonged to the Church as containing within it the See of St. Peter, and as being incorporated therewith in inseparable union ; as though the Church rather *possessed* all the powers of the episcopate by having within it the See of St. Peter, than *derived* those powers from it by any actual communication. The Church was to them one living whole, whose actions were

those of an indivisible body ; and never did it occur to them to analyze its parts, or to distribute its relative powers, much less to separate the members from the integrity of the whole. They beheld the sovereign authority of the Church, not as Mr. A. conceives, lodged independently in each separate bishop, but possessed in the unity of that see which was the beginning and origin of all the powers of the episcopate, and which was to the rest of the Church the sacrament of unity and the root of jurisdiction. It is in fact, as I have already noticed, their deep, and, to un-Catholic minds, almost unintelligible conception of unity, which gives to the writings of the Fathers the appearance of overlooking or obscuring the peculiar prerogatives of Peter's successor, as considered apart from those of other bishops. Their thoughts dwelt rather on the unity of the body as ever existing in it, even as the source of unity was ever in it, than on the process of derivation by which unity was continually imparted and preserved.

But when heresy and schism not only violently assaulted and distracted the Church, but began to assail the very bonds by which its unity was preserved, and to labour to dismember the body, and to sever it from the source

of its life and power, her defenders were obliged to turn their eyes inward, and reflect upon her relations to the seat of her strength. The schismatical and heretical bodies in the early ages did not specially oppose the claims of the chair of St. Peter. Of course, whoever separated from the unity of the Church, virtually did oppose his claims, as his chair is the centre of unity of the Church ; but his claims were not the special ground of their separation, nor the object of their peculiar animadversion. On the contrary, they would have rejoiced could they by any means have procured the shelter of his name and countenance. It is natural, therefore, that in speaking on the subject both of heresy and schism, the claims of Peter and the Church united, rather than of Peter singly, should have been the prevailing subject with the Fathers. The unity of the Church, as consolidated upon Peter's chair, and, in effect, identified with it, is their usual topic. This strongly makes for, instead of against the Catholic view ; but, seen through modern notions, it conducts many, as it does Mr. A., to the erroneous conclusion, that such language is merely a figure of speech, in which the chair of Peter either simply represents the Church, or signifies the see of every

individual bishop, as having no equal claim to the title.

When, however, schism was made on the direct ground of opposition to the personal claims of the Roman Pontiff, the mind of the Church was forced to discriminate, and to disjoin in contemplation, what she would fain ever have contemplated as a whole. And hence would naturally follow clearer teaching on the subject, and ultimately, when need required, a dogmatical decision. Schism may then be said to have taken its most malignant shape. It became pure schism when separation was made from the see of St. Peter, on the very ground of hostility to his personal claims. One might almost say that no previous schism had (by comparison) deserved the name. Pride had indeed "budded" when unity was broken from enmity to the very centre and essence of it. And as this was essential schism, so did it become imperative to state what was of the essence of unity, and what its immutable conditions. It became imperative to define and describe clearly the nature of the seamless robe of Christ. And, alas! does not that necessity still continue, when men, and those who would fain entertain Catholic views, and who are conspicuous

indeed for many Catholic sentiments and feelings, seem to consider that robe as nothing more than a garment with well-joined seams—not seamless, not woven throughout, and incapable of being divided, but something which might be separated and joined together again and no rent be made?

CHAPTER IV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

My object now shall be to show the nature and consequences of the theory which Mr. A. sets up in opposition to the Catholic doctrine, as well as the actual conclusions in which his argument terminates with respect to the Roman Church.

And, first, I will point out the real meaning and character of the accusation which he brings against Rome. His accusation is this, that the Pope and Church of Rome lay claim to that very power against which St. Gregory so vigorously protested in his reprobation of the title of “Universal Bishop.” He considers (note, p. 163) that St. Gregory’s words “contain one of the most remarkable prophecies to be found in history,” as they exactly describe that assumption of universal dominion

which is now actually claimed and exercised by the Pope.

Now let us consider the words which St. Gregory applies to the claimer of such a title, and to the title itself. He says (quoted by Mr. A. pp. 160-163), that “whoever calls himself, or desires to be called, universal priest, *in his pride goes before Anti-christ.*” “*he wishes to appear God over all men.*” He calls the words of the Patriarch John a “*poisonous sentence,*” by which “the living members of Christ’s body” might be “*destroyed.*” He characterizes the claim as “*an attempt of diabolic usurpation.*” He says, “*the enemy of the human race hath appeared in anticipation to have for his precursors, through the name of pride, those very priests who ought by a good and humble life to resist him.*” He calls it a “*nefarious name,*” a “*blasphemous name,*” an “*appellation*” “*which the first Apostate invented.*”

And these are the terms which Mr. A. adopts without qualification as exactly descriptive of, and applicable to the papal power and claims. He calls (pp. 170, 171) the very notion of such a doctrine as he imagines is held by Catholics, “*blasphemous and anti-christian.*” He says (p. 170), that “any one

reading these words of St. Gregory, and not knowing whence they came, would suppose they were written by a professed opponent of the present papal claims." And his defence of the Anglican Church (p. 171) is "simply this. That no one can now be in the communion of Rome without admitting this very thing which Pope Gregory declares to be *blasphemous and anti-christian, and derogatory to the honour of every priest.*"

Now, if such be the case, and the claim and doctrine condemned answer precisely to those of the present Roman Church, I see not how Mr. A. can shrink from the conclusion which genuine Protestants accept—that the Pope is the precursor and type of Anti-christ, if not Anti-christ himself, whose pride he so closely imitates; that his name is "*blasphemy*," both the "title and the theory implied in it" being "*devilish*," "*an imitation of Satan*," "*an anticipation of Anti-christ*," (p. 370.) Here then, after all, is the old charge in the very same terms. Mr. A. has said (p. 66), that the language which St. Augustine uses against the Donatists is applicable to all those who declare the Roman Church to be so corrupt that it is not a part of the true Church; but what stronger condemnation has ever been

passed upon the Church of Rome by schismatics or heretics of this and other times, than that with which she is assailed by Mr. A. and those who hold similar language? But if this be so—if the words of St. Gregory be indeed prophetic of the Roman usurpation—then, I say, why waste your labour in pretence of justifying the English Church from the charge of schism? What need of excuses when you are yourselves the accusers? Why take up with ground so low, when your calling is so high, even to testify to the Truth against Antichrist? what meaning have all your expressions of sympathy and longings for unity? how false, nay, how faithless, the courtesy which gives the name of Catholic to the enemy of God and His Church! The Church of Christ is she who contends for her Lord, not sets herself up against Him—“what concord hath Christ with Belial?” If this be so, that, and that only, is the Church of Christ which protests against Rome and all her abominations. I know that the writer would recoil from such sentiments as these; I mean not for a moment to fasten them upon him; his feelings on the subject are far higher than what, I must say, is consistently his creed. I must protest, however, against the unreality of using argu-

ments without being willing to accept their consequences. It is an unreality pervading all attacks upon Rome, which do not avow the true Protestant principle.

In the course of his argument, Mr. A. gives expression to a sentiment upon which, as it has an important bearing upon the morality of the Anglican theory, I must not omit to remark. Shortly after characterizing the claim of Supremacy as one which the bishops of the “West and the East would have rejected with the horror shown by St. Gregory at the first dawning of such an idea,” (p. 172,) he alludes to the case of members of the Roman Church at the present day in these words: “We have no need to consider what is the amount of this difficulty to Roman Catholics themselves: the same Providence which has placed them under that obedience, has placed us outside of it.” Now surely, so far from there being *no need*, there is the greatest possible need to consider whether a theory which is to justify the separation of the Anglican Church from Catholic Christendom is applicable or not to the members of what he himself believes to be the largest proportion of the Catholic body.* What better proof can there be of its

* This is a common expedient with Anglican High

consistency, if it bears that application ; what stronger evidence to its one-sidedness, if it does not ? No Anglican is at liberty to avoid this consideration ; he is bound to show that a thoery upon which so much depends, is not invented to meet a case, nor incapable of general application. To put aside the consideration as needless, is to shrink from a test, to which, as he must be aware, all Catholic

Churchmen. It is one of the inherent faults of their position. For, as has been well observed by Mr. Faber, [*“ Grounds for remaining in the Anglican Communion,”* p. 44.] “ it always takes two lines, and argues opposite and incompatible sides of a question at the same time.” They construct a theory which is inconsistent with itself, and claim the right of applying it only on the side where it suits their own view. When urged to apply it to the opposite side, they answer, “ That is not to our purpose, which is simply to justify ourselves ;” or they say, “ We have nothing to do with consequences ;” and call it moderation and charity to abstain from carrying their theory to its necessary conclusions.

A knowledge of this inconsistency seems to be forcing itself upon some, and driving them from a position which it is impossible for any reasoning mind to maintain for long. Thus Mr. Wray in his *“ Reasons”* for rejecting the communion of the Roman Church, declares that she has *“ cut herself off from the rest of Christendom,”* and that *no one can safely continue in that Church,”* (pp. 5, 23.) —a sentiment (by the way) which involves a far more sweeping anathema than that which he makes a ground of denunciation against the Church of Rome. So also Dr. Hook, in a late Sermon, calls the Catholic Religion “ that worst corruption of Christianity, which is indeed the type of Antichrist.” This is intelligible.

minds will be sure to subject his defence of the Anglican Church. At all events I would ask, Can a question of so grave a character, involving, as it does, the alternative of schism on one side, or anti-christian usurpation on the other, be thought to have been disposed of, or even properly examined, so long as persons forbear to apply their conclusions to the present age of the Church, and the largest portion of its members?

But Mr. A. not only omits to bring his theory to this necessary test, but assigns a reason for this omission which is as immoral as it is illogical. "We have no need," he says, "to consider *what is the amount of this difficulty to Roman Catholics themselves: the same Providence which has placed them under that obedience, has placed us outside of it.*"

Now let us seriously consider what this sentence involves. The ground upon which, according to Mr. A., the Anglican Church separated from the Roman Patriarchate, was this,—that to remain, involved the admission of a claim which was blasphemous; submission to an usurpation which was anti-christian. "Better," such he affirms to be his conviction,—"better to endure almost any degree of usurpation, provided only it be not anti-chris-

tian, than to make a schism.” His whole argument is to the effect, that the Papal claim is “a corruption of the whole constitution of the Church;” he maintains that it is this, and nothing short of this, which justified the separation 300 years ago, and which justifies the present continuance of it on the part of the Anglican Church. And yet he can speak as if the duty of the subjects of this very usurpation at the present day, were a matter of difficult calculation; nay, he can declare, that it is needless to consider *what amount of difficulty* the question may impose upon them. What amount of difficulty!—Surely, if the case be such as he represents, if the dominion which Rome claims and exercises be *anti-christian*, what difficulty can there be?—Are not the subjects of such a rule, on coming to a knowledge of their position, bound, as they would save their souls, to forsake and renounce it?—Is it not the duty of every faithful Church of Christ throughout the world, which has rejected or shaken off the ungodly yoke, never to cease calling upon the adherents of such a system to disown and “reject with horror” the pretensions of a power which is the enemy of Christ and His Church? “The cause” (says Mr. A.) “cannot be different now from

what it was at the commencement of the separation ; if inherently indefensible then, it is so now." What is it, then, that makes all the difference between the condition and responsibilities of members of the Roman obedience at the present day, and their condition and responsibilities 300 years ago ? If " the lapse of three centuries " has not " materially affected " the position or the claims of the Papal See, how can it have materially affected the " relative duties " of christian men ? Is there not the same need as ever to consider a question which makes the whole difference between being under a christian, or an anti-christian constitution ? It is profane to talk as if some men were placed by God's Providence under an anti-christian obedience, and were consequently relieved from all responsibility by remaining where they find themselves ; such a reason might equally be urged in respect to the followers of Mahomet, or any Pagan superstition. I protest—as Mr. A. himself would protest, were he not blinded by a perverse and miserable theory—against the immorality of a doctrine which implies, that the Providence of God has placed the members of His Church under the dominion of Antichrist. The Reformers did not reason thus,

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and rightly too ; if the ground they took was true, their conduct was not only defensible, but just.

But this is not the only inconsistency which this passage exhibits. Mr. A. charges the Church of Rome with the guilt of the schism,* which her anti-christian usurpation has caused, and of which, but for that usurpation, he allows (p. 172,) that the Anglican Church would herself have been guilty. And yet he elsewhere directly asserts, and indeed his whole work is based upon the assumption, that the Roman Communion is an integral part of the Catholic Church. So that here we have two of the notorious Anglican paradoxes :—that a Church may make a schism—a “ state ” which “ is a frustration of the purposes of the Lord’s Incarnation ”—without being itself in the state which it makes ; and that one part of the Church may separate from another, without involving in schism either itself, or the part from which it separates. These, however, are only instances of the generally erroneous

* “ But the schism is made ; let those answer for it before Christ’s tribunal who made it.” (p. 174.) If these words mean what they express, the statement above is correct ; but it is often difficult to separate what Mr. A. really asserts from the rhetorical language in which it is clothed.

view which Mr. A. takes of the essential constitution of the Church, and of the nature of schism. It is necessary to show this at some length.

At p. 197 he says, "I have, throughout these remarks, considered the Church of Christ to be what, at the Councils of Nicea, Ephesus, and Chalcedon, she so manifestly appeared, one organic whole; a Body with One Head and many members; as St. Gregory says, Peter, and Paul, and Andrew, and John; a kingdom with One Sovereign and rulers, an apostolic college appointed by that Head, with a direct commission from Himself. I believe that no other idea about the Church prevailed up to St. Gregory's time. It follows, that *all so-called national churches, unless they be subordinate to the law of this kingdom, are so many infringements of the great primary law of unity*, in that they set up a member instead of the Body. St. Paul, in the 12th chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, has clearly set forth such, and no less, to be the unity of Christ's Body. Certainly it is a difficulty that *we must admit this essential law to be at present broken.*"

This passage alone is sufficient to prove to any Catholic mind that the position of the

Anglican Church is utterly indefensible even in theory: it can be defended only on the supposition that *an essential law of the unity of Christ's Body is broken*. He first declares that the Church *is one organic whole*—a body—a kingdom; that this is St. Paul's doctrine, and that no other idea prevailed up to St. Gregory's time. Unity, he says, is an essential law of the Church: churches that are merely *national*, (as contrasted, I should suppose, with such as are integral portions of the *Catholic* body,) he pronounces to be so many infringements of this great and primary law, as though this were of itself sufficient to condemn them. And yet his next assertion is that this essential law is at present broken.

Let those who stand doubting between antagonist theories well consider the admission here made—an admission deliberately put forward by a defender of the Anglican Church, as an inevitable conclusion from Anglican principles, and as necessary to the justification of the Anglican position. Let them thoroughly understand that the charge of schism can be repelled, and the claims of Rome rejected, only by admitting that an *essential* law of the unity of Christ's Church is broken. Let them see and acknowledge that if the Roman theory

be *supposed* to involve a violation of the constitution of the Church, the Anglican is *acknowledged* to involve an infringement of an essential law of its unity. I cannot conceive that candid minds, which are neither warped by prejudice, nor wedded to a theory, will hesitate to confess that the one assertion is as condemnatory of the Church of England, as the other, if true, would be condemnatory of the Church of Rome ; and that a state in which an essential law of the Church's unity is broken is as inadmissible in principle, as it is indefensible in practice. On the other hand they will perceive that the Roman view, however it may appear to them to be irreconcilable with the language of the Fathers and Councils, is at least in theory consistent ; and that the claims of the Papal See are asserted upon the broad and solid ground that the Church of Christ is now, as ever, one organic whole, in accordance with the doctrine of St. Paul, and the ancient idea of its essential constitution.

Mr. A., it must be observed, not only admits that the law of unity is broken, but asserts that *the actual state of the Anglican Church corresponds with that admission*. Indeed, there is an ambiguity in his expressions which leaves it doubtful, whether he does not admit

something even more than this, viz., that the state of the Anglican Church is an infringement of this law, but that other portions of the Church are not in a like condition. His words are, "But I do not think it fair to argue against a *provisional and temporary state*, such as that of the Church of England is confessed to be—which too, has been *forced upon her*—as if it were a normal state, one that we have chosen, a theory of unity that we put forth over against the ancient theory or the present Roman one. Nay, thousands and tens of thousands feel, the whole rising mind of the Church feels, that *we are torn "from Faith's ancient home,"* that we groan within ourselves, waiting until God in His good time restore a visible unity to His Church, till the East, and the West, and the South, be one again in the mind of Christ." It may be that he only means that the Anglican Church is *similarly* situated to every other portion of the divided Church—though why, in that case, he should think it necessary to apologize for its position, on the ground of its being only provisional and temporary, I cannot see—but his words certainly convey the impression that the state of the Anglican Church is a *separated* state, in contradistinction to that of other parts of

the great Catholic body; not that the whole body is dismembered, but that this particular portion is “torn” and severed “from Faith’s ancient home,” as from some really existing centre and foundation; that is to say, that some one body there is, which is *par excellence*, the Catholic body, from which the Anglican Church is separated, not by its own fault, but by some sort of moral compulsion.*

No one can help being touched and stirred by passages such as that which follows, in which the writer pleads for mutual prayers in confidence of what the end must be; and it is sad to have to sever the mere bare argument from the inspiring words with which it is connected, and even to seem to be insensible to the earnest piety which prompts such devout and ardent desires for Catholic unity,—perhaps it may relieve the apparent harshness of these remarks to say, that I have seen the eyes of Catholics glistening with pleasure and hopeful interest at the reading of this passage—but if his meaning be, as I have said, that there exists, yea, though it be but one spot—one point—amid the scattered fragments of Christ’s Church, where stands unmoved and unob-

* So at p. 8, he speaks of “the Church in England” having become “*divided from Catholic communion.*”

scured the *rock of Peter*, to which unity, perpetuity, immutableness was promised;* unless the cry which he puts up be that of an estranged and isolated Church, imploring to be restored and reconciled, both faith and love forbid that individual desires and regrets, however deep and urgent, can be admitted as a plea of justification from the crime of schism. Great indeed—it must not be concealed—is the danger and the fear lest Anglican High Churchmen should, by their very sympathy and regrets be confirmed in the schism which they deplore, and learn to perpetuate the very sin against which they pray; lest they should think to escape the guilt of schism by lamenting its existence. Mr. A.'s language is oftentimes ambiguous—owing probably to his attempt to combine two things which are incompatible, the unity of the Church with its (supposed) divisions, and the Catholicity of Rome with its (imagined) anti-christian usurpations—and I do not wish to press his words too far, or to twist them from their meaning;

* At p. 66, he says, that if “the Roman Church be so corrupt that it is not a part of the true Church”—“*then the promises of Christ have failed.*” What is this but to assert that the Roman Church is that which none other is—not a mere particular portion of the body, but the origin and foundation of the whole!

but occasionally it would seem as if he thought that, even if the position of the Anglican Church infringed an essential law of the Church's unity, it was cleared from the charge of schism, simply because it has put forth (as he conceives) no theory of unity contrary to what he calls the true one. If so, he fails to see that the question is not what is the *theory* of the Anglican Church, but what is its *condition*; and that to break unity—to infringe an essential law of Christ's kingdom—is not to hold a wrong theory, but to commit a sinful act—an act which excommunicates from the Catholic Church of Christ.

However, although Mr. A. may not hold that the Anglican communion is in a state of separation from the unity of the Church, yet unity itself he declares to be at present broken. That is to say, he declares that the One Church is no longer one; one it was, but one it does not remain; re-united it may be, but as it is, it is not one, but divided. The same unreality of view which permits him to regard the Roman Church as an integral portion of the Catholic body, while a lie is at the foundation of her doctrine, and the type of antichrist sits enthroned as her ruler, permits him also to suppose that the Catholic Church of Christ

consists of separated portions, divided to the four winds of heaven ;—that the state, not of this or that part, but of the whole, is a state in which an *essential* law of its unity is broken. Mr. A. is not one of those who avowedly construct a theory of unity, on which it is contended that the Church is still one, though divided ; he confesses that the unity of the Church is broken, by the breaking of an essential law on which it rested (comp. p. 173-4). And thus he thinks to defend the Anglican Church from the charge of having “ put forth ” “ a theory of unity ” “ over against the ancient theory, or the present Roman one.” But he must not so deceive himself. He does put forth a theory, novel in its view, Protestant in principle, and essentially opposed to that which is maintained by the present Roman Church. The Roman, or Catholic doctrine is, that the Church is one—*indivisibly* one ; that its unity is such that it not only *ought not* to be broken, but that it *cannot* be broken. The very notion, therefore, which he entertains of the possibility of unity being broken, is sufficient to show that he does not hold the Catholic doctrine, but an Anglican theory, which is—I speak advisedly—essentially and purely *heretical*. To hold that the unity of

the Church can be broken, or suspended, is to hold a heresy : it is to deny one of the articles of the Christian faith. Never could Mr. A. have asserted that an essential law of the Church's unity is at present broken, or that "the unity of Christendom is for a time suspended," (p. 199,) had he had a right conception of the Catholic idea of unity.

In the first place, to say that *an essential law of unity is broken*, is all one with saying that *unity is destroyed*. That which is *essential* to any thing—that which is *of its essence*—is nothing less than a necessary condition of its existence—something without which it ceases to be. If, therefore, an essential law of unity has been broken, unity is destroyed ; it exists no longer. And together with the unity of the Church, its *visibility* must have also perished ; for it is the *one* Catholic Church which is, and which only can be, the visible body of Christ—not many churches, or many separated members. This also Mr. A. allows, since he speaks of "waiting until God restore a *visible unity* to His Church." Although, therefore, according to his view, the component parts of the Church remain, it exists no longer as an organized body—"one organic whole ;" its corporate existence is destroyed ;

in other words the Church is itself destroyed. We do not consider an organized body to exist any longer, when the bond that held it together is dissolved, and it is reduced to its elements, or broken into fragments. The matter which composed it exists, but the body itself exists no longer. Mr. A.'s theory does in fact resolve itself into that which is held, unconsciously, it is true, by some, though consciously by all consistent Protestants; viz., that the oneness which is an attribute of the Church is only an invisible oneness, through the union of each member with Christ their Head. And this is made evident by a passage, already alluded to, in which he supposes "that the unity of Christendom may be for a time suspended, during which the several parts of Christ's Body retain communion with the one Head, and thence derive life, though active communion with each other is "suspended." This is the simple Protestant view, though the use of the word "*suspended*" indicates the regret with which he is obliged to have recourse to it. Avowed Protestants are far more consistent, since they believe not only that visible unity is a non-essential in the constitution of the Church, but that the Church was never more really and perfectly one than

it is at present ; and consider that the multitudinous sects which divide the Christian world present a perfect realization of the Divine idea, the members of the mystical body being united through the invisible bond of the Spirit of Christ. In their view no essential law of unity is broken, because the only unity in which they believe is in its nature invisible.*

Neither, according to the Catholic idea, can unity be suspended, any more than it can be broken. Actual *intercommunion*† between

* Thus in one of the resolutions passed by the "*Evangelical Alliance*," it is declared, "that the Church of the living God, while it admits of growth is one Church, never having lost, and being incapable of losing, its essential unity. Not therefore to create that unity, but to confess it, is the design of their (the members) assembling together. One in reality, they desire also, as far as they may be able to obtain it, to be visibly one."

† Mr. A. refers (p. 27) to the often quoted and as often refuted, instance of Meletius. On this subject, the "*Dublin Review*," December 1844, p. 464, remarks : "During the thickest part of the Arian controversy, there was a dispute for the bishopric of Antioch between Meletius and Paulinus, two orthodox Catholics.....Each party fancied there were sufficient reasons for throwing doubts on the orthodoxy of the opposite party.....At the same time a third person, Vitalis, an Appolinarian heretic, laid claim to the throne of Antioch. *All three claimants professed to adhere to the Roman Pontiff*.....For a long time it was impossible to know which party was favoured at Rome ; but the orthodoxy of Paulinus being fully established, the Church of Rome rejected the communion of the (supposed)

churches may, through external causes, be suspended; a church may be in a state of *material*, as distinguished from *formal* schism; but, in such cases, unity is not suspended, nor even strictly speaking, is *communion* interrupted. Unity is of the essence of the Church. In unity its life consists. If unity be suspended, life is suspended—nay, Christ, who is the Life, withdraws Himself, and his promise to be *always* with His Church has failed.

Arian Meletius. The friends of Meletius being still convinced of his orthodoxy, and as they conceived, of the heterodox tendencies of Paulinus, and having the very best reasons for believing that their enemies had grossly misrepresented St. Meletius, they naturally supposed themselves free from the obligation of complying with a decision palpably found on a visal error of *fact*. And no one questions that in so doing (abstraction being made of individual frailty) they were perfectly right; and that were it possible, which it is not, for similar circumstances to occur at the present day, Catholic bishops would be justified in acting as St. Basil did in support of St. Meletius. The party of St. Meletius never for a moment denied the supremacy of the Pope, but on the contrary moved heaven and earth to acquaint him with the real facts of the case, and to obtain a decision in his favour.....The dispute between Paulinus and Meletius was at length amicably terminated; and it was not till *after* this that St. Meletius was called to the Council of Constantinople, at which time he was in full communion with Rome. It is, therefore, utterly irreconcilable with fact to speak of him as a saint who lived and died out of communion with Rome." (See also Kenrick *on the Primacy*, pp. 104-107, and Ballerini *de Primatu*, pp. 448-470, the latter of whom enters at length into the subject of interrupted communion.)

But upon this subject it is unnecessary to enter. The simple truth is, that although Mr. A. uses the word "unity," "organized body," "organic whole," &c., he does not really hold the deep realities which the words express. The Church, in his view, is not one organic whole, but a combination of parts—a federal union of independent states, not a kingdom which is at unity in itself. The statement which he makes at the beginning of his work, (p. 17,) and upon which I have so often remarked, is expressly opposed to the Catholic doctrine, and inconsistent with the notion of organic unity. His theory* is that the epis-

* It is surprising that Mr. A. can imagine that the theory of unity which he maintains is identical with "*the present Roman one*," (p. 198,) since it is plainly no other than that which has been again and again of late opposed to the Roman view. See for instance the note to the Oxford Translation of *St. Cyprian's Treatises*, p. 150, and *British Critic Jan.* 1840, pp. 54-58. A writer in the *Christian Remembrancer*, October, 1846, in reviewing Mr. A.'s book, reduces the theory to its extreme conclusions, and must convince Mr. A. himself of its utter incompatibility with the Catholic doctrine. "Through this, (the divine equality of bishops) every small, poor, humble diocese is competent, if all the rest were swallowed up by physical ruin to refill the world. *Each Bishop is Bishop of the entire Church*; holds the full apostolic powers, &c.," p. 392, compare 379. Indeed Mr. A.'s own work contradicts his assertion, since his very object is to show that the "Papal Theory" is a "corruption of the whole constitution of the Church."

copal power is “sovereign and independent in every individual bishop;” and thus the Church, according to his view, is made up of the several independent sovereignties of individual bishops; every bishop is possessed of a power unlimited in its nature, and each is an independent centre of authority. The union of these several portions is really not an *organic*, but merely a *federal* union. He himself expressly declares that their tendency is not to unity, but to diversity; and that consequently “a preponderating influence” is required to keep them together, and sustain the balance of power. This influence is not divine. It has no inward living connexion with the body. Its seat is not within, but without. There is no centre of unity, no pervading uniting power of divine creation. In separating from each other the bishops of the Church do not break organic unity, but merely that which is *moral*; they *ought* to remain, (so to say) united—for in separating they disturb the peace and order of the Church—but each being his own centre, and complete in himself, they do not violate that which is of the essence of the Church’s unity.

This is why Mr. A. can talk of an essential law of unity being broken. Unity, with him,

is not an essential attribute of the Church, but merely a moral property, or an external law, by which the combined action of its several parts is regulated, and to which its general government is subject. This is why he conceives that schism does not ensue upon division, but only a suspending of communion. Schism, with him, is nothing positively affecting the ecclesiastical state of the Church which is guilty of it. The Church of England may be in a state which is an infringement of the primary law of unity; the Church of Rome may make a schism—such a schism as breaks “the one condition to which victory over the world is attached” (p. 174); yet neither Church be in schism. And so the whole Catholic Church, though “one organic whole,” may consist of separated and schismatical bodies, communicating, neither with each other, nor with any common centre or head!

What then on Anglican principles is schism? What is that sin which is inexpiable and heavy, and is purged by no suffering? (Comp. p. 10.) That individuals are schismatics in seceding from the communion of their bishop is granted on all hands. But can a *church*—can a single *episcopate* be in schism? Vain is it to seek an answer from Anglican High

Churchmen. Schism is ever in their mouths, but they never venture definitely to charge it upon the Church of Rome, although they indulge in rhetorical accusations against her. I cannot see why Mr. A. need, on his principles, be under any anxiety or alarm on the subject of schism; his theory denies the very possibility of its commission by any episcopal body. For if an usurpation, such in degree, and such in kind, as to be positively *anti-christian*—from which a schism has ensued, so complete as to “work the disunion of the universal Church,” (p. 195,) and to break the visible unity of Christ’s body; nay, so fatal in its consequences as to prostrate “not only the English and the Eastern Church, but the Roman also,” “fettered and powerless before the might of the world, and bleeding internally at every pore” (p. 173)—if even this has not involved in schism the Church which caused it—though it has to answer for its sin before Christ’s tribunal—what can?*

* While these pages are passing through the press, a writer in the *Christian Remembrancer* (January, 1847, pp. 202, 203,) furnishes another illustration of the above assertion, that, on the Anglican hypothesis, schism is nothing actually affecting the state of a Church which is guilty of it.

He argues that, allowing that the Anglican theory of the Church does not preclude the abstract possibility of

Mr. A.'s idea of Catholicity is as defective as his idea of unity. By the Church being Catholic, he means simply that it has actual possession in all parts of the world. "Grant," he says, (p. 199) "that the Roman commu-

its being divided into as many churches as there are dioceses, it is not, therefore, proved to be absurd, because such a result will in fact never actually take place. But when the very question is the truth or falsehood of an essential principle, it is no answer to allege the extreme improbability of its issuing in those practical consequences which are implicitly contained in it. The writer does not seem to see that a view of the Church on which such consequences are abstractedly possible, is inconsistent with the very *idea* of unity; that the *principle* of unity does not exist—the *basis* of unity is wanting.

The writer tries to show the irrelevancy of the *reductio ab absurdum* argument, as urged by Catholics against the Anglican theory, by applying it to the doctrine of the Papal Infallibility. But his application is incorrectly made. That the Pope should formally rule some erroneous doctrine is abstractedly impossible on the Catholic hypothesis, as possessing in himself the fulness of the Episcopate, an essential attribute of which is infallibility; it is irreconcilable with the primary idea, which is the ground of the Catholic doctrine. There is, therefore, no *reductio ad absurdum* in the matter: carry out the Catholic idea to its extremest conclusions, it is ever consistent with itself. Whereas, on the Anglican theory, "unlimited schism" is not only abstractedly possible, but involved in the elementary idea of the constitution of the Church;—its basis is not unity, but division.

It is observable throughout that the idea in the writer's mind is not that of schism and separation *from* the Church, but of dissension and division *in* the Church; the idea of schism, as such, he never entertains. The following very remarkable words contain his notion of schism and its

nion is one, but it is at the expense of ceasing to be Catholic : it has lost all the East, and the North, and part of the West.” As unity, with him, is mere union, so Catholicity is mere extension. He does not seem to per-

consequences : “ Every human being tends to diabolical and insane wickedness, if by saying so be meant that he has the beginning of that which, if followed out, would become so : but no one would say that an excellent religious man actually tends to such a character ; for there is not the remotest prospect, from the fact of his having evil in him, that he will become evil to that amount. In the same way there may be *a beginning of unlimited schism* in the Church ; but it does not at all follow from that, even in the way of the remotest probability, that such unlimited schism will ensue. There is a difference of degree, which is, for all argumentative purposes, a difference in kind : a difference of degree in which there is no actual sequence from the one extreme end of the series to the other extreme end. The Church ought by rights to be one external society ; if she is split up into two or three large branches, she is so far divided, and there is so far schism : the principle of unity is violated.” From these words it is plain that, in the writer’s mind, the result of schism is the *division of the Church*, not the self-excommunication of the offending party ; the consequences of schism fall upon the Church itself ; division ensues in the Church ; “ *the Church*,” he says, “ *is so far divided ;* ” “ the principle of unity is violated.” It is the Church that suffers, not the schismatical portion. Most true it is that schism, like every other sin, not only admits of degrees, but is different in kind, according to circumstances : it is a mortal or a venial sin, material or formal. But, according to this writer, schism is the sin of the Church, not of the separatists : it is not that the separatists are thrown by their sin into a state of spiritual loss and peril, and at length into a state external to Catholic

ceive that the Church is therefore Catholic, because wherever it extends it preserves its identity; it has the property of universal diffusiveness, and is the Church, not of this or that locality, nor of this or that nation, but

communion, but the Church is "split up," and so far approximates (however remotely) to dissolution.

It is extraordinary to what confused and illogical reasoning an attempt to defend an inconsistent theory commits an acute and vigorous mind. In the succeeding sentence the writer says that if division in the Church should grow "to such an extent" (which, however, he maintains to be impossible) "that no one single particle of the Church would cleave to any other"—in such case "the Church upon earth" would have "*evanesced*." But why so? If A, B, and C are still integral portions of the Church, though holding no visible communion with each other, nor with any other portion, why do they cease to be so, when all the remaining portions are similarly circumstanced? Why do they cease to be members of the Catholic body at the moment that the remaining members take up a similar position to their own? Upon what principle? What is it that constitutes the essence of schism? How evident it is that one who can so reason has never even mentally conceived the Catholic idea of unity. Schism, according to him, is not an actual disqualifying state external to the Church, but, on the contrary, unless the whole Church itself be broken up and destroyed, there can be no such thing as a schismatical church.

It need scarcely be observed that, however extensively schisms and separations may take place, it is not that the sin of schism itself becomes consequently greater in *degree*, but that the *instances* of its commission are more numerous. The degree of schism, if it be formal, is as great in one as in a thousand instances; and if it be not formal, no accumulation of instances can make it so.

of the universe. Protestants themselves bear unconscious testimony to this, when they call it everywhere, not only Catholic, but *Roman*. The Church of England, is the church of the English; the Eastern Church is the Church of the Orientals; the Church of Rome is the church of all nations, and people, and languages. But it is unnecessary to do more than allude to this part of the Catholic argument, as it has been admirably treated of since Mr. A.'s book appeared.* I will only further remark that the loss of Catholicity need be no greater difficulty to Mr. A. than

One only other remark suggests itself. The writer regards the Papal power as, on the Catholic argument, only "a means to an end, a practical instrument for making men keep a Christian ordinance—that of external unity." And he argues as if it had failed in its purpose, because schism had nevertheless ensued. According to the Catholic idea, however, the Papal power is not only a means of preserving *external union*, but the very foundation, root, and source of *essential unity*; so that, however numerous the instances of schism from the Catholic body, that unity remains intact; the Church is ever essentially and indivisibly one. And not only does the principle of unity remain inviolate, but to this day, as from the beginning, the Church of Christ has preserved its external visibility and completeness; the Church in communion with Rome, which is the See of Peter, is that Church: its visible union is but the expression of that indivisible and essential unity on which its existence is based.

* See Northcote's *Fourfold Difficulty of Anglicanism*. Letter VII.

the loss of unity. If the Church can dispense with *one* of the principal notes, by which she is known, and in which we express our belief in the creed, she may equally dispense with *any*; her Catholicity may be of an invisible kind, as Protestants conceive it to be; and her Apostolicity may be a mere following of the apostle's doctrine.

In short, the very fact of his supposing himself reduced to the necessity of choosing between Unity and Catholicity, is of itself a sufficient proof that he had never entertained the true conception of either. Had he been possessed with the true idea of the One Catholic Church, never would he have acquiesced in the miserable theory in which he has taken refuge; never amidst a choice of difficulties* would he have considered this as the

* Mr. A. argues (p. 199) that to believe that the unity of the Church remains to this day unbroken, is to "cut off not merely our own (Anglican) Church, but the seventy millions of the Eastern Church from the covenant of salvation." This, however, is not the case. As it is believed that the Eastern Church possesses the apostolical succession and valid sacraments, it is lawful to hold that the mass of the people, who are in *invincible ignorance*—whatever spiritual loss they may sustain in being members of a schismatical and unorthodox communion—do yet receive at least so much grace as suffices to save their souls, provided they correspond therewith, and live up to their knowledge and belief. Their responsibility and their

least—that the anti-christian usurpation and blasphemous doctrine of one part of the Church had absolutely forced not only another of its parts, which was free from those sins, but the

danger are in proportion to their means of information with respect to their ecclesiastical state, and such inward lights as God may be pleased to give them.

The case of the Anglican Church, it is true, is different, because there is the very strongest presumption—amounting indeed to a moral certainty—that Anglican ordinations are invalid and void of grace. But in any case it is no part of a Catholic's belief that those who die out of the communion of the Church are cut off from the covenant of salvation. The writer could adduce positive proofs to the contrary, and those taken not merely from prevailing opinion on the subject, but from actual authorized practices. The communion of the Church is the only ordained ark of salvation; but every individual who is (visibly) out of that communion, is not, therefore, out of a state of grace, however great his disadvantage and peril.

With regard to the general question: the Church is both one and Catholic, and cannot cease to be either. It may suffer external diminution or reduction; but itself will remain an integral and perfect whole. That portions should detach themselves on this side and on that—that large communities should maintain a separate existence—that offences should come, and schisms, and fallings away from the body, is no more than was predicted, and has taken place in every age from the beginning. The chosen people were as one among thousands. Of the twelve tribes ten revolted; of the remaining two only a remnant believed. In the days of Athanasius the world seemed to be not Catholic, but Arian. Even were the Catholic Church, therefore, the least communion in the world, were Catholics as few in number as were the Jews in proportion to the other nations of the earth, the terms of the creed would be as true as they ever were—

whole Church itself, to abandon an essential law of its being, and lose for a time its visible unity; i. e. in fact, both its unity and its visibility.

The most remarkable feature in the whole theory is its property of *self-destruction*. Mr. A. asserts the independent sovereignty—the unlimited power—of every individual bishop, and that of divine right; yet declares it to have been of necessity controlled and limited by a preponderating influence of mere ecclesiastical creation. And so, though he asserts the unity of the Church, yet he supposes it to be composed of elements which necessarily tend to diversity. Individual bishops, practically and in reality, neither did, nor could, exercise the independent power with which they are supposed to be invested. They never were, and never could be, what the theory supposes them. No sooner should they assert their divine rights, and act as independent sovereigns—each by himself bishop

the Church would still be both one and Catholic. Otherwise it were an argument against Christianity that millions of heathens have perished out of the covenant of salvation, and millions now exist in a like condition. What would Mr. A. say to one who brought a similar argument against the Church of England grounded on the existence of the many sectarian bodies with which it is surrounded?

of the entire Church—than confusion and disorganization would ensue throughout the system. And the more necessary he considers this preponderating influence to be, and the more nearly divine in its origin, the greater, necessarily, must be the dependence of individual bishops upon it, and the less right can they have to exercise their sovereign authority. The higher he exalts the patriarchal power—or by whatever name he designates the influence which was necessary for the control and harmonious action of the episcopate—the more he diminishes the independent authority of particular bishops. In fact the two things are incompatible one with the other; the theory from its inconsistency destroys itself.

Mr. A. asserts the supremacy of the episcopate, and the absolute authority of general councils; and yet he concedes to three great bishops the power of determining whether or no the decrees of the assembled episcopate shall be binding on the Church. All the bishops of Christendom united could not (on his view) define an article of faith, or enact disciplinary laws for the whole Church, without the concurrence, implied or expressed, of these three patriarchs. He declares that the authority of the respective patriarchs and me-

tropolitans within their own spheres of jurisdiction, was well understood and defined (p. 53); and yet concedes to the bishop of Rome a power over all peculiar in itself, and indefinite in extent (p. 18, comp. p. 110):

He declares (p. 19, comp. p. 47,) that a consciousness of some peculiar influence he was to exercise on the whole Church, seems to have possessed the Roman Pontiff, as from a living tradition which had thoroughly penetrated the local Roman Church—a consciousness which does not show itself here and there in the line of Roman Pontiffs, but which one and all seem to have imbibed from the atmosphere which they breathed. He is ever describing the providential exemption of the Roman See from heresy and schism, its immovableness and unerring orthodoxy, amid the confusion and violence that raged around, the high prerogatives which it was acknowledged to possess, the great deference paid to it, and the actual authority which it exercised, the unfailing support and protection which it afforded to the weak and oppressed—yet in what has it all issued? Let Mr. A. answer—in “plain and manifest usurpation,” (p. 188)—division—loss of unity—the establishment of a “spiritual monarchy,” which is “blas-

phemous and anti-christian.” Can a theory be true which thus contradicts itself? Not only has this “living tradition” been falsified—not only has it come to nought—but it has issued in the most disastrous consequences. It has been abused to the most frightful ends. Its wonderful and almost miraculous fulfilment in the history of the Church has only served to fix and perpetuate a terrible delusion. The primacy of Peter, whose successor the Bishop of Rome is acknowledged, in a special sense, to be—this very thing, which (whatever it be) was designed as the “great example, type, and source of unity,” has itself been the occasion of its breach, and reduced the Universal Church to a “state of schism,” which is “a frustration of the purposes of the Lord’s Incarnation.”

And this is the miserable belief which is to be substituted for the blessed article of the Catholic faith—the indivisible, indestructible oneness of the Church of Christ—that His promises have failed, the purposes of His Incarnation have been frustrated! This is the melancholy creed of Anglican High Churchmen—that the corruptions of the Roman Church and the usurpations of the Papal See have frustrated the purposes for which the

Only-Begotten Son of God came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man, and suffered, and was crucified ; and have prostrated the Church, His mystical Body, “fettered and powerless before the might of the world, and bleeding internally at every pore”!

But perhaps the confusion and narrowness of view for which the theory is throughout remarkable, is greatest, or at least most evident, as respects the general constitution of the Church, and its dependence on the patriarchal system. Let any one who firmly holds that “the Holy Catholic Church” is one of those essential verities in which is involved his everlasting salvation, consider well the following passages. At p. 48 Mr. A. speaks of it being a “*problem*,” “how to combine in the harmonious action of One organized Body those apostolical powers which resided in the bishops generally.” And afterwards (p. 100.) he says : “The combination of the patriarch’s, and still more of the universal primate’s, power with that of the bishop, is a *nice point*. If this be *pushed too far*, it issues in a monarchy : if the other alone be allowed, it converts the one kingdom of Jesus Christ into an unlimited number of petty republics. *On the*

one hand there is danger pregnant to the high priesthood of the Church ; *on the other hand*, to the sacrament of unity. The *one-sided* development of St. Leo's teaching has produced the papacy, in which the bishops, who represent the apostles, are no longer the brethren, co-ordinate in authority, but the delegates, of St. Peter's successor ; but the *one-sided* development of St. Cyprian's teaching has rent into pieces the seamless robe of Christ."—And this is the Anglican account of the Church of the Living God, which is the Pillar and Ground of the Truth, and the Habitation of the Eternal and Undivided Trinity ! It supposes that Christ left the Church which He originated, so constituted, or so situated, as to require to be upheld on either side by external aids—as though He withdrew Himself to a distance, and deprived the work of His own hands of His Presence and protection ; that the fabric of which the Son of God Himself laid the foundation-stone, and which He commissioned His apostles, through the aid of His Holy Spirit, to build up, was so frail and imperfect a structure, and based upon so insecure a ground, that it needed support and balance from systems of human contrivance.* It had

* Thus Mr. A. says, (p. 96,) that had not the system

not in itself the principle of coherence and continuance—that immovable Temple whose foundations were on a rock, which was to endure throughout all ages, and against which it was promised that the strength and malice of men and devils should not prevail ! It partook of the weakness and instability which is inherent in all human institutions and earthly states ; its tendency was to disunion, division, decay, ruin ; on either side it needed prop and counterpoise ; unable to sustain its own weight, it depended for its existence upon the nice adjustment of mutually repelling forces—“as a breach ready to fall, swelling out in a high wall, whose breaking cometh suddenly at an instant.” O miserable theory ! so derogatory to Christ’s Almighty wisdom, so delusive to all man’s hopes, and all his deepest needs ;—a theory in which the Church is the object not of his faith, but of his anxious fears, lest that on which he trusts should “be broken and be

of the Church been consolidated by St. Leo his immediate predecessor and successors, it “might have been dissolved and broken up into fragments.” Yet the power of the Pope, according to his view, was not of divine, but of ecclesiastical or human origin ! How much more consistent and pious is the belief that a power which was necessary to the “preservation and unity of the whole Church,” nay, its very existence, could be nothing less than an ordinance of God.

divided toward the four winds of heaven.” Surely Mr. A. cannot have reflected upon the purport, or the consequences of his own statements. Is this the realization of that great idea which inspired apostles even laboured fully to express, for which holy fathers searched Nature’s primest elements and deepest unities to discover analogies and images, and found its only counterpart—where the Lord Himself had pointed—in the Mystery of Mysteries, the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity? How evident is it that one who so conceives of the unity of Christ’s Body, and the sovereignty of His kingdom, has really never comprehended that great spiritual reality which is an article of the Christian faith.*

* The same merely *human* view of the Church is observable also in the notion which Anglicans generally entertain of its fallibility and proneness to degeneracy and corruption. Indeed, the one is the correlative and necessary consequence of the other. The Unity and Faith of the Church stand and fall together. If the principles on which the constitution and government of the Church are based tend to “diversity” and one-sided developments, the essential conditions on which the doctrinal system of the Church depends must also be liable to be disturbed and displaced. Accordingly, they who hold that the Church required from the beginning the intervention of some “preponderating influence” in order to preserve its objective unity, hold likewise that it has needed the continual application of some corrective and restorative process, in order to preserve the deposit of the faith from deterioration

Before I draw these observations to a close, it is necessary to notice a subject with which the argument has been improperly connected by Mr. A., and which is calculated, I believe, to confuse the real question at issue in the minds of his readers, and to lead them to adopt false conclusions in reference to it. I allude to the difference* between what have been

and exhaustion on the one part, and from excess and exaggeration on the other. And as they admit that the principle of unity may be violated and broken, and the Church be deprived for an indefinite period of its visible integrity, so also—and indeed it follows as an inevitable consequence—the Faith itself—that body of Divine Truth which constitutes the Christian Revelation—may become obscured, defaced, intermixed with error, disintegrated, and even in parts corrupted. Thus the objective unity of the Faith is lost; the authority of the Church destroyed; nay, in effect, the Faith of Christ and the Church of Christ exist no longer. Opinion, Individual Judgment, Self-dependence succeed; and an abstraction—Antiquity, for instance—is substituted for the Living Expositor and Teacher. The “Pillar and ground of the Truth” is broken, cast down, and removed out of its place: the very Spirit of Truth is despoiled of the organs of Divine utterance, and His ministry ceases from among men.

* It is surprising that any acute or fair-minded controversialist should persist in regarding the differences which have existed between Galicans and Ultramontanes, as differences of *faith*; and at the same time make it a matter of reproach against the Catholic Church, that she has never yet *defined* the points in dispute. Yet this is the strange inconsistency of which certain Anglicans are guilty. Is it that they do not understand the distinction between what is *de fide*, and what is not? (Certainly in the Anglican Church the distinction is not practically

called the Gallican and Ultramontane doctrines. On this subject Mr. A. observes, (p. 185) that “the Ultramontane theory alone has now life and vigour in the Roman Church, and that it seems to absorb into itself all earnest and self-denying minds;” “it alone has consistency and completeness; it alone is the adequate expression of that prodigious power which was allowed to enthrone itself in the Church during the middle ages.” Now even allowing this statement to be not overcharged, still that the theory in question involves points of doctrine which have never been formally ruled as articles of Catholic faith, all theologians (as I have before remarked) are of course aware. It is hardly necessary, then, to observe that as long as a doctrine has not been formally ruled and

made. There, as must be the case everywhere out of the communion of the Church, where faith is only opinion, every man’s opinion is his faith, and is as dogmatically maintained.) Or is it that they imagine that the Church is incapable of deciding the questions in dispute? Surely the Church is the best judge when a decision is necessary to the unity of belief. That she has not thought it necessary in the points alluded to is only another instance of her moderation and wisdom, of which the present state of opinion in the Church is a striking proof. If one mind has not prevailed, at least it may be fairly said that *contest* has ceased. On this subject Mr. Northcote has some useful remarks in the work before mentioned, pp. 34–5.

defined, it is considered lawful matter of speculative debate. And even though the mind of the Church should incline decidedly in one direction, yet a contrary assertion would not expose its maintainer to excommunication, or, perhaps, to open censure. If, however, the maintainer of any such opinion should perceive, that what he held led by clear and logical consequences to un-Catholic views, and conclusions repugnant to the decisions of the Church, and its received doctrines, then, although not liable to formal condemnation, yet before God and his own conscience, he would be amenable for the maintenance of an opinion really and consciously heretical. This may explain how what are called Gallican doctrines may have been held innocently, though erroneously, by some of the most zealous and orthodox champions of the faith, such as Bossuet; though now that the questions themselves have been brought more explicitly before the consideration of the Church, and the consequences which they involve are better understood, one may believe that, were the Church at any future time to pronounce an authoritative judgment, it would condemn certain propositions which they individually maintained.

With what justice, however, can any argument in the mouth of Bossuet be claimed in justification of the English Church? How can he be taken as a champion of the *Anglican liberties* at the present day, who, two hundred years ago, condemned the Anglican Church as schismatical and heretical, even on Gallican principles? Can anything be more certain than that that illustrious prelate would have rejected and abjured any opinion, the demonstrated consequences of which were such as Mr. A. maintains, and for which he has quoted the sanction of his justly celebrated name? Is it conceivable that Bossuet would have persisted in the assertion of a doctrine which was to justify separation, or non-communion with the Church of Rome, and rebellion against the authority of the Holy See? It may be that he failed to perceive, or to understand, the necessary connection of certain undefined doctrines with the formal articles of the faith; it may be that the opinions he advocated, and the statements he advanced, are irreconcilable with that which is now the commonly received doctrine of the Church, with respect to the Pope's prerogatives and his jurisdictional power over the universal Church. But it is preposterous to suppose, that he would

have persisted in opinions which were proved to issue in consequences doctrinally irreconcilable with what he asserts to be necessary articles of the faith, and practically destructive of the unity of the Church. The Gallican doctrines were undoubtedly inconsistent, and, so far as they were so, manifestly erroneous; and Bossuet, when supporting these views, must share the same censure, as Catholics will allow. Mr. A. also perceives this inconsistency, but draws from it a forced and unnatural conclusion; making the one illogical deduction and consequent error, of which Bossuet was guilty—at variance, as it really is, (though he perceived it not,) with the whole system of doctrine which he loved and upheld—the substance and ground of his faith; and considering that which was his real, intimate belief, and which approved itself to all his moral and intellectual faculties, as a mere extraneous prejudice and casual inconsistency. Can there be a doubt that, if the alternative could have been proposed to his mind, of rejecting, on the one hand, the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff, and the necessity of communion with the Papal See, or of admitting, on the other, the universal jurisdiction and infallibility of the successor of St.

Peter, he would have hesitated for a moment which to accept?

It is, in fact, very plain from Bossuet's own words that he misunderstood the views that were propounded by the opposite school, and supposed them to involve consequences which they do not. There is all the internal evidence that language can afford, that, had they presented themselves clearly to his mind, he would have explicitly adopted them, as they are implicitly contained in the doctrines which he held. For, let it be observed that, though Bossuet misunderstood what was involved in the ultramontane doctrines, and in this respect may have used language occasionally coincident with that which is used by Mr. A., it is plain that he entertained that idea of the Episcopate which is orthodox and Catholic, and which is totally opposed to the view which is advocated by Mr. A. If Bossuet rejected a truth which he did not understand, and which he could not reconcile with other portions of the Catholic scheme, he held no fundamental error, and set up no adverse theory. He may have supposed that the head and body *connected* possessed powers which the head did not singly possess; but he was as far as any Roman divine of the present day

from imagining that that body, *separated* from the head, had any rights or powers whatever, or was anything else but a schismatical assemblage. He may have failed to see that the head was complete, and could act without the body, but he never hinted at the possibility of the body acting without the head. Here lies the difference between the views of Mr. A. and those of this Catholic bishop. There is, in truth, the whole difference between them of a zealous defender of the Papal prerogatives, who pays implicit deference to the decisions of the Holy See, and maintains the necessity of communion with the successor of St. Peter, and an avowed impugner of his claims and authority, who disregards on principle his dogmatical decisions, and openly justifies a continuance in schism.

It is really incredible that any defender of the Anglican Church should claim the authority of this Catholic bishop and divine—so incredible, indeed, that the bare idea of such an attempt has been taken to express an extravagance upon which even Anglican temerity would not venture. “If Bossuet,” says a writer in the *Dublin Review*,* had lived at

* Dec. 1844, p. 479.

that period, (the period of St. Leo and the Council of Chalcedon,) Anglican controversialists would quote him now against doctrines for which he would gladly have laid down his life." One would have thought, indeed, that such an authority would have operated to the prejudice of the Anglican Church, not in its favour. For if he who was the persevering champion of the Gallican liberties, who contended for the personal fallibility of the Pope, and his inferiority to a General Council, regarded a church which sided with him in these points to be a schismatical and heretical communion, how much stronger ought Mr. A. to feel such a condemnation to be than that of an ultramontane! It is strange that any one should justify the Anglican Church in its separation from the communion of Rome, on the ground of doctrines and claims, which not only were not imposed at the time of the separation, but which still to this day have not been formally defined, and which divines of that very communion have denied and rejected, and yet have been reckoned amongst her ablest defenders. If Gallicanism was compatible with subscription to all the articles of the Roman confession, how was it that Anglicanism was not equally compatible, sup-

posing it such as Mr. A. asserts it to be? And how can the Church of England be said to have been forced into separation by the assertion of claims which the Church of France was not excommunicated for denying? If their cause was the same, how is it that the result was so different? Is it conceivable that the Church of England separated from all the churches of the West on a doctrinal difference, such as distinguishes the theology of Bossuet from that of Bellarmine—a difference upon which, to this day, the Church has never formally decided?

It is clearly false to make the question of schism, as respects the Anglican Church, rest upon the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility and universal jurisdiction. Since what it is necessary to show, in order to justify the Anglican position, is not that the head of the Church is incapable of acting without the body, but that the body is complete and independent of the head, and capable of acting alone. To prove that the Pope is not infallible, is not to prove that bishops are independent of him.

Neither let Mr. A. imagine that he has proved this latter point by the instances he has quoted of the independent acts of parti-

cular churches, and their opposition to the Pope. Opposition which presupposes the recognition of authority, whether such opposition be justifiable in the particular case or not, differs altogether in kind from that opposition and assertion of independence, which implies rejection of authority and defiance of its claims. Let any one candidly examine the very strongest protests quoted by Mr. A.—that of the African Church, for example—against the Pope's interference, and he must allow that the protest is not against the power itself, but against a particular exercise of it. The Church of England not only protested against the power itself, but renounced her allegiance, and made herself an alien and an enemy. There is no parallel, therefore, between the remonstrances—however strong and long continued—of churches which remain in unbroken communion with the Catholic body, and the hostile denunciations of a church in separation. The one is to *protest*, the other to *rebel*. How can Mr. A. say (p. 64), that the freedom of self-government, to which (as he contends) the African bishops maintained their right, “was *all* that the Church of England claimed?” Whatever claims the African bishops made, it was as members of the

Catholic body in communion with the See of Rome: they did not imagine to themselves the possibility of rights out of that communion. The rights of different churches are not their individual property, as separated from the body, but can be enjoyed only in that body which confers the rights and makes the laws. Once out of that body, the question of right ceases. The Church of England laid claim to rights such as in their nature severed her from Catholic communion—even of governing herself independently of the whole Western Church and the Papal See. She demanded—not what Mr. A., in the words of Bossuet (p. 94), says, the Church of France demanded, that “to the authority of Peter, i. e., of the Pope,” should be “added the authority and agreement of bishops also,” but—that the authority and agreement of the bishops of particular and separate churches, not united with the Pope, but separated from him, and opposed to him, nay, separated from, and opposed to all their episcopal brethren in communion with the Pope, should be independent and supreme. The very act of claiming and asserting this unheard-of right was virtually an act of separation from the communion of Catholic Christendom. It is trifling to urge

(p. 201), that “the Church of England has never rejected the communion of the Western” Church—i. e., has never rejected it by any formal declaration; and to throw back the charge upon the Church of Rome. The judgment of the whole Western, or, rather, the whole Catholic Church, in repelling her from communion, and treating her as schismatical, only declares her to be what she has made herself.

Neither can it be allowed that, if Mr. A. could even prove, what he has laboured to establish, that the body is independent of the head, the Church of England would be cleared from the charge of schism. As long as he allows that the Church is a visible body, an organic whole, or that schism is possible, it is incumbent upon him, not only to prove that separation under certain circumstances is excusable, but that, in this particular case, it is justifiable. Now, he will grant but one sufficient ground of separation, and that is the conscientious refusal to subscribe to a falsehood, or to admit a claim that is anti-christian. If, then, this plea be granted as a justification of the separation of the Church of England from Rome, he is still bound to account for, and to justify, her separation from the rest of

Christendom. Why is she not in communion with the Eastern Church? It is in vain to urge (p. 201), that the "Church of England has never rejected the communion of the Eastern Church, neither has the Eastern Church pronounced against her." If the case were as simple a one as Mr. A. would have it, and the Church of England separated from that of Rome purely on the ground which the East had ever maintained, why did she not find herself *ipso facto* in communion with the East, when the only bar of separation was removed? Is it conceivable that, after three hundred years, the two Churches should not have discovered that their cause was one? It is utterly futile to argue, as if difficulty of communication and want of mutual knowledge would satisfactorily account for this. Rather, is there not an instinctive feeling on both sides that communion is impossible? And is it not this very absence of communication which has caused their mutual anathemas to be rather implied than expressed? Can any one, for example, suppose that, should a large body of the Greek and Russian communion be settled and naturalized in this country, they could communicate with the Established Church? If they did so, is it not

a matter self-evident that their very act of communion with the Church of England would be an act of secession from their own? And, on the other hand, has it not been proved to a demonstration, that the members of the Anglican communion would not be received at the altars of the East?

Here then is a fresh fact to be accounted for—a schism between the Anglican Church and the Churches of the East; and the plea, whatever it may be, must be different from that which is brought forward to excuse division from the West. Where then does the fault rest in this case? It is a significant symptom against the Church of England that she should not be acknowledged by a communion which Mr. A. describes (p. 197) as possessed of “all which characterizes a Church.” “Here,” he says, (p. 194) “is the ancient patriarchal system.....here is the same body of doctrine, the same seven sacraments, the same Real Presence, the same mighty sacramental and sacerdotal system, which Latitudinarian and Evangelical, statesman and heretic, dread while they hate, as being indeed the visible presence of Christ in a fallen world.....There is no break in the descent or in the doctrine of the Eastern

churches. There is the same dogmatic, the same hierarchical fabric, subsisting now as when St. Gregory addressed Anastasius of Antioch, and Eulogius of Alexandria." Is it possible that the Church of England, if indeed she be what Mr. A. imagines, should not have humbly, earnestly, perseveringly sought communion with a Church described as so pre-eminently Catholic? And how is it to be explained that that Church should not by a natural affinity have recognised her sister in the faith, and joyfully welcomed her back from a long alienation under the anti-christian usurpation of Rome?

If the Anglican Church and the Eastern separated from the Roman not on a question of doctrine, but simply on that of the supremacy, their teaching on all points of faith ought to be identical. They would be manifestly one Church in faith and doctrine, which no one can pretend them to be. Moreover, Mr. A., after using the strong expressions which I have quoted, concerning the orthodoxy of the Eastern Church, asserts (p. 199, comp. p. 197) her "complete inward identity with the Roman," and declares that "all that was deficient" on the side of England "seems made up by the Greek Church." If then

there be a complete inward identity between the Eastern Church and the Roman; and the former has preserved both doctrine and discipline unbroken from apostolical times; and the points on which the Anglican Church differs from the Eastern are *deficiencies** on her part; how can Mr. A. escape the conclusion that East and West bear one united testimony against the changes in doctrine and practice introduced by the Anglican Church, at the time of her separation from Rome? Mr. A. wishes to separate the question of schism from that of heresy—and abstractedly they may be considered apart—but let it ever be remembered that where difference of doctrine is treated in any way as the ground of separation, the nature of that difference must materially affect the character of the act of

* But are these points mere deficiencies? Would it be possible to engraft or supply them? Is the Anglican system the Catholic in *all but* these particulars, or does it contain so much as the outline and groundwork of them? How extraordinary a delusion it is to imagine that the Anglican Church implicitly maintains, or does any thing but disclaim and deny, the doctrine of the ‘*Seven Sacraments*,’ “the *Priesthood*, and the pure unbloody *Sacrifice*, and the power to bind and to loose,” without which “the Eastern mind cannot conceive a Church,” (p. 196,) because some few among her members hold a private belief about them, or secretly observe practices which suppose them!

separation. Can any one read the history of the Reformation, or consider the doctrinal differences between the Church of England and the Catholic Church, and the controversies springing out of those differences continued to this day, and believe that the ground of the separation was the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility, or universal jurisdiction, and not rather that this was one among many grounds alleged in justification of her schism? Can any one believe that the claim of the English Church was "*precisely*" that of the African bishops already mentioned, or that "this was *all* that the Church of England claimed?" (p. 64.) Was it indeed all?—It has been constantly maintained by herself, and universally believed by all the world, that she claimed not only the right of self-government, but the right of *self-reformation*—and that in doctrine as well as discipline—a privilege which Mr. A. can hardly deny she unsparingly used. Does he really believe, that, were the Anglican Church convinced that the Pope did not claim the particular power which he considers anti-christian, and therefore sinful to admit, she would return to her allegiance, and gladly submit to the patriarch of the West? Does he really believe (p. 172) that the rulers

of the Anglican Church would willingly yield to the Pope the submission paid by the first Anglo-Saxon bishops; and "regard and honour the successor of St. Gregory with the same honour with which" the first "archbishops" of Canterbury and their suffragans "regarded the occupant of St. Peter's see? Is he serious when he asks, (p. 188,) "who then but will desire that the successor of St. Peter should hold St. Peter's place?" and—as if the question were an answer to itself, and the concession which it implies a very axiom in Anglican theology—exclaims, "Be this our answer when we are accused of not really holding that article of the creed, 'One Catholic and Apostolic Church?'" That this would be the answer of Mr. A., and of many earnest-minded men, whose opinions the Reformed Church of England, so far from adopting, notices only to disclaim, I do not question; but who can doubt what answer would be returned by the assembled House of Convocation with the Primate of Canterbury at its head; or what that answer would have been at any period in the history of that Church since the separation?

I must say, however, that it appears a hazardous kind of self-deception for any one

thus to stake his confidence in the Church of England on a fanciful test which can never be verified, and which, if it could possibly be applied, it requires but little knowledge of that Church to be assured she would not bear. Many, it is to be feared, satisfy themselves with a protest against some hypothetical act of heresy or schism, at the same time that they do not scruple to avow that they are thankful to Providence, that circumstances so fetter their Church, as to deprive her of the liberty and the opportunity of thus committing herself. That this is a most dangerous state of mind experience daily teaches, as it tends to impair the sincerity of their search after truth, and to diminish their readiness unshrinkingly to abide by it when discovered; for if we do not act upon the probable truth at which we have arrived, but are ever requiring further and more convincing demonstration, there is the greatest reason to dread lest our judgment should become darkened, and the light itself be at last hidden from our eyes. Year after year we find persons saying, that if the Church of England, or its rulers, should act in this or that way, their confidence would be utterly destroyed; or pointing to their having been hitherto restrained from this or that course

of conduct, as the ground of their retaining their confidence unshaken. And yet, when the very case occurs which they had declared would be decisive, we see them devising excuses to evade the force of their own conclusions, and putting off their final proof to some still future contingency, to be similarly dealt with (it is to be feared) whenever it occurs.

The same system of self-deception which enables persons, in the face of the plainest contrary facts, to persist in regarding the differences between Anglicans and Catholics, as involving no essential doctrinal point, allows them also to imagine that a real affinity, and even some sort of communion, exists between the Anglican and Eastern Churches, which, though not as yet expressed in any definite way, awaits only mutual explanations to be actively established; while common reflection might teach them the futility of such ideas and expectations. All this is self-deception, because based upon hopes and desires, rather than upon reason and probability. It forms part of that web of delusion in which many have been for a time detained, while struggling after truth, and to their escape from which they look back with thankfulness, and with fear lest others should become so en-

tangled therein as never to be able to extricate themselves.

The relation of the Anglican Church to the other schismatical bodies bears to the mind of a Catholic full testimony to the truth of the claims of his own Church. The Eastern Church, inasmuch as she still testifies to many Catholic truths which the Anglican has rejected, recoils with instinctive repugnance from communion with her. And can it be said, that the Anglican Church has any real difference of feeling? To make common cause with the Churches of the East would suit a theory, and make her feel more respectably supported against Rome, and she strives, therefore, to forget what in consistency she should consider superstitions and corruptions, and to overlook what, if she holds the articles of her creed, she should denounce as heresy. Removed far from each other, and seldom coming in contact, the two communions may be said *actively* neither to love nor to hate. But can it be a question which of these two feelings a nearer approach would develope?—And thus it must ever be with schismatical bodies. They agree only to differ from the Catholic Church. In other respects they may in a sense be considered as even further re-

moved from each other, than from her. If bitter hostility is their position towards their common mother, cold antipathy is their feeling towards their companions in rebellion. They can never unite. They are incapable even of desiring union. They feel not—they cannot feel—the true yearnings after mutual communion which can be felt only in the bonds of Catholic unity. To unite once more, to love once more, they must return to that one Church, where is the centre of unity, and, therefore, the bond of charity.

Though it is foreign to my object to enter upon the question of the Eastern Church, yet as Mr. A. brings its state forward as a remarkable testimony to the truth of his theory, I cannot leave the subject without distinctly noticing—what I have hitherto only casually adverted to—the heresy which it has obstinately maintained from the very commencement of the schism. Independently of the notorious fact to which I refer, they who are better acquainted than I can pretend to be, with the doctrinal as well as the practical condition of the Eastern Churches, confidently deny Mr. A.'s assertion of their complete orthodoxy and inward identity with the Roman. And the accounts which are given by

the best ecclesiastical historians of the origin and course of the schism, plainly contradict the notion which Mr. A. has adopted, that the separation took place purely on the ground of the Papal Supremacy ; as if, no sooner was it asserted and claimed, than the Christians of the East pronounced it an usurpation, at once refused submission, and have ever since persevered in maintaining a firm, consistent protest. Again and again* has it been shown

* This subject is ably treated in the article in the *Dublin Review*, which has been more than once alluded to, on "*The Papal Supremacy anterior to the Division of the East and the West*," pp. 475-487.

The assertion commonly made by Anglicans, and repeated by Mr. A. p. 196—that the Russians were converted to the faith by the Greeks of Constantinople, *while out of communion with Rome*, has been often noticed and disproved by Catholic writers. (See for instance, *Dublin Review*, February 1843, pp. 227-229 ; Butler's *Lives of the Saints*, July 24 ; and *Persecutions et Souffrances de l'Eglise Catholique en Russie*, pp. 175-177.) The real facts seem to be, 1. That the conversion of the Russian nation took place in the interval (A. D. 870—1053,) between the reconciliation which followed the temporary separation caused by the ambition of Photius, (A. D. 861,) and the consummation of the schism by Michael Cerularius. 2. That intercommunion between the Church of Russia and the Holy See, continued with occasional interruptions even to the fifteenth century. In A. D. 1415, there was a division in the Russian Church, part adhering to the Latins, and part falling off to the Greeks. In 1439, immediately after the Council of Florence, a re-union between the two portions was effected, which lasted only twenty-four years. And finally, in

that this is an assumption which the facts of history disprove, though Mr. A. treats the matter as one about which there was no question. That the usurpation and tyranny of Rome should be a watchword in the mouth

1520, the whole of Russia revolted from Catholic communion.

It thus appears that the saints to whom the Church of Russia gave birth during the preceding centuries were *Catholic* saints. And even allowing that certain of them lived at times when communion with the Papal See was interrupted or temporarily broken, yet (as Alban Butler remarks, with reference to their case,) Pope Benedict XIV. proves that, upon due authority, sanctity and miracles may be admitted even of those who have died in *material* schism, or in *inculpable ignorance*.

But let those who cherish a theory about the Church of that empire read the description of its religious and ecclesiastical condition, which is given in the French work above mentioned. A very slight perusal will make the most confiding theorist suspect, if not acknowledge, that such a Church gives but faint promise of "beating back the tide of heresy and infidelity from the beleagured sees of the East"—a Church which is the helpless victim of despotic power, straitened within the limits of the imperial sway, and as impotent as it is careless about elevating and extending itself beyond—a Church which in fact has no being and no name out of Russia, and whose efforts after conversion have a mere political object, and are carried on only by the aid of the secular arm, and the arts of intimidation and seduction. Boasting of toleration, the Church of Russia so far exhibits it as to leave undisturbed every form of heresy and unbelief with which that vast empire abounds, while it actively persecutes the Catholic Church alone, and punishes conversion to her from its own communion as a crime against the religion of the state;—nay, if by any means it can seduce from the faith a Ca-

of all schismatical bodies, and a constant plea of self-justification, is not surprising; but it is not, therefore, true that it has ever been the real ground of separation in any case. Degeneracy and corruption had eaten deep into

tholic bishop, it immediately treats as apostates all those of his flock who refuse to conform.

Mr. A. says (p. 193) that "the See of Constantinople still remains where the Council of Chalcedon placed it," &c.; but what jurisdiction, what influence even, has the patriarch of Constantinople over the hierarchy of Russia?—as much as he has over the Czar, or the Sultan himself. How then can the Church of Russia be said to bear witness to the patriarchal system when it has not only disowned the authority of Constantinople, to which it was originally subject, but since the reign of Peter I. has possessed no patriarch whatever, and (to use the words of the writer alluded to) has substituted for an ecclesiastical primate "an institution borrowed from Protestantism"—a National Synod?

Mr. A. continues: "The See of Constantinople still remains where the Council of Chalcedon placed it, where the Emperor Justinian recognised it to be, the second See of the world: and it has ever since refused to admit that Rome was *first* in any sense in which itself was not *second*." Now the fact is, that the Eastern separatists—though they may maintain that such, subsequently to the Council of Chalcedon, was the relation between the patriarchate of Rome, and that of Constantinople—from the commencement of the schism down to the present time, so far from acknowledging Rome to be first in any sense, maintain that she has fallen from her dignity, nay, from Catholic communion.

And this suggests a very important observation with respect to the ground of separation of the Eastern Church from the Catholic. As it has been remarked above, the Papal supremacy *as such* was neither the real ground,

the heart's core of the Eastern Church before she raised her voice against the supremacy of Rome ; and, ere her sin was consummated, to the guilt of schism was added the taint of heresy—and heresy upon no less momentous

nor even the ostensible plea : *the Eastern Church never protested against a central supreme and sovereign power.* When Michael Cerularius consummated the schism which had long been preparing, and for which the debased mind of the Greek Church was already ripe, he did not venture to assert—what would have appeared too preposterous in the face of the traditions and practice of 1000 years—the usurpation on the part of Rome of the supreme sovereign power. A formal declaration of heresy, followed by a decree of excommunication of the Pope and the whole Western Church, was published in the church of St. Sophia. There was no attempt to deny the existence of a central power of government in the Church ; there was no protest, as Mr. A. seems to suppose, (p. 194) “against the *monarchical* as distinct from the *patriarchal* power,” and in favour of the independent rights of the episcopal body. This would have ill suited the ambitious projects of the Constantinopolitan patriarchs, who for centuries had been labouring to subvert the ancient rights of the thrones of Alexandria and Antioch, and to become universal patriarchs of the whole East, and would have been as much opposed to the designs of the imperial despots, anxious to elevate in the first instance the ecclesiastical position of the bishop of their capital, only that they might thence be able more surely to domineer over the Church, and make the spiritual power the slave of the temporal—the constant policy of tyrants, of which Russia with its ephemeral patriarch of a hundred years, and its present enslaved “Holy Synod” which is a mere tool in the hands of the Czar, furnishes an exemplification. There was no such attempt, no such protest. The pope was declared to have fallen from, and forfeited, his dignity. The leaders

a subject than the unity of the Godhead in the Persons of the Undivided Trinity. Thus, if the Eastern Church testifies, as she assuredly does, against the Anglican in that body of true doctrine which she has retained, and which the latter has rejected, the Anglican, on the other hand, testifies (in terms at least) against the Eastern, in that she still holds the

of the schism maintained that those who sat in the Papal chair were traitors to faith, heretics, and unworthy to occupy it. Such was the plea. The real cause is plain from history. The patriarchs of Constantinople had long been seeking the aggrandizement of their see, supported by the emperors for the obvious reasons which have been mentioned. The growth of this power the Popes had opposed and retarded, seeing in it the germ of future evil. Having now, however, obtained the second rank by a tardy concession of the Roman See, the patriarchs of Constantinople coveted the first. The Pope alone stood in the way of the universal dominion to which they aspired. It was for this cause really that they sought pretexts of difference; it was for this that they brought accusations of heresy against the chief See, and proceeding boldly to pronounce it *together with the whole Western Church in communion with it* as fallen from the faith, they remained, as by a necessary consequence, with the whole East which they had brought under their jurisdiction—the Orthodox and Catholic Church, to the exclusion of the rest, and they themselves the heads of that Church. The judgments of God which so soon fell upon that devoted city, it is true, chastised their arrogance, and swept away the mighty fabric of their ambition, but it is not the less evident from history that such were their real views and motives. (See *Persecutions et Souffrances*, &c., pp. 106, 178.

Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son. In respect to Rome the Eastern Church is Protestant, as is the Anglican, though the matter of her protest differs; she protests that Rome has added to the sense of Scripture, and defined what the word of God has not defined. Together they witness against each other and against themselves; and bear unwilling and unconscious testimony to the One unchanging and immutable Church.

It is a melancholy and condemnatory symptom in the theology of Anglican controversialists that there has ever appeared a disposition to gloss over and make light of this fatal defect in the creed of the Eastern separatists, so different from the acute sensitiveness which has ever distinguished the true Church in her contact with heresy. The main reason which may be assigned for this indifference, even in the case of those who are sincerely earnest in their zeal for orthodoxy, appears to be this—that, whatever detached truths heretical bodies may retain, yet not holding the faith as a *whole*, they cannot estimate or discern the analogy of its several portions. If, therefore, a doctrine seems to have no very important practical results, its probable, nay, its certain connection with other truths, and with all truths, is not

perceived, and the doctrine itself, even when held in words, is neither justly valued, nor zealously defended. In this particular instance it ought to be matter of anxiety to Anglicans—as it is of interesting speculation to all who wish to gain a deeper knowledge of the truths of their holy religion—whether there be not some close discernible connection between the heresy which rejects the Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, and that which misconceives the essential Unity of the Church. The doctrine of “the Holy Catholic Church”—it need not be said—is intimately involved in that of “the Holy Ghost ;” may it not be impossible, therefore, to hold either aright where belief is defective respecting one or the other? The true organic and indivisible oneness of the Church (as has been implied throughout) is but the expression and the type of the Unity of the Godhead and the Indivisibility of the Three Divine Persons. If, then, the existency of Him Who is ever represented as the Breath of the Power of God, the Living Bond, the Pure All-pervading Influence, be misconceived; if it be denied, or not believed and confessed that the Holy and Life-giving Spirit of God proceeds eternally from the Son—from Him who is the Express Image of the

Father and the Word made flesh—God manifest in the flesh—may it not be impossible to conceive aright of the unity, visibility, and indivisibility of the Church, which is the Body of God's Son, and the habitation of His Spirit?

And this, then, is the true ground on which the matter rests. The question at issue between the Catholic Church and all separated bodies is not a question of speculative theology, or a thesis of debate between differing schools, or conflicting parties. It concerns the articles of the faith; it lies deeply at the foundations of a Christian man's belief. The doctrine of the Supremacy is not a question of right or usurpation, of disputed power, or a papal prerogative more or less; neither is it a matter of mere historical comparison between earlier and later systems, or forms of government. Viewed in its source and primal element, it involves the doctrine of the Unity of the Church; nay, it involves by implication the fundamental mystery of the Undivided Trinity. To treat it as of less moment is to take but a shallow, superficial view of the doctrine itself, and of the relation which it bears to the primary truths of Revelation. This, and nothing less than this, is the point at

issue; and on no lower ground will the Church—in which Peter still lives through his successors, and still maintains the faith which he first confessed—discuss or place the matter. Unity, as she conceives of it and exemplifies it, is *essential* unity, of which the great archetype and divine original is the Unity of the Godhead. There is One Episcopate, One Catholic Church, as there is One God in Three Persons.

My object in these pages has been simply this:—To suggest an idea; to show something of its inward completeness and consistency; and to trace it from its original and elementary form to its more perfect development in the life and condition of the existing Church; and at the same to exhibit the weakness, incoherence, and thorough one-sidedness of the common Anglican theory as maintained by Mr. A. I have endeavoured to show that the general members of his argument are mutually incompatible and destructive of each other, and that his theory of unity—so far from being, as he supposes, identical with the Roman, or Catholic, doctrine—is essentially opposed to the great spiritual object which the creed of the Church proposes—one organized body, one and indivisible. Though occa-

sionally expressed in orthodox terms, and coincident in parts with the ancient faith, it possesses in fact only an apparent, not a real identity therewith, and obscures and falsifies the truth which it seems to declare. This is the conclusion which Anglican High Churchmen are bound to confront. The question is fairly before them. The Church is in the midst of them. Her voice is no longer faintly heard in desolate and secret places, but calls to them from the house-tops, and her form is all but visibly revealed in the streets and lanes of the city. She tells them with a firm and loving voice—in tones as full of anxiety for men's souls, as they are clear and peremptory in witnessing to the one only true unchanging faith—that they are fighting against the truth which they think they are defending, and violating the unity of Christ's body while deprecating and condemning the guilt of schism. On every side are heard earnest voices, saying that faith is impossible except in the Catholic Church; that Anglicanism, as such, is a fatal heresy touching the essentials of salvation; that it puts an abstract Catholicism in the place of the Catholic Church; makes it a thing of past time, instead of an ever subsisting reality; deprives it of its utterance, its autho-

rity, even its visible existence ; dissolves the very groundwork of all positive teaching ; robs faith of its object, and simplicity of its guide, and obedience of its director ; sets men up to be judges of truth, instead of teachable children ; imposes upon them the task of informing their instructor, infusing life into their parent, *Catholicising* that body, which in terms they confess to *be* the Catholic Church—as from some superior and external source residing in themselves—and of investing it with such a character and power as shall make it in the end a safe and practical authority ; leaving, meanwhile, the little ones of Christ to invent their own rule, and to frame their own creed, as though it were a matter of nice calculation between fallible and erroneous systems, what each should adopt on the one side, and reject on the other : in short, that it maintains the very evils which its own defenders so unsparingly denounce—“destroys dogmatic faith altogether,” “breaks up the visible unity of the Church of Christ into a multitude of atoms,” and substitutes “the confusion of Babel,” for “the unity of Pentecost.” (p. 55.)

This is the charge ; and being such, it cannot be too strongly stated. Earnest minds which love the truth, and are ready to sacrifice

everything for its sake, will bear to have it plainly spoken. Men who feel that Christianity is a Revelation from God, and that the work which Christ wrought on the earth was a perfect work, and the faith He delivered a definite faith, and the Church He established an indefectible Church, must be wearied with a state of controversy, and doubt, and speculation, as being irreligious and unchristian. They must be suspicious of every new theory which is propounded for the purpose of reconciling the nationality of the Anglican Communion with the idea of Catholicity, and the notion of a divided Church with the doctrine of its visible and essential unity. Such as these I would earnestly entreat to consider the Catholic idea of the Church. Whatever difficulties they may experience at present respecting particular doctrines and practices, they cannot fail to perceive that that idea is complete and comprehensive, while the Anglican is inconsistent and self-contradictory. Now, of the truth of a doctrine there can be no proof more conclusive than that of its inward completeness. Falsehood may exhibit on the surface an apparent consistency, but inconsistent, at least, the truth cannot be. They, therefore, who are intellectually convinced that the argu-

ments which are commonly alleged in defence of their position, are weak and inconclusive, and that the theories which Anglicanism obliges them to substitute for the simple Catholic idea, though ingeniously compacted in parts, are incapable of general application, and composed of irreconcilable elements—nay, involve principles which are merely Protestant, heretical, and even immoral—are bound in all honesty to abandon a system so manifestly false, and to pass into that which, so far at least, carries with it the evidence of truth, as it is consistent throughout and perfect as a whole.

This, in itself, is sufficient to form ground of conviction, and to impose a corresponding obligation. What stronger moral evidence can they need, or what clearer intellectual proof do they think they will attain, so long as they stand investigating from without? They have already all the demonstration which is ordinarily compatible with their state. If there be a vast system of manifold and complicated action, the application to which of one great simple principle supplies the interpretation of all its combined and apparently contradictory movements, reducing all to perfect harmony, accounting for all anomalies, and showing that which seemed exceptional

to be subject to a general law ; and if, on the other hand, all other principles fail in their application, and require the help of arbitrary suppositions in order to meet the difficulties which they are inadequate to explain—such a principle as the former has in its favour all the moral evidence, and carries with it all the force of conviction, which alone is attainable while viewing the system from without. If, in the case of natural phenomena, we consider such evidence as not only sufficient, but even irresistible, are not they reprehensible who, in spiritual matters, refuse their assent to analogous proof, and require such demonstration as it is vain to expect and presumptuous to await ? May they not be bringing upon themselves the awful rebuke of our Lord to the unbelieving Jews, “ Ye can discern the face of the sky, and of the earth : but how is it that ye do not discern this time ? yea, and why *even of yourselves* judge ye not what is right ? ” (Luke xii. 56, 57.)

Only let them act in this as they act in common matters, as they would have those act whom they believe to be dissenters and schismatics, and they will accomplish by faith what they will never arrive at by reasoning alone, though they spend their life in the endeavour. To the assurance of conviction God,

in His mercy and for Jesus's sake, will add the grace of conversion ; and all their moral being will be at unity with itself. Wondering in themselves how their deliverance was wrought, so strange beyond all that they expected, they will feel that, while consciously but following the conclusions of their reason, or the suggestions of their conscience, and exerting the power of their own will, they were being guided and led forward by a Hand Invisible. With awe they will perceive that what seemed to them the last concluding step in a continuous self-directed course, was indeed an act of Divine power and mercy, by which they were lifted up and transported into another and a higher sphere. As they look back, and try to recollect the point far beneath them in the distance at which their foot last rested, they will see that, between it and the eminence on which they stand, there exists no mere natural connexion ; that something has supervened—something of the Eternal and the Infinite—so imperfect were their perceptions, so inadequate their motives, as compared with all that experience now shows them of the glorious objects, to which they had thought themselves so close. I speak not now of the ineffable gifts of God, the graces of His holy sacraments,

the treasures of His indulgent love, the powerful advocacy of His Saints, or the miraculous signs that still follow them that believe, nor of the peace of conscience, the confidence of hope, the satisfaction of desire, with which experience of the Church's supernatural power and wisdom will fill and enlarge their hearts. I speak of the assurance of faith which will be theirs in the presence of an authoritative teacher, and the possession of the key that lays open the secrets of heavenly knowledge. They will find themselves in a region reaching up into infinity, on all sides boundless and immeasurable; where is the widest compass for thought and amplest freedom of speculation, yet where all is fixed, solid, indestructible;—a land of beautiful and rich variety, where, as the eye becomes accustomed to the marvellous and hallowed light, far-reaching vistas at every step disclose themselves, and glimpses still appear of glorious things beyond, and every minutest and remotest point is found by contemplation to contain a world of objects, each in itself again a very universe, and all harmoniously combined in perfect unity—a region in whose pure heavenly atmosphere heresy cannot live,* but “goes out,” as being

* Mr. A. (as do Anglicans generally,) compares the schisms and apostasies *from* the Church, of which France

not of it, making itself manifest of what sort it is ;—a country whose language is Truth ; where words express realities, not of the traditional past or the imaginary future, but the actual and substantial present ; where teaching is one, and belief is one, as the Truth is one

at the revolution, and Germany recently have been the scene, with the divisions, and heresies, and open denials of the faith, which prevail *within* the Anglican communion. Surely the two cases are as strongly opposed to each other, as unity is opposed to schism, or faith to apostasy. The Anglican Church stands condemned, not because heresies take their rise from within her, but because she has neither the power nor the will to cast them off. Within the communion of Rome,—heresy cannot subsist. “The ‘obscene rout’ of Ronge and Czerski,” (to use Mr. A.’s expression, p. 199.) are “*without*” the walls of the holy city, where are “dogs and sorcerers,” self-ejected, self-excommunicated. To broach heresy was, as they knew, to be at mortal enmity with that Church which is the guardian of God’s truth. Yet a respectable writer in the “*Christian Remembrancer*,” (July 1846, p. 68,) can say, “It is *within* the pale of the Church of Rome, that this new religion has first *gained* a name and a *habitation*.” Were those within the Church of whom St. John said, “they went out from us ?” That particular churches, so far as they are particular and local, may be guilty of unfaithfulness and lukewarmness, and so provoke the wrath of God, no one can doubt who remembers the warnings to the seven churches in the Book of Revelation, or who recalls the fact that the English Reformers had been members of the Catholic body. But that infidelity should prevail in France, and rationalism in Germany, is no more a reproach to the Catholic Church in these latter days, than was Arianism, or any other form of blasphemy and unbelief to the Church of the earlier ages : nay, than was the impiety and apostasy of the Jews to the Lord of life and glory whom they crucified.

—where are to be heard ten thousand voices speaking one thing, ten thousand organs of the same Divine mind and the same infallible judgment—in short, where the words of the holy Apostle are still fulfilled, and can never fail in their fulfilment: “One Body, and one Spirit; one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all, Who is above all, and through all, and in all.”

Almighty and everlasting God, whose judgments are righteous and counsels unsearchable; who visitest the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation, and yet at length rememberest mercy; forgive, we beseech Thee, the sins of our forefathers, and turn away thy wrath from their posterity; deliver the ignorant from being seduced by false teachers, and the learned from being abused by their passions, and the whole nation from the spirit of contradiction, licentiousness, and discord; that instead of so many divisions and changes in religion, under which they labour, they may be again restored to that unity of mind, steadiness of faith, and tranquillity of conscience, which is no where to be sought but in the communion of thy Church, nor possible to be found but by the conduct of thy grace. Through our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.

APPENDIX.

THE case of St. Cyprian falls under so many heads, and seems to illustrate so many points of the preceding argument, that it requires to be noticed by itself. As, however, it has been again and again explained, nothing more is necessary than to indicate the true answer to the objections which are made by Mr. A., and refer to the writers who have so fully treated of the matter.

Mr. A. endeavours (p. 28) to weaken the force of St. Cyprian's words respecting the authority of the Roman See, and its right to receive appeals, by urging that "the cause of his vehement indignation" against Felicissimus was, that he "had ventured to appeal to Pope Cornelius, when his cause had already been heard and settled by St. Cyprian at Carthage." To this argument Mr. Husenbeth has sufficiently replied in his "*Vindication*," (p. 56.) "Does then St. Cyprian utter a syllable of disapproval of appeals to Rome? Certainly not.

He censures indeed the audacity of the schismatics in appealing to Rome ; *not opposing the principle of appeal in itself*, but because it was arrogant presumption to appeal *in their particular case*. They had been so decidedly condemned by their provincial bishops, that it was most audacious to approach that Holy See with their fallacious letters, which was not to be imposed upon by any perfidy. St. Cyprian moreover infringed not, in the slightest degree, the privilege of Rome, when he proclaimed the principle, founded on plain justice, and sanctioned, as he says, by all bishops, *statutum ab omnibus nobis*, that every offender should be tried where his offence was committed. And as these men had been condemned by the competent authority of a provincial synod, he very properly protests against their unwarrantable appeal from its decision."

Again, (p. 35) Mr. A. prints in italics a passage from St. Cyprian, in which he uses strong expressions concerning the rights of bishops. "For no one of us sets himself up to be a bishop of bishops, or by fear of his tyranny compels his colleagues to the necessity of obedience, since every bishop according to his recognised liberty and power possesses a free choice, and can no more be judged by another, than he himself can judge another. But let us all await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who singly and alone has the power both of setting us up in the government of His Church and of judging our proceedings." Upon these words Bishop Kenrick remarks: "Were these words

taken as they sound, they would suppose each bishop absolute and independent, whereas all antiquity attests that the action of individual bishops may be directed and controlled by synodical enactments—not to speak at present of the authority of the Holy See—and that delinquents may be removed for mal-administration or misconduct. St. Cyprian, then, cannot be thought to declare the absolute independence of each individual bishop. He himself had solicited the Pontiff to remove Marcian from Arles, and he had approved of the deposition of Basilides made in a Spanish council. The liberty which he claimed was in matters *not decided by the supreme authority of the Church*, as St. Augustine understands him. He stated with complacency that neither he himself, nor any of his African colleagues acted as bishop of bishops, because all were willing to allow a difference of sentiment and practice in the matter of baptism, which they did not conceive to interest *faith*, and which they referred to divine judgment.” *On the Primacy*, p. 116.

Again Mr. A. says. (p. 41.) referring to St. Cyprian and St. Firmilian: “If his (the Pope’s) decision was final, must they not have known it? If his primacy involved their obedience, must they not have rendered it?” “The answer is obvious,” replies Bishop Kenrick, “because he (St. Cyprian) believed that Stephen rashly employed his authority to proscribe a practice intimately connected with the unity and sanctity of the Church. Respectful remonstrance is permissible when authority is inju-

ditionally exercised, and resistance itself is justifiable, when power is abused to the prejudice of truth and piety. Cyprian felt that to acknowledge the baptism of heretics, was virtually to sanction heresy, by communicating to an adultress the inalienable privileges of the pure Spouse of Christ; and resting on her acknowledged unity, he rejected the pretensions of every other body. Stephen relied on ancient usage and tradition, and proscribed the novel usage, and the decree made in its support: but *he did not issue a formal definition of faith.*" *Id.* p. 117.

The sum of the matter seems to be, that whatever faults St. Cyprian and St. Firmilian may have committed in this matter—and Catholics are in no way called upon to justify them—it cannot be inferred from their opposition that they did not consider communion with the Roman Pontiff to be necessary in matters of faith. It is true that the question did in fact involve a point of faith, as became evident afterwards, and St. Stephen with that marvellous instinct which distinguished St. Peter's successors, felt its importance, and therefore enforced his command with a threat of excommunication, (though no proof exists that he ever proceeded to put it into execution; indeed St. Augustine seems to say that he did not,*) still he did not think fit to pronounce any doctrinal decision, though he enjoined the continuance of the ancient practice.

Catholics do not hold that opposition to the Pope is in itself, and in all cases, a schismatical act, even

* See Ballerini, pp. 160, 224-5. Husenbeth, p. 103.

though it be of a very censurable kind. To constitute the guilt of schism, it is necessary that a person should knowingly resist the Pope when pronouncing a dogmatic decision, as head and supreme pastor of the Church. There are a number of secondary truths involved in the essential articles of the faith, which are not obviously contained in them, but have to be developed from them. With respect to these, it has been the practice of the Church, previous to pronouncing definitely upon them, to allow them to be revolved in the minds of her children, and made the subject of discussion to and fro. In due time, when the matter has come to be more fully understood by them, and its connection with the primary articles of the faith more exactly ascertained, and made manifest, the Church makes her voice to be heard, if necessity require, in the form of a dogmatic decree, which henceforth obliges the belief of the heart, and the profession of the mouth. In the interval, while it is the subject of discussion, the Church, as a jealous guardian of the Truth, watches over the debate, checks it when it becomes dangerous, and issues prohibitions, or makes regulations, which, although they may serve as intimations of what her decisions on the subject would be, are not to be regarded in the light of definitions of faith.

Now of this nature was the prohibition of St. Stephen in the question of rebaptizing. He did not pronounce a doctrinal decision, but issued a command—*nihil inovetur*; in disobeying which St. Cyprian and his colleagues were not formal schis-

matics. They believed that the practice enjoined involved consequences which St. Stephen did not perceive; and believing this they speculatively erred, and rashly, and it may be intemperately, persisted in their error. But their whole language and conduct show that they believed themselves to be only opposing the judgment of the individual, and not the formal decision of the sovereign Pontiff. The experience of many ages, it is true, has proved that the Church may place far higher confidence in the deliberate judgment of her chief Pastor in what manner soever expressed, and such want of respect for his judgment could hardly take place at the present day, without involving much more wilfulness and presumption than it need be supposed to have done in them; but abstractedly the matter remains the same, and nothing is strictly binding on the Church but a formal decision.

The question of rebaptizing was one upon which there had not yet been a decision of the Church. Upon this ground it was that St. Augustine (as Mr. A. observes,) apologized for St. Cyprian's conduct. That he was in the wrong he acknowledged; that his fault may have been great he does not deny; but he maintains it was not such as to hurt his sanctity, and if he had in this respect any need of purification, he was cleansed by the glorious scythe of martyrdom. He had not broken the unity of the Church, nor resisted its authority. How then can St. Augustine be taken as a testimony against the Pope's supremacy? The Pope had made no formal decree; had he done so, would not St. Augus-

tine have pronounced it sufficient, as he did in the case of Pelagius? Not one word did he utter to the disparagement of the Papal power. As a matter of fact it was commonly the judgment of the Church in council which gave a final decision in any disputed question; and it was a council which had actually decided in the matter of rebaptizing. The power of the Pope was not the point in dispute; how then can St. Augustine's silence on the subject be taken as an evidence against the supremacy? St. Augustine is maintaining the authority of the Church: he nowhere definitely states that a council of bishops possess the supreme authority in contradistinction to the Pope. That a question is not formally and finally decided until the *Church* pronounces upon it, no Catholic denies; but the voice of the Pope solemnly giving judgment and declaring that judgment final, is in fact the voice, not of an individual bishop or patriarch, but of the supreme visible head of the universal Church. St. Augustine in declaring the Church to possess the plenary power, no more distinguishes the episcopal body from the Pope, or opposes the one to the other, than he excludes the Pope from a general council, properly so called. To argue, as Mr. A. does, that, because St. Augustine speaks of the authority of the whole Church, and not of the authority of the supreme Pontiff, *therefore* his words contain a denial of the Papal supremacy, is to set in opposition to each other two powers which are in fact identical. Such opposition is founded on a misunderstanding of the Catholic idea of the Episcopate.



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